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Abstract
This work aims at addressing two critical security issues residing in the physical layer of wireless
networks, namely, intelligent jamming and eavesdropping.
In the first two chapters we study the problem of jamming in a fixed-rate transmission system
with fading, under the general assumption that the jammer has no knowledge about either the
codebook used by the legitimate communication terminals, or the source’s output. Both transmitter
and jammer are subject to power constraints which can be enforced over each codeword (peak) or
over all codewords (average). All our jamming problems are formulated as zero-sum games, having
the probability of outage as pay-off function and power control functions as strategies. We provide
a comprehensive coverage of these problems, under fast and slow fading, peak and average power
constraints, pure and mixed strategies, with and without channel state information (CSI) feedback.
Contributions to the eavesdropping problem include a novel feedback scheme for transmitting
secret messages between two legitimate parties, over an eavesdropped communication link, pre-
sented in Chapter 4. Relative to Wyner’s traditional encoding scheme, our feedback-based encod-
ing often yields larger rate-equivocation regions and achievable secrecy rates. More importantly,
by exploiting the channel randomness inherent in the feedback channels, our scheme achieves a
strictly positive secrecy rate even when the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the legitimate
receiver’s channel.
In Chapter 5, we study the problem of active eavesdropping in fast fading channels. The active
eavesdropper is a more powerful adversary than the classical eavesdropper. It can choose between
two functional modes: eavesdropping the transmission between the legitimate parties (Ex mode),
and jamming it (Jx mode) – the active eavesdropper cannot function in full duplex mode. We con-
sider two scenarios: the best-case scenario, when the transmitter knows the eavesdropper’s strategy
in advance – and hence can adaptively choose an encoding strategy – and the worst-case scenario,
vi
when the active eavesdropper can choose its strategy based on the legitimate transmitter-receiver
pair’s strategy – and thus the transmitter and legitimate receiver have to plan for the worst. For the
second scenario, we introduce a novel encoding scheme, based on very limited and unprotected
feedback – the Block-Markov Wyner (BMW) encoding scheme – which outperforms any schemes
currently available.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
As the title suggests, the present dissertation is focused on the physical layer security in wireless
networks. The concept of communication security is linked to two main desired features. The first
of these is the system reliability, which means that a certain message (encoded for transmission and
transmitted over a wireless channel) intended for a specific user (or “legitimate receiver”), should
be reliably received by that user. In practical terms, the legitimate receiver’s decoding error should
satisfy an acceptable specification. The “enemy” of system reliability is called a jammer. The
purpose of a jammer is solely to disrupt the process of communication by increasing the legitimate
receiver’s probability of decoding error, and/or by causing “reliability outage”.
The second of the desired features is message secrecy, which means that under certain con-
ditions, a transmitter may want to communicate a secret message to a legitimate receiver. The
“enemy” of message secrecy is called an eavesdropper. The sole purpose of an eavesdropper is to
listen to the transmission, and try to understand the secret messages encoded therein.
In this dissertation, we treat the issues of security at the physical layer of the Open Systems In-
terconnection (OSI) reference model. Although throughout the following chapters we may some-
times specify simple protocols pertaining to upper layers, our main focus will remain on channel
encoding and power allocation.
In the next two sections we provide a series of brief comments about the evolution and the main
ideas behind system reliability and message secrecy.
1.1 Jamming in Wireless Networks
The problem of jamming in wireless networks started to attract interests in the 80’s when several
works [3, 4] studied simple, point-to-point communication systems affected by intelligent jammers,
as shown in Figure 1.1. The jammer was assumed to have access to either a noise-distorted version
1
of the transmitter’s output [3], or the transmitter’s input message [4]. The jamming problem was
formulated as a two-player, zero-sum game, with the mean-squared error of the decoded message,
relative to the transmitted message, as objective. 
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FIGURE 1.1. A simple point-to-point jamming problem.
The saddle-point policy of the jamming game formulated in [3] consists of an amplifying trans-
mitter and a jammer that performs a linear transformation of the transmitter’s output signal. A de-
terministic problem (shown to display no saddle point) and a probabilistic one are investigated in
[4]. It is interesting to note that for the probabilistic formulation, the saddle point is attained when
the jammer ignores its information about the transmitter’s output. Similar results were obtained
in [5] for correlated jammers suffering from phase/time jitters at acquisition or at transmission.
Again the jamming problem was formulated as a game, but this time having the channel capacity
as objective function.
Relatively few papers on this subject followed until lately, when several extensions to more
complex, multi-user channels with fading were derived in [6–10]. It is shown in [7] that, in the
absence of channel state information (CSI) at both transmitter and jammer, an equilibrium point is
obtained when the jammer completely ignores its information about the encoder’s output.
Broadcast (BC) and multiple access channels (MAC) are investigated in [8] under the assump-
tion of complete CSI and uncorrelated jammer. The sum-rate is used as objective of the jamming
game for the broadcast channel scenario, while this role is played by an arbitrary weighting of
the user’s rates for the MAC. Proofs of existence of multiple Nash equilibria and conditions for
uniqueness are provided. Similar results for the multiple access channel are presented in [9]. The
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paper covers all possible cases in terms of CSI and correlation of the jammer with transmitter’s
output, for a two-transmitter, one jammer scenario.
The general tendency seems to be in favor of an assumption that the jammer has access to either
the transmitter’s output or input and consequently is able to produce correlated jamming signals.
Uncorrelated jammers are often studied only as particular cases of the more complex correlated
jamming scenarios.
Most of the recent works [7, 9] that study the jamming games in fading channels focus on
fast fading, and consequently adopt the ergodic capacity as objective of the game. An interesting
point of view is expressed in [11], where the jamming problem is differently viewed as a special
case of an arbitrarily varying channel. The capacity (when it exists) and λ-capacity (maximum
transmission rate that guarantees a probability of error less than λ) are given for both peak and
average power constraints, under random coding.
1.2 Eavesdropping in Wireless Networks
The pioneering work in message secrecy at the physical layer belongs to Wyner [12]. In 1975,
Wyner shows that physical layer secrecy is possible without the use of a secret key. The concept
of wire-tap channel is introduced by [12] for the first time. The wire-tapper is a particular form of
eavesdropper, with the specific characteristic that the wire-tapper’s channel is a degraded version
of the legitimate receiver’s channel, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
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FIGURE 1.2. Wyner’s wiretapper channel.
The secrecy, or “equivocation” is defined as the wire-tapper’s conditional entropy (or uncer-
tainty) of the secret message, given its own received signal. Unlike the previous cryptographic
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approach to message secrecy, which assumes that the eavesdropper is unable to solve certain com-
putational problems, Wyner’s information-theoretic secrecy guarantees the privacy of the transmit-
ted message at the physical layer, without any assumptions on the wire-tapper’s capabilities. In that
sense, physical layer secrecy is the strongest form of secrecy available to communication systems.
It is shown in [12] that for any discrete channels, the secrecy rate is given by the supremum
over all possible input distributions of the difference between two information quantities: the mu-
tual information between transmitter and legitimate receiver, and the mutual information between
transmitter and wiretapper.
The generalization to the case when the eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily a degraded
version of the receiver’s channel (hence the introduction of the term “eavesdropper”) was tackled
in [13], in the extended context of a broadcast channel, where secret, non-secret and common mes-
sages need to be communicated. The achievable secrecy rate is shown to be always positive only
if the legitimate receiver’s channel is in a certain relationship with the eavesdropper’s channel.
In [13], this relationship was first denoted by saying that the main channel is less noisy than the
eavesdropper’s channel. It is also notable that the results in [13] imply that when secret messages
are transmitted to the legitimate receiver at a rate arbitrarily close to the secrecy capacity, no com-
mon message (i.e. a message intended for both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper) can
be successfully transmitted.
However, the results of [13] are mainly formulated in terms of single letter information mea-
sures, which means that for finding the secrecy capacity of a specific eavesdropper channel, one
would have to perform a functional optimization over at least one probability distribution. This is
why we should recognize the importance of more recent works, which elaborate the generic re-
sults of [13] for special, widely used channel models. For example, [14] shows that for any pair
of discrete channels of which the eavesdropper’s channel is more noisy in the sense of [13], the
secrecy capacity equals the difference between the receiver’s and wiretapper’s channel capacities.
4
An extension to continuous alphabets appears in [15], which uses similar techniques as [12] to
prove that the same result holds for Gaussian wire-tap channel.
A geometrical interpretation of the encoding technique used in [12], [15] for achieving the se-
crecy capacity is shown in Figure 1.3 for Gaussian channels. To understand this description, the
reader should already be familiar to the geometric interpretation of the channel coding theorem.
 
Cluster of coset 
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noise sphere 
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FIGURE 1.3. Achieving the secrecy capacity of an eavesdropped Gaussian channel.
In Figure 1.3 a randomly generated Gaussian codebook is divided into equivalent subcodes (or
bins). The transmitter encodes the secret message into the indices of the bins formed in this in way.
A codeword belonging to the chosen bin is picked randomly and transmitted. This corresponds to
randomly picking one of the clusters shown in Figure 1.3, and transmitting the corresponding bin
representative belonging to this cluster. Note that for high-dimensional codebooks, the equiparti-
tion characteristic of Figure 1.3 holds with high probability.
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Note that the noise sphere (represented for convenience as a hexagon in Figure 1.3) of the legiti-
mate receiver permits the asymptotically perfect decoding of the transmitted codeword. Thus, both
the chosen bin (bearing the secret message) and the randomly picked cluster are available to the
receiver. If the “radius” of each cluster is picked such that it equals the eavesdropper’s noise sphere
“radius”, then the eavesdropper’s noise sphere centered around the transmitted codeword contains
a bin representative from each bin. Therefore, from the eavesdropper’s point of view, all secret
messages are asymptotically (as the codeword length approaches infinity) equally likely. More-
over, the eavesdropper cannot even be certain about the cluster to which the transmitted codeword
belongs, and thus no common message can be transmitted while aiming for the secrecy capacity.
A different scenario is that where the secrecy constraint is abandoned in favor of a common
message [13], [16]. This scenario is depicted in Figure 1.4). A similar representation can be found
in [16]. Note that the cluster to which the transmitter codeword belongs can be identified by the
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FIGURE 1.4. Transmission of common and private (although not secret) messages.
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eavesdropper. The common message can thus be encoded in the centers of the clusters, while the
legitimate receiver’s private message can be encoded in the indices of the bins, as before. However,
the receiver’s private message is not perfectly secret to the eavesdropper. For instance, given its
observation, the eavesdropper can compute a short list of possible transmitted codewords. Note
that although we represent the two encoding schemes in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 in a similar way, the
two encoding techniques are fundamentally different. An example of the confusion arising from
the similar geometric interpretation is the wrong encoding scheme of [2], which is discussed in
Chapter 5.
In order to achieve a positive secrecy rate, the receiver’s rate has to be decreased [13], as shown
in Figure 1.5). The “short list” of possible transmitted codewords that is computable by the eaves-
dropper has to contain a representative of the bin corresponding to each secret message.
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FIGURE 1.5. Achieving a positive secrecy rate in the presence of common messages.
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Just like the case of jamming problems, the concept of eavesdropping had escaped much atten-
tion for several decades until lately, when security issues have become one of the biggest concerns
in wireless networks. The flexibility of these networks amounts to a greater risk, but also creates
the optimal environment for multiuser defense strategies.
A recent attempt to extend the eavesdropper problem to Gaussian multiple-access wire-tap chan-
nels (with and without fading) can be found in [17], [2]. In [17], the secrecy is defined in two dif-
ferent ways: individual (which means secrecy is preserved for each user even when the other users
are compromised), and collective (when all users are supposed to trust each other and achieve a
larger overall secrecy rate).
A different multiuser approach [18] investigates the eavesdropper scenario where the transmitter
can request the help of a trusted relay node. The relay can either send independent codewords in
order to confuse the wiretapper (“noise forwarding”), or forward quantized versions of its noisy
observations of the transmitter’s signal to the destination (“compress and forward”). However,
sometimes the relay may not be fully trusted with the secret message. The scenario where the
relay needs to be kept from learning the secret message, but at the same time can still be used for
enhancing communication reliability is discussed in [19].
A different direction in the fight against eavesdroppers, arising from the field of cryptography,
is encryption by means of a secret key. For wireless environments, the secret key needs to be
generated by using the available resources, and in the presence of the eavesdropper. Significant
contributions in this direction were brought in [20], [21]. The main idea behind the secret key
generation process is that the legitimate parties take advantage of some form of “common ran-
domness”. Such randomness could be provided if all terminals decode (with errors) a sequence
of random bits, as for example those transmitted by a satellite at a very low signal to noise ratio
(SNR) [20]. A multi-step protocol is presented in [20], which is designed to put the eavesdropper
at a disadvantage, and thus to make possible the agreement upon a secret key.
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FIGURE 1.6. General framework.
More recent works, like [22], [23], [24] or [25] have been focused on ergodic-fading eavesdrop-
per channels. Although achievable secrecy rates and the benefits of noise injection at the transmitter
are discussed by [22], the secrecy capacity of fast-fading eavesdropper channels remains unknown.
A secrecy capacity is derived in [23], for a modified channel model, which assumes that the ergodic
fading is slow enough to be considered constant for extremely long intervals, each of which may
therefore accommodate an entire codeword. Similarly, [24] and [25], treat the fading broadcast
channel with confidential messages as a particular case of parallel AWGN broadcast channel with
confidential messages.
Slow fading eavesdropper channels with delay constraints have been investigated in [26] and
[27]. Since under block fading (when the channel state information is not available to the trans-
mitter in a non-causal manner) one cannot guarantee either the secrecy or the intelligibility of the
secret message, these works evaluate system performance by quantities like the outage probability
(referring to intelligibility outage), combined with the probability of secrecy outage.
1.3 The Big Picture
This dissertation represents the first and most fundamental steps towards creating and developing
a framework in which the eavesdropping and intelligent jamming problems are intertwined. As a
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general scenario, we envision a wireless network with nodes of similar capabilities, where nodes
may create alliances aimed either at sharing confidential messages in the most efficient way, or at
eavesdropping and disrupting an enemy alliance.
The first type of alliance, or the “legitimate users” are fully aware of the existence of enemy
alliances (or simply “enemies”). As a consequence, they attempt to find and implement optimal
strategies against both eavesdropping and jamming. On the other hand, the enemies may collabo-
rate in order to obtain as much information about their opponents as possible, and to use it in an
optimal manner for disrupting the communication.
A very general description of our model is depicted in Figure 1.6. Note that while the enemies’
primary purpose is to eavesdrop and/or jam the legitimate alliance, they may find it optimal to
communicate to each other by sending and receiving “legitimate” messages. In turn, in addition to
communicating legitimate messages, the legitimate users could attempt to intercept and, once the
enemies have been identified and labeled, even disrupt the communication between them.
We begin the present dissertation by a separate treatment of the jamming and the wiretapping
problems. An application-oriented scenario for uncorrelated jamming is first investigated in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. The outage probability is adopted as an objective function, over which the transmitter
aims at minimization and the jammer aims at maximization by selecting their respective optimal
power control strategies. We provide a comprehensive coverage of the problem, by studying multi-
ple scenarios: fast and slow fading, peak and average power constraints, pure and mixed strategies,
with and without channel state information (CSI) feedback.
For the eavesdropping problem, we bring some improvements to the present state of the art,
by developing a novel scheme that can guarantee strictly positive secrecy rates even when the
eavesdropper’s channel is better than the legitimate receiver’s channel. A particular implementation
of the scheme for binary symmetric channels is presented in Chapter 4.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we make the first steps towards the joint jamming and eavesdropping prob-
lem. For the first time in the related literature, we consider the scenario of an “active eavesdropper”
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whose purpose is to decrease the achievable secrecy rate of a pair of legitimate users. We show how
an active eavesdropper can seriously degrade the achievable secrecy rate over a fast fading chan-
nel, and we provide an ingenious sequential secrecy scheme that can significantly ameliorate these
effects.
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Chapter 2
Jamming in Fixed-Rate Wireless Systems with Power
Constraints - Part I: Fast Fading Channels
2.1 Introduction
The importance of designing anti-jamming strategies cannot be overstated, due to the extremely
wide deployment of wireless networks, the very essence of which makes them vulnerable to at-
tacks. Although the bases of jamming and anti-jamming strategies have been set in the 80’s and
90’s [3–5], new interest has been recently generated by the increasing demand for wireless security.
Jamming and anti-jamming strategies were developed for the broadcast channel [8], the multiple
access channel [9], and even studied from the perspective of an arbitrarily varying channel [11].
Under all scenarios, the jamming problem is formulated as a two-player, zero-sum game. The cor-
responding objective functions are the sum-rate [8], the ergodic capacity [9] or the λ-capacity [11].
Although most often the jammer is assumed to have access to either the transmitter’s output or
input [3, 5, 10] and consequently is able to produce correlated jamming signals, the correlation as-
sumption can only be accurate for repeater protocols, or other situations where the jammer gets the
chance to jam a signal about which it has already obtained some information from eavesdropping
previous transmissions.
The approach of [11] is quite relevant to our work. The jamming problem is viewed as a special
case of an arbitrarily varying channel (AVC). Constraints are placed either on the power invested
in each codeword (peak power constraints), or on the power averaged over all codewords (average
power constraints). The λ-capacity, which is used to evaluate system performance, is defined as
the maximum transmission rate that guarantees a probability of codeword error less than λ, under
random coding. It is shown that when peak power constraints are imposed on both transmitter and
jammer, the λ-capacity is constant for 0 ≤ λ < 1, and therefore is the same as the channel capacity.
No fading is assumed in [11], and consequently no power control strategies are necessary.
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Fading channels are often the more practical models for wireless applications. Traditionally, fast
fading channels are characterized by their ergodic capacity, which is completely determined by
the probability distribution of the channel coefficient and the transmitter power constraints. The
physical interpretation of this measure of channel quality is related to the capabilities of channel
codes. In the fast fading scenario, the codewords are assumed long enough to reveal the long-
term statistical properties of the fading coefficient (in practical systems, this requirement may
be satisfied by the use of interleaving [28]). Implicitly, power constraints are imposed over each
codeword. Therefore, for achieving asymptotic error free communication, all codewords need to
be transmitted at the same rate not exceeding the channel’s ergodic capacity.
However, applications like video streams in multimedia often require fixed data rates that could
exceed the channel’s ergodic capacity, but can tolerate non-zero codeword error probabilities.
Therefore, in situations when the transmitter’s available power is not sufficient for supporting a
certain rate for each codeword in the traditional framework, the transmitter can choose to concen-
trate its power on transmitting only a subset of the codewords, while dropping the others. This
maneuver ensures error free decoding of the transmitted messages, at the cost of a non-zero prob-
ability of message decoding error, which is feasible when power constraints are imposed over the
ensemble of all codewords, instead of over each single codeword. This justifies the evaluation of
fixed rate systems in fast fading channels by a quantity that is best known to characterize slow
fading channels: the outage probability. Note that unlike the case of slow fading, in fast fading
channels, due to the large codeword length, the channel conditions affecting the transmission of
different codewords are asymptotically identical.
In this chapter, we consider a fast fading AWGN channel where codewords (we denote the span
of a codeword by the term frame) are considered long enough to reveal the long-term statistical
properties of the fading coefficient. Our channel model is depicted in Figure 2.1. It was shown in
[29] that the ergodic capacity of the fast fading AWGN channel can be achieved by a constant-rate,
constant-power Gaussian codebook, provided that when the fading coefficients are available at the
13
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FIGURE 2.1. Channel model
transmitter, the transmitter employs a dynamic scaling of the code symbols, by the appropriate
power allocation function. For this reason we assume in out model that the transmitter uses a
capacity-achieving complex Gaussian codebook. The jammer is assumed to have no knowledge
about this codebook or the actual output of the transmitter, and hence its most harmful strategy is
to transmit white complex Gaussian noise [30].
The channel coefficient is a complex number, the squared absolute value of which will be de-
noted throughout this chapter by h. The average powers invested by the transmitter and jammer in
transmitting and jamming a codeword, respectively, are denoted by PM and JM . The transmitter
and the jammer are subject to either peak power constraints (over each frame, or codeword) of the
form PM ≤ P and JM ≤ J , or average power constraints (over all frames) of the form EPM ≤ P
and EJM ≤ J , where the expectation is taken with respect to the players’ strategies of allocating
the powers P and J between frames.
A codeword is decoded with strictly positive probability of error (i.e. outage) if the ergodic
capacity calculated over the frame is below the fixed rate R. The probability of this event (the
equivalent of λ in [11]) will be denoted as the probability of outage Pout. The transmitter aims at
minimizing the probability of outage for a fixed rate R, while the jammer attempts to maximize it.
Our contributions can be summarized as below:
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• We first investigate the scenario where full channel state information (CSI) is available to
all parties. For this case we show that peak power constraints are not efficient for high rate
transmissions or large jammer power;
• We formulate the scenario of average transmitter/jammer power constraints as a two-person,
zero-sum game with the probability of outage as the pay-off function.
• Under average power constraints, we first investigate pure strategies and find the maximin
and minimax solutions, as a result of two levels of power control: one within frames and one
concerning the additional randomization introduced by the transmitter. Optimal strategies
are derived for both levels, and it is shown that a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies does
not exist in general.
• As a result, we investigate mixed strategies and find the (unique) Nash equilibrium by solving
a generalized version of a game that was first discussed by Bell and Cover [31] and then
extended by Hughes and Narayan [11].
• Finally, for comparison purposes, we find the optimal transmitter and jammer mixed strate-
gies for the case when the receiver does not feed back the CSI. Our results show that CSI
feedback only brings slight improvements in the overall transmission quality.
One comment is in order. Note that Nash equilibria of mixed strategies are not always the best
approach to practical jamming situations. An equilibrium of mixed strategies usually assumes that
none of the two players knows exactly when or with what power the other player is going to trans-
mit. While this may generally be true for the legitimate transmitter, a smart jammer might con-
stantly eavesdrop the channel and detect both the legitimate transmitter’s presence and its power
level. Therefore, many real jamming scenarios might be more accurately characterized by the solu-
tions of the maximin problem formulation with pure strategies when the jammer tries to minimize
and the transmitter tries to maximize the objective, and the solutions of the minimax problem
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formulation with pure strategies when the jammer tries to maximize and the transmitter tries to
minimize the objective (the latter case applies to the present chapter). At worst, these solutions
provide a valid lower bound on system performance.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 formalizes the peak power constrained problem
when full CSI is available to all parties. It turns out that this problem has an intuitive solution. Un-
der the same full CSI assumption, Section 2.3 studies the problem of average power constraints and
pure strategies, and is divided into three subsections. The first one presents the optimal strategies
for allocating power over one frame. Using the results therein, the maximin and minimax solutions
are derived in Subsection 2.3.2. Some numerical results are shown in Subsection 2.3.3. Section
2.4 investigates the problem of full CSI, average power constraints and mixed strategies and pro-
vides the Nash equilibrium point. The scenario when the channel coefficients are only known to
the receiver is investigated in Section 2.5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6.
2.2 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with Peak
Power Constraints
This game represents a more general version of the game discussed in Section IV.B of [9], and its
solution relies on the results therein. The transmitter’s goal is to: Minimize Pr(C(P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to PM = Eh[P (h)] ≤ P , (2.1)
while the jammer’s goal is to: Maximize Pr(C(P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to JM = Eh[J(h)] ≤ J , (2.2)
where
C(P (h), J(h)) = Eh
[
log
(
1 +
hP (h)
σ2N + J(h)
)]
.
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is the ergodic capacity, which is completely determined by the p.d.f. of the channel coefficient p(h)
and the transmitter/jammer power control strategies P (h) and J(h). The expectation is defined as
Eh[f(h)] =
∫
h
f(h)p(h)dh.
We prove that this game is closely related to the two player, zero-sum game of [9], which has
the mutual information between Tx and Rx as cost/reward function:
Tx
 Maximize C(P (h), J(h))Subject to PM ≤ P , (2.3)
Jx
 Minimize C(P (h), J(h))Subject to JM ≤ J . (2.4)
This latter game is characterized by the following proposition, proved in Section IV.B of [9]:
Proposition 2.1. The game of (2.3) and (2.4) has a Nash equilibrium point given by the following
strategies:
P ∗(h) =

[
1
λ
− σ2N
h
]
+
if h < σ2Nλ
1−σ2Nν
h
λ(h+λ
ν
)
if h ≥ σ2Nλ
1−σ2Nν
(2.5)
J∗(h) =
 0 if h <
σ2Nλ
1−σ2Nν
h
ν(h+λ
ν
)
− σ2n if h ≥ σ
2
Nλ
1−σ2Nν
(2.6)
where λ and ν are constants that can be determined from the power constraints and [x]+ =
max{x, 0}.
The connection between the two games above is made clear in the following theorem, the proof
of which follows in the footsteps of [32] and is given in Section 2.7.
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Theorem 2.2. Let P ∗(h) and J∗(h) denote the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game described
by (2.3) and (2.4). Then the original game of (2.1), (2.2) has a Nash equilibrium point, which is
given by the following pair of strategies:
P̂ (h) =
 P
∗(h) if C(P ∗(h), J∗(h)) ≥ R
Pa(h) if C(P ∗(h), J∗(h)) < R
(2.7)
Ĵ(h) =
 Ja(h) if C(P
∗(h), J∗(h)) > R
J∗(h) if C(P ∗(h), J∗(h)) ≤ R,
(2.8)
where Pa(h) and Ja(h) are some arbitrary power allocations satisfying the respective power con-
straints. (Note that no particular improvements are obtained by setting Pa(h) = Ja(h) = 0, since
only peak power constraints are in effect.)
The results are intuitive: if the ergodic capacity under the optimal jammer/transmitter strategies
is larger than the fixed rate R, reliable communication can be established over each frame, and
hence the probability of outage is Pout = 0. In this case, the actual power allocation of the jammer
does not matter anymore, since the jammer has already lost the game.
On the other hand, if the ergodic capacity is less than R, outage occurs on all frames (Pout = 1),
and the actual transmitter strategy makes no difference. As will be shown in the next section,
enforcing average power constraints in this case gives the transmitter more freedom, and results in
a smaller outage probability.
2.3 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with Average
Power Constraints: Pure Strategies
In this section power constraints are imposed over a large number of frames rather than on each
frame. The transmitter and jammer may increase their transmission and jamming powers over any
frame from P to PM , and from J to JM , respectively. To satisfy the average power constraints
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imposed by P and J , less power has to be allocated to other frames. We shall prove that for both
players, the optimal way to control the power allocation between frames is to employ ON/OFF
strategies. Since all frames are equivalent from the point of view of their corresponding channel
realizations, the manner in which the “discarded” codewords are picked is somewhat random.
However, note that this type of randomization only aims at ensuring that a possibly larger PM
or JM is obtained. We don’t consider mixing strategies in this section [33]. Although each player
picks up a frame randomly, we assume this is known by its opponent when considering the maxmin
and minimax problems as formulated below. That is, the maximin scenario assumes the transmitter
has perfect non-causal access to the jammer’s strategy (we say the jammer “plays first”), while the
minimax case assumes the jammer has perfect, non-causal access to the transmitter’s strategy (we
say the transmitter “plays first”). The first player in the minimax or maxmin cases is always more
vulnerable in the sense that the follower has the freedom to adapt its strategy such that it minimizes
the first player’s payoff.
The minimax scenario is the more practical one. In addition to being pessimistic from the sys-
tem designer’s point of view, it accurately models the situation where the jammer (who is not
interested in exchanging any information of its own) listens to the feedback carrying the channel
coefficients and senses the transmitter’s presence and power level, hence estimating the transmit-
ter’s strategy. The maximin scenario is not of less importance, since it is required for determining
the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium and for comparison with the minimax approach.
An important remark should be made here. We shall prove in the sequel that under both the pure
strategies and the mixed strategies scenarios, the optimal power allocation over a frame is done
similarly. Therefore, the major difference between the two cases is in the strategies of allocating
power to different frames. We should note that it is easier for one of the players to detect the
presence of the other player over a frame, than to estimate the other player’s transmission power.
Under the minimax solution of pure strategies, the jammer only needs to detect the presence of
the transmitter (the optimal strategies are of ON/OFF type) to have complete information about
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the transmitter’s behavior. However, if the transmitter chose to use mixed strategies, a complete
characterization of its behavior would require not only knowledge about its presence, but also
about the power it decided to allocate to that frame.
The average power constrained jamming game can be formulated as:
Tx
 Minimize Pr(C(P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to E[PM ] ≤ P (2.9)
Jx
 Maximize Pr(C(P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to E[JM ] ≤ J (2.10)
where PM and JM are defined as in (2.1), (2.2), the expectation is taken over all frames with respect
to the power allocation strategies introduced by the transmitter and jammer, and P and J are the
upper-bounds on average transmission power of the source and jammer, respectively.
2.3.1 Power Allocation within a Frame
The game between transmitter and jammer has two levels. The first (coarser) level is about power
allocation between frames, and has the probability of outage as a cost/reward function. The prob-
ability of outage is determined by the number of frames over which the transmitter is not present
or the jammer is successful in inducing outage. This set is established in the first level of power
control which is investigated in detail in the next two subsections, but which cannot be derived
before the second level strategies are available.
The second (finer) level is that of power allocation within a frame. In this subsection we derive
the optimal second level of power allocation strategies for both maximin and minimax problems,
and show they are connected by a special kind of duality.
Note that decomposing the problem into several (two or three) levels and solving each one sepa-
rately does not restrict the generality of our solution. Our proofs are of a contradictory type. Instead
of directly deriving each optimal strategy, we assume an optimal solution has already been reached
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and show it has to satisfy a set of properties. We first assume these properties are not satisfied,
and then show that under this assumption there is room for improvement. Thus we prove that any
solution not satisfying our set of properties cannot be optimal (i.e. the properties are necessary).
We pick the properties in such a manner that they are sufficient for the complete characterization
of the optimal solution. That is, we make sure that the system of necessary properties has a unique
solution.
In the maximin case (when jammer plays first), assume that the jammer has already allocated
some power JM to a given frame. Depending on the value of JM , and its own power constraints,
the transmitter decides whether it wants to achieve reliable communication over that frame. If it
decides to transmit, it needs to spend as little power as possible (the transmitter will be able to
use the saved power for achieving reliable communication over another set of frames, and thus to
decrease the probability of outage). Therefore, the transmitter’s objective is to minimize the power
PM spent for achieving reliable communication over each frame. Note that if the jammer is present
over a frame, the value of PM required to achieve reliable communication over that frame is a
function of JM . However, the transmitter should attempt to minimize the required PM even when
the jammer is absent. The jammer’s objective is then to allocate the given power JM over the frame
such that the required PM is maximized.
In the minimax scenario (when transmitter plays first) the jammer’s objective is to minimize the
power JM used for jamming the transmission over a given frame. The jammer will only transmit
if the transmitter is present with some PM . The transmitter’s objective is to distribute PM within a
frame such that the power required for jamming is maximized.
The two problems can be formulated as follows:
Problem 1 (for the maximin solution - jammer plays first)
max
J(h)≥0
[
min
P (h)≥0
PM = Eh[P (h)], s.t. C(P (h), J(h)) ≥ R
]
s.t. Eh [J(h)] ≤ JM ; (2.11)
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Problem 2 (for the minimax solution - transmitter plays first)
max
P (h)≥0
[
min
J(h)≥0
JM = Eh[J(h)], s.t. C(P (h), J(h)) ≤ R
]
s.t. Eh[P (h)] ≤ PM . (2.12)
Let m denote the probability measure introduced by the probability density function (p.d.f.)
of h, i.e., for a set A ⊆ R+, we have m(A ) =
∫
A
p(h)dh. Denote x(h) = J(h) + σ2N . Note
that the expectation is defined as Eh[f(h)] =
∫
h
f(h)p(h)dh. Similarly, we define Eh∈X [f(h)] =∫
h∈X f(h)p(h)dh.
Solution of Problem 1
The transmitter’s optimization problem:
min
P (h)≥0
Eh[P (h)], s. t. Eh
[
log
(
1 +
hP (h)
σ2N + J(h)
)]
≥ R (2.13)
has linear cost function and convex constraints. Write the Lagrangian as:
L1 = Eh[P (h)]− λ
{
Eh
[
log
(
1 +
hP (h)
σ2N + J(h)
)]
−R
}
. (2.14)
With the notation c = exp(R) , the resulting KKT conditions yield the unique solution [34]:
P (h) =
[
λ− x(h)
h
]
+
, h ∈ R+, (2.15)
where
λ = c
1
m(M′)
{
exp
[
Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]} 1
m(M′)
, (2.16)
and M ′ ⊂ R+ is the set of channel coefficients over which λ ≥ x(h)/h, and [z]+ = max{z, 0}.
We say the transmitter is “non-absent” overM ′, and “absent” on R+ \M ′.
The following proposition, the proof of which is given in Section 2.8.1, states that the jammer
should only be present where the transmitter is non-absent.
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Proposition 2.3. The jammer should only transmit where the transmitter is ”non-absent”. Other-
wise, if J(h) > 0 and λ < x(h)/h for h in some setS ⊂ R+, the jammer can decrease J(h) over
h ∈ S and maintain the same required transmitter power over the frame.
Substituting (2.16) in (2.13), the jammer’s problem can be formulated as:
Find max
x(h)≥σ2N
c
1
m(M′)m(M ′) ·
{
exp
[
Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]} 1
m(M′)
− Eh∈M ′
(
x(h)
h
)
(2.17)
subject to Eh[x(h)] ≤ (JM + σ2N) (2.18)
Since the setM ′ depends on the jammer power allocation J(h), solving the optimization prob-
lem above analytically is difficult. This is why we next provide an alternative method for finding the
solution. Our method examines the properties of the setsM ′ over which the transmitter is present
and M ′′ over which the jammer is present, as well as those of the optimal transmitter/jammer
strategies.
FixingM ′, the Lagrangian for the jammer’s optimization problem can be written as
L2 = −PM + µ
{
Eh[x(h)]− (JM + σ2N)
]
. (2.19)
This yields the new KKT conditions:
1
x(h)
{
exp
[
Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]} 1
m(M′)
c
1
m(M′) − 1
h
− µ = 0 for h ∈M ′′, (2.20)
Eh∈M ′′x(h) = JM + σ2Nm(M
′′), (2.21)
µ ≥ 0, (2.22)
whereM ′′ is the set of channel coefficients on which the jammer transmits non-zero power.
For fixed M ′ and M ′′, the jammer’s optimal strategy has to satisfy these KKT conditions. The
resulting optimal strategy is
x(h) =
h
1 + µh
{
c exp
[
Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]} 1
m(M′)
. (2.23)
23
  
h
λ
Transmitter’s 
strategy 
'M'
M'*h0h
h
N
2σ
h
hx )(
Jammer’s 
strategy 
1−
equivalenth
(inverse 
equivalent 
channel) 
 
FIGURE 2.2. Optimal second level power control strategies
The expression above states that for any two channel realizations with coefficients hi, hj be-
longing toM ′′, we have
x(hi)
hi
≥ x(hj)
hj
⇔ hi ≤ hj ⇔ x(hi) ≤ x(hj). (2.24)
Note that for any two channel realizations hi, hj /∈M ′′ (i.e. x(hi) = x(hj) = σ2N ) we also have
x(hi)
hi
≥ x(hj)
hj
⇔ hi ≤ hj. (2.25)
The following proposition brings more insight into the optimal jamming strategy. Its proof is
deferred to Section 2.8.2.
Proposition 2.4. The optimal jamming strategy is such that x(h)/h is a continuous decreasing
function of h over all of R+, and M ′′ is of the form M ′′ = [h∗,∞). Moreover, this implies that
M ′ is of the formM ′ = [h0,∞).
The optimal transmitter/jammer strategies for allocating power over a frame are described in
Figure 2.2.
Substituting (2.23) into (2.16), we get a new expression for λ:
λ =
x(h)
h
(1 + µh), for h ∈M ′′ (2.26)
which together with (2.15) yields
P (h) = µx(h), for h ∈M ′′. (2.27)
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An interesting remark which supports the results of the next subsection is that, for the optimal
solution of Problem 1, µ has to be strictly greater than zero, hence eliminating the possibility that
the jammer allocates positive power to frames where the transmitter, although “non-absent”, could
allocate zero power. In Section 2.8.2 it is shown how this remark follows from Proposition 2.4.
Taking expectation over h ∈M ′′ in (2.23), and using the constraint (2.21), we get
x(h) =
JM +m(M ′′)σ2N
1+µh
h
Eh∈M ′′ h1+µh
, (2.28)
for h ∈M ′′ and x(h) = σ2N for h /∈M ′′.
To solve for µ, substitute (2.28) into (2.23):[
JM +m(M ′′)σ2N
Eh∈M ′′ h1+µh
]m(M ′)−m(M ′′)
=
= c exp
[
Eh∈M ′′
(
log
1
1 + µh
)]
· exp
[
Eh∈M ′−M ′′
(
log
σ2N
h
)]
. (2.29)
The second level power allocation solution for the maximin problem is thus completely de-
termined by the triple (M ′,M ′′, µ), or equivalently by (h0, h∗, µ). By Proposition 2.4 above,
x(h∗) = σ2N (by continuity in h∗), and λ = σ2N/h0. Rearranging these two relations, along with
(2.29) in a more convenient form, we obtain the following system of equations, which has to hold
for any solution to our problem:
h0 =
h∗
1 + µh∗
, (2.30)
JM
σ2N
=
∫ ∞
h∗
(
h
1+µh
h∗
1+µh∗
− 1
)
p(h)dh, (2.31)
R =
∫ h∗
h∗
1+µh∗
log
(
h
1 + µh∗
h∗
)
p(h)dh−
∫ ∞
h∗
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h)dh. (2.32)
The equations above lead to the following result:
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Proposition 2.5. The solution of the maximin second level power allocation problem is unique.
Proof. It is easy to see that the right hand side of (2.31) is a strictly decreasing function of h∗,
for fixed µ, and a strictly decreasing function of µ, for fixed h∗, while being equal to a constant.
Hence, for given JM , (2.31) yields µ as a strictly decreasing function of h∗.
Similarly, the right hand side of (2.32) is a strictly decreasing function of h∗, for fixed µ, and a
strictly increasing function of µ, for fixed h∗, while being equal to a constant. Hence, (2.32) yields
µ as a strictly increasing function of h∗.
Since (2.31) and (2.32) have to be satisfied simultaneously by any solution, the solution has to
be unique.
Another insightful remark that follows from (2.30)–(2.32) is that as JM increases, both µ and h∗
should be decreasing.
The following proposition, characterizing the PM(JM) function, is necessary for deriving the
optimal power allocation between frames in the next section. The proof is deferred to Section
2.8.3.
Proposition 2.6. Under the optimal maximin second level power control strategies, the “required”
transmitter power PM over a frame is a strictly increasing, unbounded and concave function of the
power JM that the jammer invests in that frame.
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we shall denote by PM(JM) the function that char-
acterizes the “required” transmitter power over a frame where the jammer invests power JM , in the
maximin case.
Solution of Problem 2
To solve the minimax intra-frame power allocation problem by using the same techniques as in
Problem 1 turns out to be more difficult. Instead we use the above solution of Problem 1 and show
that for both problems, the second level power allocation follows the same rules.
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Theorem 2.7. If JM,1 is the value used for the second constraint in Problem 1 above, and PM,1 is
the resulting value of the cost/reward function, then solving Problem 2 with PM = PM,1 yields the
cost/reward function JM = JM,1. Moreover, any pair of second level power allocation strategies
that makes an optimal solution of Problem 1, should also make an optimal solution of Problem 2,
and this also holds conversely.
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.21 in Section 2.8.4, if we denote x = P (h),
y = J(h), f(x) = Eh[P (h)], g(y) = Eh[J(h)] and h(x, y) = C(P (h), J(h)).
We shall denote byJM(PM) the function that characterizes the “required” jamming power over
a frame where the transmitter invests power PM , in the minimax case. By Theorem 2.7, we have
thatJM(PM(JM)) = JM andPM(JM(PM)) = PM .
Further comments on the power control within frames
Although the second level optimal power allocation strategies for the maximin and minimax
problems coincide, this result should not be associated to the notion of Nash equilibrium, since the
two problems solved above do not form a zero-sum game, while for the game of (2.9) and (2.10),
first level power control strategies are yet to be investigated.
Instead, the result should be interpreted as a form of duality. In fact, a much stronger result
can be observed as a consequence of Theorem 2.21. Namely, a similar “duality” property links
Problem 1 and Problem 2 above to the auxiliary problem of (2.3) and (2.4) appearing in the peak
power constraints scenario. This explains the resemblance between the solution of the peak power
constraints auxiliary problem (2.6) and the solution of Problem1 (2.26), (2.27).
Also, this common solution implies that P (h) = µ(J(h) + σ2N) over the set M ′′ of channel
realizations where both jammer and transmitter are present. Although the transmitter is also active
over the set of nonzero measureM ′ \M ′′ as in Figure 2.2, under practical conditions the measure
m(M ′ \M ′′) of this set is relatively small. This is the reason why thePM(JM) curve appears to
be linear (although it is not) in Figure 2.3 of the numerical results section.
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2.3.2 Power Allocation between Frames
The Maximin Solution
In this subsection we present the first level optimal power allocation strategies for the maximin
problem. Recall that all frames are equivalent in the sense that they are all characterized by the
same channel realizations (although not necessarily occurring in the same chronological order).
The maximin scenario assumes that the transmitter is completely aware of the jammer’s power
control strategy (only pure strategies are considered in this section). Given a jammer’s strategy that
allocates different jamming powers to different frames, the optimal way of allocating the transmit-
ter’s power is always to ensure that reliable communication is obtained on the frames that require
the least amount of transmitter power. The jammer’s optimal strategy (which is based solely on
this knowledge about the transmitter’s strategy) is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8. Under the maximin scenario it is optimal for the jammer to allocate the same
amount of power JM = J to all frames.
Proof. The proof relies on the concavity of PM(JM). Consider the optimal maximin inter-frame
power allocation strategies. LetS ,X denote the sets of frames over which the transmitter and the
jammer are present, respectively. Note that the jammer can itself compute the optimal transmitter
strategy in response to its own, and hence is fully informed of the transmitter’s response.
We first look at the set of frames S where the transmitter is active. Denote the power invested
by the jammer in this set by JS . Note that P is the average “required” transmitter power overS .
If the two players’ strategies are both optimal, then by modifying the allocation of JS over the
frames ofS , the new average “required” transmitter power overS can only be less than or equal
to P . In other words, if we denote by jM the generic power level allocated by the jammer to a
frame inS , then
P = max
jM
∫
S
PM(jM)djM (2.33)
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subject to ∫
S
jMdjM = JS . (2.34)
By writing the KKT conditions for the maximization problem in (2.33) and (2.34) above, it is
straightforward to see that, at an optimum, dPM (jM )
djM
should be constant all over S . Taking into
account the fact that PM(jM) is concave, we have that a uniform jamming power allocation of
JS overS achieves this optimum.
We next look at the set of framesX \S where the transmitter cannot afford to be active. This
means that the “required” transmitter power over X \ S is greater than or equal to PM(JS ),
or equivalently, the power invested by the jammer is greater than or equal to JS . But since the
jammer already knows the transmitter’s strategy, investing more than JS in any of the frames of
X \ S would be a waste. Therefore, under the optimal maximin inter-frame power allocation
strategies, the jammer can invest the same amount of power into all the frames ofX ⋃S (which
meansS ⊂X ). But since the transmitter decides to match the required transmitter power onS ,
there can be no frames where the jammer is not active, and henceX is the set of all frames.
The jamming power allocated to each frame is JM = J . In this case the transmitter faces an in-
different choice space. The power required for the transmitter to achieve reliable communication is
PM(JM). Hence, the transmitter’s optimal strategy is to randomly pick as many frames as possible
and allocate power PM(JM) to each of them. This is equivalent to saying the transmitter is present
over a frame with probability pt, given by pt = PPM (J ) . The resulting probability of outage is now
Pout = 1 − pt. Note that if P ≥ PM(J ), the probability of outage can be reduced to zero. This
corresponds to the case when the ergodic capacity of the channel, computed in the conventional
way, with peak power constraints, is larger than the rate R.
The Minimax Solution
Theorem 2.7 showed that for the minimax problem the power allocation within a frame, as well
as the relationship between the total powers used by transmitter and receiver over a particular
29
frame, are identical to the maximin problem. Hence, by rotating the PM(JM) plane, we get the
characteristicJM(PM) curve for the minimax problem.
The minimax scenario assumes that the jammer knows exactly when and with what power level
the transmitter transmits. Given a transmitter’s strategy that allocates different powers to different
(equivalent) frames, the optimal way of allocating the jammer’s power is such that outage is first
induced on the frames that require the least amount of jamming power. Under these conditions, the
transmitter’s optimal strategy is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9. Under the minimax scenario it is optimal for the transmitter to transmit over a
maximum number of frames, with the same power PM that minimizes the probability of outage.
Proof. The proof relies on the convexity of JM(PM). Consider the optimal minimax inter-frame
power allocation strategies, and letS ,X denote the sets of frames over which the transmitter and
the jammer are present, respectively. It is clear in this scenario thatX ⊂ S .
We first look at the set of frames X where the jammer is active. Denote the power invested by
the jammer in this set by JX , and the power invested by the transmitter by PX . Note that JX is
the average “required” jamming power overX .
If the two players’ strategies are both optimal, then by modifying the allocation of PX over the
frames of X , the new average “required” jamming power over X can only be less than or equal
to JX . In other words, if we denote by pM the generic power level allocated by the transmitter to
a frame inX , then
JX = max
pM
∫
X
JM(pM)dpM (2.35)
subject to ∫
X
pMdpM = PX . (2.36)
From the KKT conditions for the maximization problem in (2.35) and (2.36) above, we see
that, at an optimum, dJM (pM )
dpM
should be constant all over X . Taking into account the fact that
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JM(pM) is convex, we have that a uniform transmitter power allocation of PX overX achieves
this optimum.
We should emphasize here that the above arguments hold under the assumption that the jammer
is active over the whole set X , i.e. when JM(pM) > 0 over X . Of course, the overall required
jamming power is increased by increasing the transmitter power over some frames of X , while
neglecting the others. But this action modifies the setX itself, and thus the initial assumptions.
We next look at the set of frames S \X where the jammer cannot afford to be active. This
means that the “required” jamming power over S \X is greater than or equal to JM(PX ), or
equivalently, the power invested by the transmitter is greater than or equal to PX . But since the
transmitter already knows the jammer’s strategy, investing more than PX in any of the frames of
S \X would be a waste.
Therefore, under the optimal maximin inter-frame power allocation strategies, the transmitter
can invest the same amount of power into all the frames ofS .
The frames over which the transmitter allocates the optimal PM can be chosen at random. This
is equivalent to the transmitter being active over a frame with probability pt given by pt = PPM .
Searching for the optimal PM is equivalent to searching for the optimal pt.
The jammer’s strategy is to attack as many of the frames where the transmitter is present as
possible. In order to induce outage over these frames, the jammer needs to allocate JM(PM) to
each of them. This is equivalent to the jammer transmitting JM(PM) on a frame on which the
transmitter is present, with probability pj given by pj = JptJM (PM ) . Note that pj represents the
conditional probability that the jammer transmits over a frame, given that the transmitter is present
over that frame. Outage over a frame occurs in two circumstances: either the transmitter (and
consequently also the jammer) decides to ignore the frame, or the transmitter attempts to transmit
the corresponding codeword, but the jammer is present (and since this is the minimax scenario, it
is also successful).
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The resulting probability of outage is Pout = (1− pt) + pjpt or, only as a function of PM :
Pout = (1− P
PM
) +
J
JM(PM)
. (2.37)
The transmitter finds the optimal value of PM as the argument that minimizes Pout above. A nu-
merical approach should perform exhaustive search with the desired resolution in the interval
[P , PM,max], where PM,max can be set such that ∀PM > PM,max we have Pout(PM) > 1 − ²
for a fixed ². Since Pout → 1 as PM → ∞ independently of the JM(PM) curve, such a finite
bound PM,max exists for any ².
Note that if the PM(JM) curve is strictly concave, the jammer can never achieve an outage
probability Pout = 1. This is because the transmitter can invest all its power over a small enough
set of frames, such that the jamming power required to jam all the frames in this set exceeds the
jammer’s power budget. If however the probability measure m is chosen such thatPM(JM) is an
affine function of the form PM = PM,0 + 1/θJM , and furthermore if J ≥ θ(P − PM,0), then
J
JM (PM )
≥ P−PM,0
PM−PM,0 ≥ PPM for all values of PM , and the probability of outage becomes Pout = 1.
2.3.3 Some Numerical Results
An example of the PM(JM) curve is given in Figure 2.3 for a fixed rate R = 2, noise power
σ2N = 10 and a channel coefficient distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
For the same parameters used to generate Figure 2.3, the probability of outage was computed
for a jammer power constraint J = 10 and different values of the transmitter power constraint
P . The results were plotted in Figure 2.4. For comparison, the same figure shows Pout(P) for the
case when the jammer does not use any power control strategy (non-intelligent jammer). Since the
jammer’s first level of power control for the maximin scenario reduces to uniformly distributing
the available power to all frames, the only difference between the maximin scenario and the non-
intelligent jammer scenario is in the power allocation within frames. However, as seen from Figure
2.4, this difference is almost negligible.
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FIGURE 2.3. PM vs. JM curve when R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter
λ = 1/6.
Figure 2.5 shows how the outage probability varies with the rate R, for fixed power constraints
P = 30 and J = 10. The Pout(R) curves delimitate the achievable capacity vs. outage regions for
both peak power constraints and average power constraints (minimax and maximin cases).
Note that even for the minimax solution of the average power constraints problem, there exist
values of P (Figure 2.4), or of the rate R (Figure 2.5) for which the outage probability is less than
that achievable under peak power constraints.
Also note that the maximin curve coincides with the peak power constraints curve at large trans-
mitter power (in Figure 2.4) or at small rates (in Figure 2.5). Recall that the jammer’s strategy in the
maximin scenario is the same as in the peak power constraints scenario (i.e. the jammer allocates
the same amount of power J to each frame). Due to the favorable conditions in the regions charac-
terized by large P or small R, the transmitter can also spread its power uniformly over all frames
(just like in the peak power constraints scenario), overcoming the jammer completely (hence the
resulting zero probability of outage).
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FIGURE 2.4. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P when J = 10, R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h
is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
2.4 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with Average
Power Constraints: Mixed Strategies
In the previous section we studied the maximin and minimax solutions of the jamming game when
only pure strategies were allowed. Implicitly, we assumed that the power control strategies em-
ployed by the first player are perfectly known to the second player, even if they include a form
of ON/OFF randomization. We made a case that such a situation as the minimax case can emerge
when the jammer does not transmit unless it senses that the transmitter is on (and it can always
serve as a pessimistic scenario for the transmitter).
However,our previous assumption may sometimes be inappropriate from a practical point of
view. For example, if the transmitter does not stick with the optimal minimax solution, the jammer
may have a hard time following the transmitter’s behavior. The reason for this is that, as we have
already mentioned, the jammer would find it much harder to correctly estimate the amount of power
that the transmitter invests in a given frame, than to just detect the presence of the transmitter.
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FIGURE 2.5. Outage probability vs. rate for P = 30, J = 10, σ2N = 10 and h is distributed exponentially,
with parameter λ = 1/6.
In this section we investigate the jamming game with average power constraints when mixed
(probabilistic) strategies are considered. Similarly to the pure strategies scenario of the previous
section, this game is played on two levels, with the first (coarser) level dealing with power allo-
cation between frames. Its cost/reward function is the probability of outage. We assume that the
jammer’s and transmitter’s randomized strategies consist of picking the power values to be invested
over a frame in a random manner. In our previous notation, PM and JM are now random variables,
and each frame is characterized by a realization (pM , jM) of the pair (PM , JM).
Given this realization, each player has to distribute its power over the frame in an optimal way.
This is the purpose of the second (finer) level of power control. The objective of each player at
this level is to make the best of the available resources (i.e. the powers (pM , jM)). This means
maximizing (or minimizing, respectively) the average rate supported by the frame, in the hope that
the resulting average rate will be above (or below, respectively) the system’s fixed rate R.
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2.4.1 Power Allocation within a Frame
We can formulate the second level of power control similarly to the two-player, zero-sum game of
(2.3) and (2.4) having the ergodic capacity calculated over a frame C(P (h), J(h)) as cost func-
tion. The difference is that under the current scenario, none of the players knows the other player’s
constraints, because (PM , JM) is a random event. Theorem 2.10 below provides the optimal trans-
mitter/jammer strategies for power allocation within a frame.
Theorem 2.10. Given a realization (pM , jM) of (PM , JM), let PM(jM) denote the solution of
Problem 1 in Section 2.3 with JM = jM , and JM(pM) denote the solution of Problem 2 in
Section 2.3 with PM = pM .
The transmitter’s optimal strategy is the solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the jam-
mer is constrained to Eh[J(h)] ≤JM(pM) and the transmitter is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤ pM .
The jammer’s optimal strategy is the solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the transmitter
is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤PM(jM) and the jammer is constrained to Eh[J(h)] ≤ jM .
Note that each of the two players deploys the strategy that results from the most pessimistic
scenario that it can handle successfully.
Proof. Denote the solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the jammer is constrained to
Eh[J(h)] ≤ JM(pM) and the transmitter is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤ pM by (P1(h), J1(h)),
and the solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the transmitter is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤
PM(jM) and the jammer is constrained to Eh[J(h)] ≤ jM by (P2(h), J2(h)).
Denote the solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the jammer is constrained toEh[J(h)] ≤
jM and the transmitter is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤ pM by (P0(h), J0(h))..
By the duality property of Theorem 2.21 in Section 2.8.4, we must have C(P1(h), J1(h)) = R
and C(P2(h), J2(h)) = R.
We will show that (i) even if mixed strategies are considered for the game in (2.3) and (2.4), any
Nash equilibrium has the same value as the Nash equilibrium of pure strategies; (ii) even if the
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jammer’s power jM is different fromJM(pM), the transmitter’s strategy is still optimal; (iii) even
if the transmitter’s power pM is different fromPM(jM), the jammer’s strategy is still optimal.
(i): Since the game of (2.3) and (2.4) is a two-person zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria of
mixed strategies yield the same value of the cost/reward function [33]. Moreover, the two players
are indifferent between all equilibria. It was shown in [9] that this game has a Nash equilibrium
of pure strategies. But any equilibrium of pure strategies is also an equilibrium of mixed strategies
[33] and hence it is enough to consider the equilibrium of pure strategies found in [9].
(ii),(iii): Assume the transmitter plays the strategy given by P1(h).
If jM = JM(pM), it is clear that the optimal solution for both transmitter and jammer is the
solution of the game in (2.3) and (2.4), where the jammer is constrained to Eh[J(h)] ≤ jM and the
transmitter is constrained to Eh[P (h)] ≤ pM . In this case, it is as if each player knows the other
player’s power constraint.
If jM < JM(pM), then by Lemma 2.16 in Section 2.8.3 we have that J0(h) < J1(h). Since
C(P (h), J(h)) is a strictly decreasing function of J(h) (under the order relation defined in Section
2.8.4), this implies that C(P1(h), J0(h)) > R. Note that J0(h) is the jammer’s strategy when the
jammer knows the transmitter’s power constraint pM . Thus we have shown that when the transmit-
ter plays P1(h) and jM < JM(pM), the jammer cannot induce outage over the frame even if it
knew the value of pM .
The condition jM >JM(pM) is equivalent to pM <PM(jM) (by Theorem 2.21). In this case,
since the jammer plays the strategy given by J2(h), a similar argument as above (but this time
applied to the transmitter’s strategy) shows that the transmitter cannot achieve reliable communi-
cation over the frame even if it knew the exact value of jM .
This accomplishes the proof and shows that (P1(h), J2(h)) is a Bayes equilibrium [33] for the
game with incomplete information describing the power allocation within a frame.
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2.4.2 Power Allocation between Frames
Due to the form of the optimal second level power allocation strategies described in the previous
subsection, the outage probability can be expressed as
Pout = Pr{JM ≥JM(PM)} = 1− Pr{PM ≥PM(JM)}, (2.38)
where PM(JM) is the strictly increasing, unbounded and concave function of Proposition 2.6.
The optimal mixed strategies for power allocation between frames are presented in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.11. The unique Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies of the two-player, zero-sum game
with average power constraints described in (2.9) and (2.10) is attained by the pair of strategies
(FP (pM), FJ(jM)) satisfying:
FP (PM(y)) ∼ kpU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− kp)∆0(y), (2.39)
FJ(JM(x)) ∼ kjU([0, JM(2v)])(x) + (1− kj)∆0(x), (2.40)
where U([r, t])(·) denotes the CDF of a uniform distribution over the interval [r, t], and ∆0(·)
denotes the CDF of a Dirac distribution (i.e. a step function), and the parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1]
and v ∈ [max{J ,JM(P)/2},∞) are uniquely determined from the following steps:
1. Find the unique value v0 which satisfies:
PJ = [PM(2v0)−P ](2v0 − J ). (2.41)
2. Compute S(v0) =
∫ 2v0
0
PM(y)dy − 2v0P .
3. If S(v0) < 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM(y)dy − 2vP = 0, (2.42)
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kp = 1 (2.43)
and
kj =
JPM(2v)
2v[PM(2v)− P ] . (2.44)
4. If S(v0) = 0 then v = v0, kp = kj = 1.
5. If S(v0) > 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM(y)dy −PM(2v)(2v − J ) = 0, (2.45)
kp =
2vP
PM(2v)[2v − J ] (2.46)
and
kj = 1. (2.47)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.22 in Section 2.9, by substituting x = PM ,
y = JM , g(y) = PM(y), g−1(x) = JM(x), a = P and b = J . It is also interesting to note that
the condition
∫ b
0
g(y)dy < limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx− b[g(z)− g(b)] is satisfied becausePM(y) is
unbounded (Proposition 2.6).
2.4.3 Numerical Results
For the same parameters as in subsection 2.3.3 we evaluated numerically the optimal probabilis-
tic power control strategies. Figure 2.6 shows the probability of outage obtained under the mixed
strategies Nash equilibrium, versus the transmitter power constraint P , for a fixed rate R = 2,
noise power σ2N = 10, a jammer power constraint J = 10 and a channel coefficient distributed
exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6. All the previously obtained curves are shown for compar-
ison.
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FIGURE 2.6. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P when J = 10, R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h
is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
Figure 2.7 shows the same probability of outage when P = 30 and the system rate R is varied.
In both figures it can be seen that the system performance under the Nash equilibrium of mixed
strategies is better (from the transmitter’s point of view) than the minimax and worse than the
maximin solutions of the pure strategies game. This is expected since the pure strategies solutions
assume that the second player (the “follower”) is constantly at a disadvantage with the first player
(the “leader”).
2.5 CSI Available to Receiver Only. Jamming Game with
Average Power Constraints: Mixed Strategies
In this section we investigate the scenario when the receiver does not feed back any channel state
information. Since we have already shown that the long term power constraints problem is the more
interesting and challenging one, we further focus only on the scenario of average power constraints
and mixed strategies. As in the previous sections, we have to discuss two levels of power control:
within a frame and between frames.
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2.5.1 Power Allocation within a Frame
The jammer and transmitter powers allocated to each frame will be established in the next sub-
section. For now we are concerned with the optimal power allocation within a frame, given the
amounts of power invested in that frame by each one of the players. For a given frame, denote
these powers by PM and JM , to be consistent with our previous notation. Both the transmitter and
the jammer will choose a probability distribution for the randomly variable power levels P and J ,
respectively, such that EPP ≤ PM and EJJ ≤ JM , where the notations EP and EJ denote the ex-
pectations with respect to these probability distributions. For the generic channel use, the channel
coefficient h, the transmitter’s power P and the jammer’s power J are all independent random vari-
ables, which yield the randomly variable instantaneous mutual information log
(
1 + hP
J+σ2N
)
. For
a frame, this results in the ergodic capacity Eh,P,J log
(
1 + hP
J+σ2N
)
, where Eh denotes expectation
with respect to the channel coefficient.
The transmitter’s purpose is to use the allocated power PM in an attempt to make this ergodic
capacity larger than the rate R. Similarly, the jammer is concerned with using JM for making the
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ergodic capacity fall below R. The problem of allocating the power within the frame can be written
as:
max
P :EPP≤PM
min
J :EJJ≤JM
Eh,P,J log
(
1 +
hP
J + σ2N
)
. (2.48)
Denote L(P, J) = Eh log
(
1 + hP
J+σ2N
)
and let us observe that
dL
dP
= Eh
h
Ph+ J + σ2N
> 0, (2.49)
dL
dJ
= −Eh Ph
(Ph+ J + σ2N)(J + σ
2
N)
< 0, (2.50)
d2L
dP 2
= −Eh
(
h
Ph+ J + σ2N
)2
< 0, (2.51)
d2L
dJ2
= Eh
Ph(Ph+ 2J + 2σ2N)
[J2 + J(Ph+ 2σ2N) + σ
2
N(Ph+ σ
2
N)]
2
> 0, (2.52)
which implies that L(P, J) is a strictly increasing, concave function of P for fixed J , and a strictly
decreasing, convex function of J for fixed P .
Thus, we can write
Eh,P log
(
1 +
hP
JM + σ2N
)
≤ Eh log
(
1 +
hPM
JM + σ2N
)
≤ Eh,J log
(
1 +
hPM
J + σ2N
)
, (2.53)
and hence the uniform distribution of PM and JM over the frame achieves a Nash equilibrium. A
frame to which the transmitter allocates power PM and the jammer allocates power JM is in outage
if and only if
Eh log
(
1 +
hPM
JM + σ2N
)
≤ R. (2.54)
The probability of this event depends on the power allocation between frames and is the subject of
the first level of power control treated in the next subsection.
But before we get to that, we need to make several comments. Note that if we force equality in
(2.54) above, we obtain a P ′M(JM) curve as in Section 2.3. It is straightforward to see that the
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P ′M(JM) curve is affine, because solving (2.54) with equality yields PM = µ′(JM + σ2N) where
µ′ is the (unique) solution of Eh log (1 + µ′h) = R. Recall that the curvePM(JM) of Section 2.3
(with full CSI) is almost affine due to the fact that the measure of the set of channel realizations,
within a frame, over which the transmitter is present but the jammer is not, is often quite small. For
this reason, we expect theP ′M(JM) and thePM(JM) curves to be very close to each other.
Although the two curves are still different in general, they have the same physical interpretation:
if the jammer invests power jM over a frame, and the power pM invested by the transmitter satisfies
pM < P ′M(jM), then the frame is in outage. Otherwise, if pM > P ′M(jM), the frame supports
the asymptotically error-free decoding of the transmitted codeword.
As in Section 2.3, we shall denote byJ ′M(PM) the “inverse” of theP ′M(JM) function, or the
symmetric of theP ′M(JM) curve with respect to the first bisector.
2.5.2 Power Allocation between Frames
The arguments of this subsection are very similar to those of Subsection 2.4.2 and will not be
discussed in great detail. We have seen that the outage probability can be expressed as
Pout = Pr{JM ≥J ′M(PM)} = 1− Pr{PM ≥P ′M(JM)}, (2.55)
where P ′M(JM) is an affine, and hence strictly increasing and unbounded function of the form
P ′M(JM) = µ′JM +µ′σ2N . The optimal mixed strategies for power allocation between frames are
presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.12. The unique Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies of our two-player, zero-sum game
with average power constraints is attained by the pair of strategies (FP (pM), FJ(jM)) satisfying:
FP (x) ∼ kpU([µ′σ2N , 2vµ′ + µ′σ2N ])(x) + (1− kp)∆0(x),
FJ(y) ∼ 2v
2v + σ2N
kjU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− 2v
2v + σ2N
kj)∆0(y),
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where U([r, t])(·) denotes the CDF of a uniform distribution over the interval [r, t], and ∆0(·)
denotes the CDF of a Dirac distribution (i.e. a step function), and the parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1]
and v ∈ [max{J ,J ′M(P)/2},∞) are uniquely determined from the following steps:
1. If
P ≥ µ′σ2N +
1
2
µ′J
1 +
√
1 +
2σ2N
J
 , (2.56)
then
v =
P − µ′σ2N
µ′
, (2.57)
kp = 1 (2.58)
and
kj =
µ′J (2P − µ′σ2N)
2(P − µ′σ2N)2
. (2.59)
2. If
P < µ′σ2N +
1
2
µ′J
1 +
√
1 +
2σ2N
J
 , (2.60)
then
v =
1
2
J
1 +
√
1 +
2σ2N
J
 , (2.61)
kp =
2vP
µ′(2v + σ2N)(2v − J )
(2.62)
and
kj = 1. (2.63)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.22 in Section 2.9, by substituting x = PM ,
y = JM , g(y) =P ′M(y), g−1(x) =J ′M(x), a = P and b = J . It is also interesting to note that
the condition
∫ b
0
g(y)dy < limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx− b[g(z)− g(b)] is satisfied becauseP ′M(y) is
unbounded.
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2.5.3 Numerical Results
In this subsection we provide the numerical evaluation of our system’s performance when no chan-
nel state information is fed back by the receiver. The parameters are identical to those used in the
numerical evaluation of the previous sections.
The new PM(JM) curve is given in Figure 2.8. It can be seen that for a given jamming power
allocated to a frame, the transmitter power required to ensure asymptotically error-free transmis-
sion over that frame is only slightly larger if no CSI is fed back than when full CSI is available to
all parties.
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FIGURE 2.8. PM vs. JM curve with and without CSI feedback when R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h is distributed
exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
This observation explains the very small difference in achievable outage probabilities that can
be observed in Figures 2.9 and 2.10.
2.6 Conclusions
We have shown that for a high transmission rateR the jammer could have enough power to keep the
ergodic capacity below R. In this scenario, if the transmitter imposes average power constraints
45
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Transmitter power constraint P
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 o
ut
ag
e 
P o
u
t
P
out vs. P for R=2, J=10, σN
2
=10, h distributed exponentially with parameter λ=1/6
 
 
Long−term powr. constr. − CSI feedback − mixed strategies
Long−term powr. constr. − no CSI feedback − mixed strategies
FIGURE 2.9. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P with and without CSI feedback when
J = 10, R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6. (Mixed strategies.)
rather than peak power constraints, reliable communication is possible at the cost of a non-zero
probability of outage.
If both transmitter and jammer use average power constraints, their optimal strategies result as
solutions of a two-person zero-sum game. This game is played on two levels of power control. The
second level (power control within a frame) exhibits similar strategies for the pure (maximin and
minimax cases) and mixed strategies scenarios. However in the pure strategies scenario, maximin
and minimax first level power control (between frames) is generally done differently, implying
the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium was derived for the mixed strategies
scenario, placing the value of the objective function between those of the minimax and maximin
pure strategies solutions.
Although it may seem that the mixed strategies game makes more sense from a practical point
of view, the pure strategies minimax scenario may be a more appropriate model for the case when
the jammer does not attempt to jam unless it senses that the transmitter is on. In any circumstances,
the minimax scenario with pure strategies serves as a lower bound (the pessimistic approach) to
the system’s performance.
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FIGURE 2.10. Outage probability vs. rate with and without CSI feedback for P = 30, J = 10, σ2N = 10
and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.(Mixed strategies.)
The feedback of CSI by the legitimate receiver is known to bring benefits (in terms of achiev-
able transmission rate) when nobody attempts to jam the transmission. However, for a fast fading
AWGN channel, these improvements are shown to be marginal [35]. We have shown that a sim-
ilar conclusion holds (this time in terms of outage probability) for the case when the parties that
communicate over the fast fading AWGN channel are under attack from a jammer. The CSI fed
back can easily be intercepted by the jammer, which can then use this information to the transmit-
ter’s disadvantage. If one should also take into account the loss of bandwidth and the complexity
required for CSI feedback and processing, keeping the transmitter (and jammer) ignorant of the
channel coefficients may seem a better choice.
The same remark cannot be made for a parallel slow fading AWGN channel. It was shown in
[32] that when CSI is fed back and no jamming is present, the improvements in terms of probability
of outage are significant. In Chapter 3 we show that this conclusion also holds if we consider the
jamming scenario. In doing this we exploit the similarities that the parallel slow fading channel
bears to the fast fading channel, and develop new and even more interesting techniques to make up
for the additional complexity incurred by this new model.
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2.7 Additional Results for Peak Power Constraints - Proof of
Theorem 2.2
This proof follows the one described in the Appendix B of [32]. The probability of outage can be
written as:
Pr(C(P (h), J(h)) < R) = E[χ{C(P (h),J(h))<R}], (2.64)
where χ{A } denotes the indicator function of the set A . Replacing the power allocations by the
solutions of the game described by (2.3) and (2.4), we define
χ∗ = χ{C(P ∗(h),J∗(h))<R}. (2.65)
We next use the fact that the pair (P ∗(h), J∗(h)) determines an equilibrium of the game (2.3),
(2.4). Thus, for any random power allocation P (h) satisfying the power constraint, we can write:
χ∗ ≤ χ{C(P (h),J∗(h))<R},with probability 1. (2.66)
Similarly, for any random J(h), we have
χ∗ ≥ χ{C(P ∗(h),J(h))<R},with probability 1. (2.67)
Now pick some arbitrary power allocation functions Pa(h) and Ja(h), which satisfy the peak
power constraints, and set
P̂ (h) = (1− χ∗)P ∗(h) + χ∗Pa(h), (2.68)
and
Ĵ(h) = (1− χ∗)Ja(h) + χ∗J∗(h), (2.69)
It is easy to see that EhP̂ (h) ≤ P with probability 1 , EhĴ(h) ≤ J with probability 1, and
moreover that
χ∗ = χ{C( bP (h), bJ(h))<R}. (2.70)
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Note that transmitter and jammer could pick Pa(h) = 0 and Ja(h) = 0 respectively, but this
strategy would not improve their performances (power cannot be saved), since the only power
constraints are set over frames.
Now, using (2.64), (2.66) and (2.67), we get:
Pr(C(P (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥ Pr(C(P̂ (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥ Pr(C(P̂ (h), J(h)) < R), (2.71)
which proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
2.8 Additional Results for Average Power Constraints: Pure
Strategies
2.8.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3
In proving the proposition, we take a contradictory approach. It suffices to show that the situation
J(h) > 0 and λ < x(h)/h cannot be part of the solution of Problem 1.
Assume that J(h) > 0 and λ < x(h)/h for h in some set S ⊂ R+. If the jammer decreases
the value of J(h) onS , two situations are possible. In the first one, J(h) is reduced to zero onS ,
and the transmitter is still ”absent”. This happens if σ2N > λh. In this case, modifying the value of
J(h) has no impact upon the value of λ, and hence neither upon the outcome.
In the second case J(h) is reduced to some positive value J ′(h), such that the transmitter decides
to be ”non-absent” over S . This happens if J ′(h) + σ2N = λ′h. Note that the value of λ might be
changed to some λ′. However, as we shall see briefly, if we consider J ′(h) that satisfies J ′(h) +
σ2N = λ
′h, then we have λ′ = λ.
To prove this, let λ be given by (2.16), and assume that λ − x(h)/h ≥ 0 for h ∈ M ′, and
λ− x(h)/h < 0 for h ∈ S . Now modify x(h) by decreasing J(h) as above. We have
λ′ = c
1
m(M′ SS )
{
exp
[
Eh∈M ′SS
(
log
x(h)
h
)]} 1
m(M′ SS )
=
x(h)
h
, for h ∈ S . (2.72)
Note that for h ∈ S we have x(h)
h
= λ′, so
Eh∈S log
x(h)
h
= log λ′m(S ). (2.73)
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Taking logarithm of (2.72):
1
m(M ′) +m(S )
[
log c+ Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)
+ Eh∈S
(
log
x(h)
h
)]
= log
x(h)
h
, for h ∈ S ,
(2.74)
and noting that the left hand side of (2.74) is independent of the actual realizations of h, we can
compute the expectation over h ∈ S , and get:
m(S )
m(M ′) +m(S )
[
R + Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]
=
m(M ′)
m(M ′) +m(S )
Eh∈S
(
log
x(h)
h
)
. (2.75)
Using (2.73), this leads to
log λ =
1
m(M ′)
[
R + Eh∈M ′
(
log
x(h)
h
)]
=
1
m(S )
Eh∈S
(
log
x(h)
h
)
= log λ′. (2.76)
Therefore the outcome is maintained because, although “non-absent”, the transmitter still invests
zero power onS .
Hence if such a situation where the jammer transmits on a set of channel coefficient values
over which the transmitter is “absent” occurs, the jammer can save power and maintain the same
outcome. Meanwhile the new set over which jammer transmits becomes a subset of the new set
over which the transmitter is “non-absent”.
2.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
We already know that the optimal x(h) is a continuous function of h ∈ M ′′ if M ′ and M ′′ are
fixed.
The following lemma shows that under this scenario the optimal x(h) is also unique.
Lemma 2.13. For fixedM ′ andM ′′, the KKT conditions (2.20)–(2.22) admit a unique solution.
Proof. Consider M ′ and M ′′ to be fixed. The constant µ resulting from (2.20)–(2.22) can be
computed as in (2.29). This implies that JM(µ) is a strictly decreasing function, hence an injection.
Thus, for a given JM there exists a unique corresponding value of µ, and since x(h) is a deter-
ministic function of µ, a unique solution x(h).
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Suppose the jammer’s optimal power distribution x∗(h) is not continuous over the whole R+.
Note that an optimal power distribution x∗(h) obtained for fixed M ′ and M ′′ can only be a
globally optimal solution (i.e. over all possible choices of M ′ and M ′′), if by keeping the same
M ′ and extendingM ′′ to a setM ′′n that contains a discontinuity point , the new optimal strategy
is either the same as x∗(h), or violates the constraint x(h) ≥ σ2N . But an optimal strategy has to be
continuous overM ′′n, and hence the constraint x(h) ≥ σ2N has to be violated on the left-most side
ofM ′′n (according to (2.28)).
Also note that if under the optimal strategy the jammer allocates some power Jx over a set
M ⊂ R+, then the distribution of Jx over M should be done optimally, according to (2.28),
(2.29). This implies that by extending the set M by a set N disjoint from M ′′, and re-allocating
Jx overMx
⋃
N , the constraint x(h) ≥ σ2N will be violated on the left-most side ofMx
⋃
N .
The arguments above imply the following:
1. The optimal jamming power allocation should be such that x(h) = σ2N on the left-most
point of M ′′: otherwise extend M ′′ by an arbitrarily small set to the left and increase JM
until x(h) = σ2N on the left-most point of the new set M ′′n; by continuity of x(h), the
left-most point ofM ′′ should be arbitrarily close to σ2N .
2. The optimal jamming power allocation should be such that M ′′ = [h∗,∞): otherwise take
a subset Mx ⊂ M ′′, such that there exists a set N situated to the right of Mx, and denote
by Jx the jamming power originally allocated to Mx. By re-allocating Jx over Mx⋃N ,
the constraint x(h) ≥ σ2N will be violated on the left-most side of Mx. If N is picked of
arbitrarily small m-measure, by the previous arguments we should have x(h) arbitrarily close
to σ2N at the left-most point of Mx. But since Mx is arbitrary, this yields the contradiction
that x(h) = σ2N for any h to the left ofN .
This proves Proposition 2.4.
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Note that if µ = 0, then P (h) = 0 overM ′′, and since x(h)/h is decreasing over the whole R+,
andM ′′ = [h∗,∞), this implies that the transmitter does not transmit at all. However, this strategy
does not achieve an ergodic capacity larger than the rate R, and hence it results in a contradiction.
2.8.3 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Recall Proposition 2.6: Under the optimal maximin second level power control strategies, the “re-
quired” transmitter power PM over a frame is a strictly increasing, unbounded and concave func-
tion of the power JM that the jammer invests in that frame.
The fact thatPM(JM) is strictly increasing follows from Proposition 2.5 and Proposition 2.20.
If JM,1 < JM,2 existed such that PM(JM,1) = PM(JM,2), then when the jammer’s power constraint
is JM,2, Problem 1 would either have two different solutions, or the solution would satisfy the
constraint with strict inequality.
If JM → ∞ then (2.28) implies that J(h) → ∞ for any h. If PM was finite, this would imply
C(P (h), J(h)) → 0, which violates the constraints of Problem 1. Hence JM(PM) has to be
unbounded.
In proving concavity of the PM(JM) function for the case when the channel coefficient h be-
longs to a continuous alphabet, we first show that the solution of the discretized problem (i.e. when
h belongs to a discrete alphabet, obtained by some discretization of the original continuous alpha-
bet) is unique and converges point-wise to the solution of the continuous problem as the discrete
alphabet converges to the original continuous alphabet.
This approach also serves the purpose of legitimizing numerical evaluations.
Next, we prove that for the discretized problem PM(JM) is concave. Finally, we show that
point-wise convergence of a sequence of concave functions is enough for the concavity of its limit
function.
Consider the uniformly spaced discretization qZ+ of the interval [0,∞), and a p.m.f. of the
channel coefficient h ∈ qZ+ that converges to the original p.d.f. as q goes to zero.
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The maximin second level power allocation problem can still be written as in (2.11), even though
the integrals representing the expectations can now be written as sums. Moreover, Propositions 2.3–
2.4 and relations (2.15)–(2.29) hold with the only modification that the term “continuous” should
be crossed out.
The second level power allocation solution for the discretized maximin problem is completely
determined by the triple (M ′,M ′′, µ), or equivalently by (h0, h∗, µ). Instead of (2.30)–(2.32) we
can now write
σ2N
h0
≤ λ < σ
2
N
h0 − q , (2.77)
σ2N
1 + µh∗
h∗
≤ λ < σ2N
1 + µ(h∗ − q)
h∗ − q , (2.78)
R =
h∗−q∑
h0
log
(
λh
σ2N
)
p(h)−
∞∑
h∗
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h), (2.79)
or equivalently
QU
[
h∗ − q
1− µ(h∗ − q)
]
≤ h0 ≤ QD
[
h∗
1− µh∗ + q
]
, (2.80)
∞∑
h=h∗
[
h
1+µh
h∗
1+µh∗
− 1
]
p(h) ≤ JM
σ2N
≤
∞∑
h=h∗
[
h
1+µh
h∗−q
1+µ(h∗−q)
− 1
]
p(h), (2.81)
h∗−q∑
h=QD[ h
∗
1+µh∗+q]
log
(
h
1 + µh∗
h∗
)
p(h)−
∞∑
h∗
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h) ≤ R ≤
≤
h∗−q∑
h=QU [ h
∗−q
1+µ(h∗−q) ]
log
(
h
1 + µ(h∗ − q)
h∗ − q
)
p(h)−
∞∑
h∗
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h), (2.82)
where QD[h] denotes the largest element of qZ+ that is less than h and QU [h] denotes the smallest
element of qZ+ that is larger than h.
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Lemma 2.14. For a given JM the solution of the discretized maximin second level power allocation
problem is unique.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that for fixed h∗ the left-most and the right-most terms of
inequality (2.81) (which upper-bound and lower-bound JM/σ2N ) are strictly decreasing functions
of µ, and similarly the left-most and the right-most terms of inequality (2.82) are strictly increasing
functions of µ.
Note that
∞∑
h=h∗
[
h
1+µh
h∗
1+µh∗
− 1
]
p(h) =
∞∑
h=h∗+q
[
h
1+µh
h∗
1+µh∗
− 1
]
p(h), (2.83)
QD
[
h∗ − q
1 + µ(h∗ − q) + q
]
= QU
[
h∗ − q
1 + µ(h∗ − q)
]
, (2.84)
and
h∗−q∑
h=QD[ h
∗
1+µh∗+q]
log
(
h
1 + µh∗
h∗
)
p(h)−
∞∑
h∗
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h) =
=
h∗∑
h=QD[ h
∗
1+µh∗+q]
log
(
h
1 + µh∗
h∗
)
p(h)−
∞∑
h∗+q
log
(
1
1 + µh
)
p(h). (2.85)
These arguments imply that by keeping µ constant and replacing h∗ by h∗ − q in both first terms
of (2.81) and (2.82), we get exactly the last terms of (2.81) and (2.82), respectively. Thus, if (h∗,µ)
satisfy both (2.81) and (2.82), then decreasing h∗ (by more than one step) and maintaining the same
µ violates both (2.81) and (2.82). In order for (2.81) to still hold, µ should be increased, while in
order for (2.82) to still hold, µ should be decreased. But once h∗ and µ are given, λ and hence
h0 are uniquely determined. Therefore there cannot exist more than one solution to the discretized
problem.
The following lemma deals with the convergence of this solution as q → 0.
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Lemma 2.15. For a given JM , the solution of the discretized maximin second level power alloca-
tion problem converges to the solution of the continuous problem as q → 0.
Proof. This follows by noticing that as q → 0 (2.77)–(2.79) become arbitrarily close to (2.30)–
(2.32), and the sums involved in the expectations converge to integrals (by the definition of the
Riemann integral).
Next we prove that for the discretized problem, the resulting PM(JM) function is concave.
We first show in Lemma 2.16 that the optimal jammer strategy {x∗(h)}∞h=0 is a continuous func-
tion of the given jamming power JM . Lemma 2.17 proves that PM({x(h)}) is continuous and
has continuous first order derivatives. This implies that PM(JM) is in fact continuous and has a
continuous first order derivative. Finally, Lemma 2.18 shows that for any fixed M ′ and M ′′ the
functionPM(JM) is concave.
Lemma 2.16. The optimal jammer power allocation {x∗(h)}h∈qZ+ within a frame is a continuous
increasing function of the given jamming power JM invested over that frame.
Proof. It is clear that x(h) is continuous and increasing as a function of JM if h∗ and h0 are fixed.
At any point where either h∗ or h0 change as a result of a change in JM , the optimal jamming
strategy {x∗(h)}h∈qZ+ maintains continuity as a result of the uniqueness of the solution (Lemma
2.14).
Lemma 2.17. Both PM({x(h)}) and the derivatives dPMdx(h) , for h ∈ qZ+ are continuous functions
of {x(h)}h∈qZ+ .
Proof. Consider any two points {x1(h)}h∈qZ+ and {x2(h)}h∈qZ+ and any trajectory T that connects
them.
Without loss of generality, assume that the channel coefficients are always indexed in decreasing
order of the quantities x(h)
h
.
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For a given vector {x(h)}h∈qZ+ , the required transmitter power is
PM = λ
∑
h∈M ′
p(h)−
∑
h∈M ′
x(h)
h
p(h), (2.86)
while the derivatives are given by
dPM
dx(h)
=
[
λ
x(h)
− 1
h
]
p(h) (2.87)
for h ∈M ′, with λ given by
λ(M ′) =
[
c
∏
h∈M ′
(
x(h)
h
)p(h)] 1Ph∈M′ p(h)
. (2.88)
Note that M ′ depends upon the choice of {x(h)}. For fixed M ′, the continuity and differen-
tiability of PM({x(h)}) are obvious. Thus, it suffices to show that these properties also hold in a
point of T whereM ′ changes.
If we can show continuity and differentiability when M ′ is increased by including one channel
coefficient h0, then larger variations of M ′ can be treated as multiple changes by one channel
coefficient, and continuity still holds.
Let {xk(h)}h∈qZ+ be a point of T where the transmitter increases the number of frames over
which it transmits as above, and denote by T1 the part of the trajectory T that is between {x1(h)}
and {xk(h)}, and T2 = T \ T1.
Since P (h0) = 0 (i.e. λ = x(h0)h0 ), we have λ(M ′) = λ(M ′
⋃{h0}), because they both satisfy∑
h∈M ′
[
λ− x(h)
h
]
p(h) = PM . (2.89)
Define the “left” and “right” limits PM({xk(h)}−) and PM({xk(h)}+) as:
PM({xk(h)}−) = lim{x(h)}→{xk(h)}
{x(h)}∈T1
PM({x(h)}), (2.90)
PM({xk(h)}+) = lim{x(h)}→{xk(h)}
{x(h)}∈T2
PM({x(h)}). (2.91)
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We can now write:
PM({x(h)}+) = λ
∑
h∈M ′S{h0}
p(h)−
∑
h∈M ′S{h0}
x(h)
h
p(h) =
= λ
∑
h∈M ′
p(h)−
∑
h∈M ′
x(h)
h
p(h) + λp(h0)− x(h0)
h0
p(h0) = PM({x(h)}−) (2.92)
where the last equality follows since λ = x(h0)
h0
. This proves continuity.
Similar arguments can be used to show the continuity of the derivatives in (2.87).
Lemma 2.18. In the discretized case, for fixed h0 and h∗, the functionPM(JM) is concave.
Proof. Write (2.29) explicitly for the discretized problem:
MJM + σ
2
N
∞∑
h=h∗
p(h) =
[
c
∞∏
h=h∗
(
1
1 + µh
)p(h)
·
·
h∗−q∏
h=h0
(
σ2N
h
)p(h)] 1Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h) ∞∑
h=h∗
h
1 + µh
p(h), (2.93)
and denote
g(µ) =
∞∏
h=h∗
(
1
1 + µh
) p(h)Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h) ·
∞∑
h=h∗
h
1 + µh
p(h). (2.94)
Note that for fixed h0 and h∗, JM is a linear function of g.
From (2.15), (2.16) and (2.28) a similar relation can be found for the required transmitter power
PM :
MPM +
h∗−q∑
h=h0
σ2N
hm
p(h) =
[
c
∞∏
h=h∗
(
1
1 + µh
)p(h)
·
h∗−q∏
h=h0
(
σ2N
h
)p(h)] 1Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h)
·
·
[
h∗−q∑
h=h0
p(h)−
∞∑
h=h∗
1
1 + µh
p(h)
]
. (2.95)
Denote
f(µ) =
∞∏
h=h∗
(
1
1 + µh
) p(h)Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h) ·
[ ∞∑
h=h0
p(h)−
∞∑
h=h∗
1
1 + µh
p(h)
]
, (2.96)
57
and note that for fixed h0 and h∗, PM is a linear function of f .
It suffices to show that f(g) is concave. For this purpose, the derivative df
dg
= df
dµ
(dµ
dg
)−1 should
be a decreasing function of g, and hence an increasing function of µ.
Computing the derivatives from (2.94) and (2.96) we obtain
df
dg
=
df
dµ
dg
dµ
=
1Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h)
(∑∞
h=h0 p(h)−
∑∞
h=h∗
1
1+µh
p(h)
)
−
P∞
h=h∗
h
(1+µh)2
p(h)P∞
h=h∗
h
1+µh
p(h)
1Ph∗−q
h=h0
p(h)
∑∞
h=h∗
h
(1+µh)2
p(h) +
P∞
h=h∗
h2
(1+µh)2
p(h)P∞
h=h∗
h
1+µh
p(h)
(2.97)
Looking at the right hand side of (2.97) (the “large fraction”), we notice that the first term in
the numerator increases with µ. For the second term in the numerator, it is clear that as µ in-
creases, its numerator decreases faster than its denominator. This implies that the whole numerator
of the “large fraction” is an increasing function of µ. Similarly, the first term in the denominator is
clearly a decreasing function of µ. The only thing left is the second term of the denominator. It is
straightforward to show that its derivative with respect to µ can be written as
d
dµ
∑∞
h=h∗
h2
(1+µh)2
p(h)∑∞
h=h∗
h
1+µh
p(h)
=
1[∑∞
h=h∗
h
1+µh
p(h)
]2 ·
·
{[ ∞∑
h=h∗
h2
(1 + µh)2
p(h)
]2
−
∞∑
h=h∗
h3
(1 + µh)3
p(h) ·
∞∑
h=h∗
h
(1 + µh)
p(h)
}
(2.98)
If we consider the fact that for any two real numbers a and b we have
(a2 + b2)2 − (a+ b)(a3 + b3) = −ab(a− b)2 (2.99)
and the summations in (2.98) are positive, it is easy to see that the second term of the denominator
of the “large fraction” is decreasing with µ. Hence overall the derivative in (2.97) increases with
µ.
Lemma 2.19. The limit of a point-wise convergent sequence of concave functions is concave.
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Proof. Denote the sequence by (fn(x))∞n=1 and its limit by f(x). Point-wise convergence implies
that for any x and ∀² > 0, ∃N(x) such that |f(x) − fn(x)| < ², ∀n ≥ N(x). Take two arbitrary
points x and y, and pick some arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1]. Denote N = max{N(x), N(y), N(αx + (1 −
α)y)}. Then for n ≥ N and any ² > 0 we have
f(αx+ (1− α)y) > fn(αx+ (1− α)y)− ² ≥
≥ αfn(x) + (1− α)fn(y)− ² > αf(x) + (1− α)f(y)− 2², (2.100)
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of fn. This implies that f is also concave.
2.8.4 On a Special Kind of Duality
Take x, y ∈ L2[R] and define the order relation x > y if and only if x(t) > y(t) ∀t ∈ R. Consider
the continuous real functions f(x), g(y) and h(x, y) over L2[R], such that f is a strictly increasing
function of x, g is a strictly increasing function of y, and h is a strictly increasing function of x for
fixed y and a strictly decreasing function of y for fixed x.
Define the following minimax and maximin problems:
max
y≥0
[
min
x≥0
f(x) s.t. h(x, y) ≥ H
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G, (2.101)
max
x≥0
[
min
y≥0
g(y) s.t. h(x, y) ≤ H
]
s.t.f(x) ≤ F, (2.102)
min
y≥0
[
max
x≥0
h(x, y) s.t. f(x) ≤ F
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G. (2.103)
The following result is important in the proof of Theorem 2.21 below.
Proposition 2.20. For any of the three problems above, the optimal solution satisfies both con-
straints with equality.
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Proof. Take problem (2.101). Let (x1, y1) be a solution such that f(x1) = F , and assume that
h(x1, y1) > H . Since h is a continuous, strictly increasing function of x for a fixed y, we can find
xn < x1 such that h(xn, y1) = H . But then f(xn) < f(x1), which means that there exists a better
value of x if y = y1, and hence that (x1, y1) is not a solution.
Therefore, the first constraint has to be satisfied with equality.
Now assume that g(y1) < G. Then we can find y0 > y1, such that g(y0) = G. However, since
h(x1, y1) = H , we have h(x1, y0) < H . In order for the first constraint to be satisfied, we need to
replace x1 by some other value x0. We prove next that the value x0 resulting from this modification
will be such that f(x0) > f(x1), which makes the pair (x1, y1) suboptimal, thus contradicting the
hypothesis that it is a solution, and proving that the second constraint should hold with equality.
Assume that the value of x0 is such that
f(x0) = F0 ≤ F. (2.104)
Then, replacing y0 by y1, we have that (x0, y1) is either a second solution of Problem 1 (if the
inequality in (2.104) holds with equality), or a better choice (if the inequality in (2.104) holds
with strict inequality). We can readily dismiss the latter case, since (x1, y1) was assumed to be an
optimal solution. For the former case, h is a strictly decreasing function of y, thus h(x0, y1) > R,
which contradicts the first part of this proof. The same arguments work for the problem in (2.102).
Take problem (2.103), and denote by (x3, y3) one of its optimal solutions. If g(y3) < G, we can
increase y up to a value ym such that g(ym) = G. But in turn, this yields h(x3, ym) < h(x3, y3),
making y3 suboptimal. Therefore, the first constraint has to hold with equality.
Similarly, if f(x3) < F , we can increase x up to a value xm such that f(fm) = F , yielding
h(xm, y3) > h(x3, y3), and thus resulting in a contradiction. Thus the second constraint also holds
with equality.
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which introduces a special kind of
duality between the three problems in (2.101), (2.102) and (2.103).
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Theorem 2.21. (I) Choose any real values for G and H . Take problem (2.101) under these con-
straints and let the pair (x1, y1) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective
function f(x1) = F1. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (2.102) and
(2.103) to F = F1, then the values of the objective functions of problems (2.102) and (2.103) under
their optimal solutions are g(y) = G and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x1, y1) is also an
optimal solution of all problems.
(II) Choose any real values for F and H . Take problem (2.102) under these constraints and
let the pair (x2, y2) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function
g(y2) = G2. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (2.101) and (2.103)
to G = G2, then the values of the objective functions of problems (2.101) and (2.103) under their
optimal solutions are f(x) = F and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x2, y2) is an optimal
solution of all problems.
(III) Choose any real values for F and G. Take problem (2.103) under these constraints and
let the pair (x3, y3) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function
h(x3, y3) = H3. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (2.101) and
(2.102) to H = H3, then the values of the objective functions of problems (2.101) and (2.102)
under their optimal solutions are f(x) = F and g(y) = G, respectively. Moreover, (x3, y3) is an
optimal solution of all problems.
Proof. (I) Take problem (2.101) and let (x1, y1) be an optimal solution, such that f(x1) = F . We
need to show that (x1, y1) is also an optimal solution of problems (2.102) and (2.103). Since x1
and y1 are a solution of problem (2.101), by Proposition 2.20, they satisfy the first constraint in
problem (2.101) with equality, and so they also satisfy the first constraint in problem (2.102).
Since the second constraint of problem (2.102) reads f(x) ≤ F , we note that x1 and y1 are in
the feasible set. If we evaluate the cost function at this point, we get g(y1) = G. Thus, keeping
x = x1, in problem (2.102), we can only obtain g(y) ≤ G, by minimizing the cost function over y.
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Now take any different value x0 6= x1, satisfying f(x0) = F . If the pair (x0, y1) satisfies the first
constraint in problem (2.101), then it is a solution of problem (2.101), and hence the constraints
should hold with equality. This implies that (x0, y1) also satisfies the first constraint of problem
(2.102). If (x0, y1) does not satisfy the first constraint in problem (2.101), then it certainly satisfies
the first constraint of problem (2.102). Either way, the pair (x0, y1) makes a feasible solution of
problem (2.102) (although possibly not optimal) and, by evaluating the cost function at this point,
we get g(y1) = G.
Thus, for any value x0 we pick, we should always obtain an optimal solution of problem (2.102)
for which g(y) ≤ G. But any such optimal solution has to satisfy the first constraint with equality,
hence is also a solution of problem (2.101). In turn, this implies g(y) = G. But then the original
pair (x1, y1) is a solution of problem (2.102), since it is feasible and yields the same cost/reward
function.
Take problem (2.103), and denote by (x3, y3) one of its optimal solutions. By Proposition 2.20
we have f(x3) = F and g(y3) = G. Then either h(x3, y3) ≤ H , which implies that (x3, y3) is
an optimal solution of problem (2.102), or h(x3, y3) ≥ H and then (x3, y3) is an optimal solution
of problem (2.101). Either way, the inequality should hold with equality, and hence (x3, y3) is an
optimal solution of both problem (2.101) and problem (2.102), with h(x3, y3) = H . But this also
implies that (x1, y1) is an optimal solution of problem (2.103).
(II) A similar argument can be made if we consider an optimal solution (x2, y2) of problem
(2.102), such that g(y2) = G.
(III) Consider an optimal solution (x3, y3) of problem (2.103), such that h(x3, y3) = H , and
suppose there exists an optimal solution (x2, y2) of problem (2.102) is such that g(y2) 6= G. By
Proposition 2.20, (x2, y2) satisfies f(x2) = F and h(x2, y2) = H . If g(y2) < G, then (x2, y2) is an
optimal solution of problem (2.103) which does not satisfy the constraints with equality, and thus
Proposition 2.20 is contradicted. If g(y2) = G2 > G, then if we construct a modified version of
problem (2.103), where the constraint g(y) ≤ G is replaced by g(y) ≤ G2, we know by the first
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part of this proof that (x2, y2) is an optimal solution of this new problem, yielding h(x2, y2) = H .
But the same objective is attained by (x3, y3), and moreover (x3, y3) satisfies the new problem’s
constraints since g(y3) = G < G3, and thus is an optimal solution. However, one of the constraints
is satisfied with strict inequality, thus contradicting Proposition 2.20. Therefore, (x3, y3) has to be
a solution of problem (2.102). A similar argument can be made to prove it is also a solution of
problem (2.101).
2.9 Additional Results for Average Power Constraints: Mixed
Strategies - A Special Two-Player, Zero-Sum Game with
Mixed Strategies
In this section, we present a general form of a special two-player, zero-sum game with mixed
strategies. Particular forms of this game have been investigated by other authors over the last three
decades. The first simplified version was presented by Bell and Cover [31], and a slightly more
general form was later solved by Hughes and Narayan [11].
Problem Statement
Let g(y) : R+ → R+ be a monotone increasing, almost everywhere (a.e.) continuous function
such that g(0) = 0. For any point of discontinuity y0 such that g(y−0 ) = x1 and g(y+0 ) = x2 > x1,
we define g(y0) = x1 (g is left-continuous) and g−1(x) = y1 for all x ∈ [x1, x2]. For any interval
of non-zero measure (y1, y2) where g is constant, i.e. g(y) = x0 for all y ∈ (y1, y2), we define
g−1(x0) = y1 (g−1 is also left-continuous). On the rest of R+, where g is continuous and strictly
increasing, g−1 is defined as the usual inverse function of g. Note that g−1 is a monotone increasing,
a.e. continuous function.
Consider the two-player, zero-sum game with mixed strategies defined as follows. The allowable
strategies for Player 1 are all non-negative, real-valued random variables X satisfying E[X] ≤ a.
The allowable strategies for Player 2 are all non-negative, real-valued random variables Y sat-
isfying E[Y ] ≤ b. The payoff function is Pr{X ≥ g(Y )}, which Player 1 seeks to maximize,
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while Player 2 seeks to minimize, by properly picking the probability distributions of X and Y
respectively. Throughout the sequel, these probability distributions will be represented by their
corresponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) F 0X(x) and F 0Y (y).
Problem Solution
Theorem 2.22. (I) If there exists a solution with kx, ky ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞)
of the following three equations:
kx
(
1− b
2v
)
= 1− ky
(
1− a
g(2v)
)
, (2.105)
kx =
2va∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy
, (2.106)
ky =
g(2v)b∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx
. (2.107)
then this solution is unique and the unique Nash equilibrium of the two-player, zero-sum game
described above is attained by the pair of strategies (F 0X(x), F 0Y (y)) satisfying:
F 0X(g(y)) ∼ kxU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− kx)∆0(y), (2.108)
F 0Y (g
−1(x)) ∼ kyU([0, g(2v)])(x) + (1− ky)∆0(x), (2.109)
where U([r, t])(·) denotes the CDF of a uniform distribution over the interval [r, t], and ∆0(·)
denotes the CDF of a Dirac distribution (i.e. a step function).
(II) If g is strictly increasing and continuous on [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞), and ∫ b
0
g(y)dy <
limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx−b[g(z)−g(b)], then the system in (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107) has a unique
solution such that kx, ky ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞). Moreover, the parameters
kx, ky and v are uniquely determined from the following steps:
1. Find the unique value v0 which satisfies:
ab = [g(2v0)− a](2v0 − b). (2.110)
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2. Compute S(v0) =
∫ 2v0
0
g(y)dy − 2v0a.
3. If S(v0) < 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − 2va = 0, (2.111)
kx = 1 (2.112)
and
ky =
bg(2v)
2v[g(2v)− a] . (2.113)
4. If S(v0) = 0 then v = v0, kx = ky = 1.
5. If S(v0) > 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − g(2v)(2v − b) = 0, (2.114)
kx =
2va
g(2v)(2v − b) (2.115)
and
ky = 1. (2.116)
Proof. Before starting the actual proof, several remarks are in order. First, F 0X(x) can be computed
from F 0X(g(y)) by writing x = g(g−1(x)), and thus by evaluating F 0X(g(y)) in y = g−1(x). A
similar algorithm works for computing F 0Y (y) from F 0Y (g−1(x)).
Second, note that by following this algorithm, for any point of discontinuity y0 of g such that
g(y−0 ) = x1 and g(y+0 ) = x2 > x1, we have:
F 0X(x1) = F
0
X(g(g
−1(x1))) = F 0X(g(y0)) = F
0
X(g(g
−1(x2))) = F 0X(x2), (2.117)
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i.e. Player 1 does not allow X to take values in (x1, x2), and
F 0Y (y0) = F
0
Y (y
+
0 ) = F
0
Y (g
−1(g(y+0 ))) = F
0
Y (g
−1(x2)), (2.118)
while by the same rational F 0Y (y−0 ) = F 0Y (g−1(x1)), meaning that Player 2 uses a probability mass
point in y0.
Third, for an interval of non-zero measure (y1, y2) where g is constant, i.e. g(y) = x0 for all
y ∈ (y1, y2), we have:
F 0Y (y1) = F
0
Y (g
−1(g(y1))) = F 0Y (g
−1(x0)) = F 0Y (g
−1(g(y2))) = F 0Y (y2), (2.119)
i.e. Player 2 does not allow Y to take values in (y1, y2), and
F 0X(x0) = F
0
X(x
+
0 ) = F
0
X(g(g
−1(x+0 ))) = F
0
X(g(y2)), (2.120)
while by the same rational F 0X(x−0 ) = F 0X(g(y1)), meaning that Player 1 uses a probability mass
point in x0. We now proceed with the proof of the first part of the theorem.
(I) Since this is a two-player, zero-sum game with mixed strategies, it has a unique Nash equi-
librium. Let X0 ∼ F 0X and Y0 ∼ F 0Y denote the random variables with the CDFs in (2.108) and
(2.109), and X ∼ FX and Y ∼ FY be any arbitrary random variables.
Note that Pr{X ≥ g(Y )} = ∫∞
0
[1 − FX(g(y))]dFY (y) =
∫∞
0
FY (g
−1(x))dFX(x). We can
write
Pr{X0 ≥ g(Y )} =
∫ ∞
0
[1− F 0X(g(y))]dFY (y) =
= 1− kx
∫ ∞
0
U([0, 2v])(y)dFY (y)− (1− kx)
∫ ∞
0
∆0(y)dFY (y) ≥
≥ kx
(
1− 1
2v
∫ ∞
0
ydFY (y)
)
≥ kx
(
1− b
2v
)
, (2.121)
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and
Pr{X ≥ g(Y0)} =
∫ ∞
0
F 0Y (g
−1(x))dFX(x) =
= ky
∫ ∞
0
U([0, g(2v)])(x)dFX(x) + (1− ky)
∫ ∞
0
∆0(x)dFX(x) ≤
≤ 1− ky
(
1− 1
g(2v)
∫ ∞
0
xdFX(x)
)
≤ 1− ky
(
1− a
g(2v)
)
. (2.122)
Note that equality holds in the first inequality of (2.121) if FY (2v) = 1, and in the second
inequality of (2.121) if E[Y ] = b. Similarly, equality holds in the first inequality of (2.122) if
FX(g(2v)) = 1, and in the second inequality of (2.122) if E[X] = a.
Since F 0Y (2v) = F 0Y (g−1(g(2v))) = 1 and F 0X(g(2v)) = 1 (see (2.108), (2.109)), equalities hold
in (2.121) and (2.122) when FX = F 0X and FY = F 0Y if and only if
a =
∫ ∞
0
xdF 0X(x) (2.123)
and
b =
∫ ∞
0
ydF 0Y (y). (2.124)
Although the two CDFs F 0X(x) and F 0Y (y) may not be continuous as functions in L1, they admit
derivatives in the distribution space D ′ [36], and thus we can write∫ ∞
0
xdF 0X(x) =
∫ ∞
0
x
dF 0X(x)
dx
dx =
∫ ∞
0
g(y)
dF 0X(g(y))
dg(y)
dg(y)
dy
dy =
=
∫ ∞
0
g(y)
dF 0X(g(y))
dy
dy = (1− kx)
∫ ∞
0
δ0(y)g(y)dy +
kx
2v
∫ ∞
0
g(y)dy, (2.125)
which along with (2.123) results in (2.106), and similarly∫ ∞
0
ydF 0Y (y) =
∫ ∞
0
g−1(x)
dF 0Y (g
−1(x))
dx
dx =
= (1− ky)
∫ ∞
0
δ0(x)g
−1(x)dx+
ky
g(2v)
∫ ∞
0
g−1(x)dx, (2.126)
which together (2.124) yields (2.107). The conditions for (F 0X(x), F 0Y (y)) to achieve a saddle-point
is that equality holds between the bounds in (2.121) and (2.122), which translates to (2.105), and
that there always exists a solution of the system given by (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107).
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(II) This part of the theorem provides a general (although not necessary) condition for such a
solution to exist and states that under this condition no more than one such a solution can exist (al-
though the uniqueness already follows as a consequence of the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium).
By substituting (2.106) and (2.107) in (2.105) we get
a(2v − b)∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy
= 1− b(g(2v)− a)∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx
. (2.127)
Denote the left hand side of (2.127) by L(v) and the right hand side by R(v) for simplicity. Note
that for any function g that satisfies the conditions set in the problem formulation we have∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy = 2vg(2v)−
∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx. (2.128)
This relation is best observed graphically in Figure 2.11.
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FIGURE 2.11. The relationship between the integrals of g(y) and g−1(x).
Computing the derivatives of L(v) and R(v) with respect to v (these derivatives always exist for
v ≥ max{b/2, g−1(a)/2}) we get
dL(v)
dv
=
2a[∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy
]2 · [∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − g(2v)(2v − b)
]
, (2.129)
and
dR(v)
dv
=
2g′(v)b[∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx
]2 ·
[
2v(g(2v)− a)−
∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx
]
=
=
2g′(v)b[∫ g(2v)
0
g−1(x)dx
]2 [∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − 2va
]
, (2.130)
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where g′(v) > 0 denotes the first derivative dg(y)/dy, evaluated in y = v, and the second equality
in (2.130) follows from (2.128).
Note that L(v) and R(v) are both probabilities, hence belong to [0, 1]. Therefore, any possible
solution of the system in (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107) should satisfy 2v ≥ b and g(2v) ≥ a, or
equivalently:
v ≥ max{b/2, g−1(a)/2}. (2.131)
Therefore, in the sequel of this proof we shall implicitly assume that (2.131) holds true.
Denote SL(v) =
∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − g(2v)(2v − b) and SR(v) =
∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy − 2va. Since
d
dv
∫ 2v
0
g(y)dy = 2g(2v), (2.132)
we observe that
d
dv
SL(v) = −2g′(v)(2v − b) < 0 (2.133)
and
d
dv
SR(v) = 2(g(2v)− a) > 0, (2.134)
which imply that SL(v) is a strictly decreasing function of v, while SR(v) is a strictly increasing
function of v, for the domain of interest v ∈ [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞).
Note that d
dv
SR(v) is strictly positive even in the limit as v →∞, and thus limv→∞ SR(v) =∞.
By writing SL(v) =
∫ b
0
g(y)dy − ∫ g(2v)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx, we also have limv→∞ SL(v) = −∞.
A first possible solution:
An extremum of L(v) is obtained by setting dL(v)
dv
= 0, or equivalently∫ 2vl
0
g(y)dy = g(2vl)(2vl − b). (2.135)
In our previously introduced notation, this writes SL(vl) = 0. But since SL(v) is strictly decreasing
on the domain of interest, the extremum is unique and is a maximum.
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The values of L(v) and R(v) at this point are given by
L(vl) = R(vl) =
a
g(2vl)
. (2.136)
Moreover, substituting (2.135) and (2.128) back in (2.106) and (2.107) we get
kx,l =
2vla
g(2vl)(2vl − b) (2.137)
and
ky,l = 1. (2.138)
Therefore (vl, kx,l, ky,l) are a solution of the system given by (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107) if and
only if kx,l ∈ [0, 1]. From (2.131) it is implied that 2vl ≥ b, and hence that kx,l ≥ 0. The condition
kx,l ≤ 1 yields
2vla ≤ g(2vl)(2vl − b). (2.139)
A second possible solution:
An extremum of R(v) is obtained by setting dR(v)
dv
= 0, or equivalently∫ 2vr
0
g(y)dy = 2vra. (2.140)
In our previously introduced notation, this writes SR(vr) = 0. When this extremum of R(v) exists,
it is also unique and is a minimum, since SR(v) is strictly increasing on the domain of interest.
The values of L(v) and R(v) at this point are given by
L(vr) = R(vr) = 1− b
2vr
. (2.141)
Moreover, substituting (2.140) back in (2.106) and (2.107) we get
kx,r = 1 (2.142)
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and
ky,r =
bg(2vr)
2vr(g(2vr)− a) . (2.143)
Therefore (vr, kx,r, ky,r) are a solution of the system given by (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107) if and
only if ky,r ∈ [0, 1]. From (2.131) it is implied that g(2vr) ≥ a, and hence that ky,r ≥ 0. The
condition ky,r ≤ 1 yields the same inequality as before:
2vra ≤ g(2vr)(2vr − b). (2.144)
Recall that L(v) has a unique maximum, while R(v) has a unique minimum. The immediate
implication of this is that the equation L(v) = R(v) can have a maximum of two solutions. These
are the possible solutions discussed above.
To summarize, we have two sets of relations:∫ 2vl
0
g(y)dy = g(2vl)(2vl − b),
2vla ≤ g(2vl)(2vl − b) (2.145)
and ∫ 2vr
0
g(y)dy = 2vra,
2vra ≤ g(2vr)(2vr − b) (2.146)
that could each yield a solution of the system in (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107).
In the remainder of this proof, we show that at least one of the sets (2.145) and (2.146) has a
solution and the sets (2.145) and (2.146) cannot both have different solutions.
Let v0 denote the value of v in [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞) for which
2v0a = g(2v0)(2v0 − b), (2.147)
as in Figure 2.12.
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FIGURE 2.12. Finding v0.
Such a value exists and is unique since (2.147) is equivalent to ab = (g(2v0)−a)(2v0−b), where
the term on the right hand side is a strictly increasing function of v0 on [max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞),
with a minimum in v0 = max{b/2, g−1(a)/2} which is 0 and limv→∞(g(2v) − a)(2v − b) = ∞.
Note that this also implies that 2va ≤ g(2v)(2v − b) can only be satisfied if v > v0.
Denote S = SL(v0) = SR(v0) the common value of SL and SR in v0. If S = 0, then vl = vr =
v0. If S < 0 or S > 0, since SL(v) is decreasing with v and SR(v) is increasing with v for the
domain of interest, it is not possible to obtain solutions larger than v0 to both equations SL(v) = 0
and SR(v) = 0.
However, a solution always exists. If S < 0, the solution is guaranteed by the continuity of SR(v)
on the domain of interest, and by the fact that limv→∞ SR(v) = ∞. If S > 0, the solution is guar-
anteed by the continuity of SL(v) on the domain of interest, and by the fact that limv→∞ SL(v) < 0,
which follows from the condition
∫ b
0
g(y)dy < limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx− b[g(z)− g(b)]. Note that
this condition is only necessary if S > 0 and is illustrated in Figure 2.13.
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FIGURE 2.13. The necessary condition for the existence of a solution when S > 0.
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A similar condition can be written for the case when S < 0, that is limv→∞ SR(v) > 0 if and
only if
∫ a
0
g−1(x)dx <
∫∞
g−1(a) g(y)dy. However, since g is a function and is defined over R+, this
latter condition can only be violated if g is constant on [g−1(a),∞). But this is impossible under
the former condition.
We have thus shown that under the condition that g is strictly increasing and continuous on
[max{b/2, g−1(a)/2},∞), and ∫ b
0
g(y)dy < limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx − b[g(z) − g(b)], the system
given by (2.105), (2.106) and (2.107) always has a solution, and that this solution is unique.
Several additional remarks
Bell and Cover [31] found the solution of our game for the particular case when a = b = 1
and g(y) = y. In the context of Gaussian arbitrarily varying channels, Hughes and Narayan [11]
extended the previous result to the case where a and b are any positive constants, and g(y) = y+ c,
with c ≥ 0. In the remainder of this section we show that our results can be easily particularized to
obtain the same results as in [11].
 )( yg
y
y
x
)(1 xFX−
))((1 ygFX−
)(vg
v
Values of                            that are 
achievable by Player 2 (by picking a 
distribution consisting of one or two mass 
points), under certain probability 
distributions of Player 1. 
The only achievable value of                                    
(for any distribution of Player2), under 
the optimal probability distributions of 
Player 1. 
)}(Pr{ YgX ≥
)}(Pr{ YgX ≥
0 1
 
 
 FIGURE 2.14. Intuitive explanation for the optimality of the strategy in (2.108).
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FIGURE 2.15. Intuitive explanation for the optimality of the strategy in (2.109).
If we force g(0) = g(0−) = 0, the function g(y) = y + c, ∀y > 0 is unbounded, linear, strictly
increasing, and has only one discontinuity in y = 0. Hence, it satisfies all the conditions set in the
problem formulation, as well as those of part (II) of our Theorem 2.22.
Substituting g(y) = y + c in (2.145), we get (Case 1):
2v2l − 2vlb− bc = 0 (2.148)
and
a ≤ vl + c, (2.149)
resulting in
vl =
b
2
[
1 +
√
1 +
2c
b
]
(2.150)
under the condition that
a ≤ c+ b
2
[
1 +
√
1 +
2c
b
]
. (2.151)
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The cost function for this case results from (2.136) as
Pr{X ≥ g(Y )} = a
c+ b
[
1 +
√
1 + 2c
b
] = a
c
[
1 +
b
c
(
1−
√
1 +
2c
b
)]
, (2.152)
and is also consistent with [11]. Note that although ky = 1 for this case, this does not mean
that Player 2 is always on. Recall that a discontinuity of g is translated into a mass point for the
probability distribution of Y . In this case, the discontinuity in y = 0 means that Y = 0 with
probability c
g(2vl)
= 1− b
vl
, which is the same as in [11].
Similarly, substituting g(y) = y + c in (2.146), we get (Case 2):
vl =
b
2
[
1 +
√
1 +
2c
b
]
(2.153)
under the condition that
a ≥ c+ b
2
[
1 +
√
1 +
2c
b
]
. (2.154)
Note that the two conditions (2.151) and (2.154) are mutually exclusive. The cost function for this
case is
Pr{X ≥ g(Y )} = 1− b
2(a− c) , (2.155)
and is consistent with [11].
In Figure 2.14 we offer an intuitive explanation of why F 0X(g(y)) should be uniform over [0, 2v],
from a maximin point of view. The function g(y) is taken to be linear, with a discontinuity in 0, sim-
ilar to [11]. Assuming that Player 1 plays first (maximin), we note that if F 0X(g(y)) is not uniform,
the second player can pick a strategy that decreases the value of the objective Pr{X ≥ g(Y )}.
Therefore, in order to provide the second player with an indifferent choice space (the strategy of
Player 2 can be any probability distribution over [0, 2v]), Player 1 should pick F 0X(x) such that
F 0X(g(y)) is uniform over [0, 2v].
Similarly, in Figure 2.15 we offer an intuitive explanation of why F 0Y (g−1(x)) should be uniform
over [0, g(2v)], from a minimax point of view. Assuming that Player 2 plays first (minimax), note
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FIGURE 2.16. The resulting strategies F 0X(x) and F 0Y (y) for a linear g(y) with a discontinuity in 0.
that if F 0Y (g−1(x)) is not uniform, the first player can pick a strategy that increases the value of the
objective Pr{X ≥ g(Y )}.
The optimal distributions resulting from Figures 2.14 and 2.15 are shown in Figure 2.16. They
are consistent with our theoretical results (and the results of [11]) for g(y) = y + c.
76
Chapter 3
Jamming in Fixed-Rate Wireless Systems with Power
Constraints - Part II: Parallel Slow Fading Channels
3.1 Introduction
The concept of jamming plays an extremely important role in ensuring the quality and security of
wireless communications, especially at this moment when wireless networks are quickly becoming
ubiquitous. Although the recent literature covers a wide variety of jamming problems [3–5, 9, 11,
37, 38], the investigation of optimal jamming and anti-jamming strategies for the parallel slow-
fading channel is missing.
The parallel slow-fading channel is a widely used model for OFDM transmission [28]. Since
the usual definition of capacity does not provide a positive performance indicator for this model,
a more adequate performance measure is the probability of outage [28], defined as the probabil-
ity that the instantaneous mutual information characterizing the parallel channel, under a given
channel realization, is below a fixed transmission rate R. Under the optimal diversity-multiplexing
tradeoff, the parallel slow-fading channel with M subchannels is known [28] to yield an M -fold
diversity gain over the scalar single antenna channel. However the diversity-multiplexing tradeoff
only gives an approximative analytical evaluation of the probability of outage for a given rate R
and a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and this approximation is usually accurate only in the high SNR
region. Thus, for evaluating a system which functions at a moderate SNR, the exact probability-
of-outage vs. transmission-rate curve is often computed numerically. Moreover, the high SNR
assumption is clearly not adequate for studying a practical uncorrelated jamming situation, where
the jammer’s power should be considered at least comparable to the legitimate transmitter’s.
Therefore, we aim at deriving the exact probability of outage achievable in the presence of a
jammer, over our parallel slow fading channel, for a fixed transmission rate R. Our channel model
is depicted in Figure 3.1. The span of a codeword is denoted by “frame”. To model our parallel
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slow fading channel, each frame is divided into M “blocks” (corresponding to the M subchannels),
each of which consists of N channel uses, like in Figure 3.2.
The channel fading is slow, such that the corresponding channel coefficients remain constant
over each block and vary independently across different blocks. The channel coefficients are com-
plex numbers, and their squared absolute values are denoted as hm. The vector h = [h0, h1, . . . , hM−1]
of channel coefficients over a whole frame is assumed to be perfectly known to the receiver, and
can be made available by feedback (if the receiver wishes) to the transmitter (Tx), and jammer (Jx)
before the transmission begins. It was shown in [32] that the feedback of channel state informa-
tion (CSI) (i.e. the M coefficients of a frame) brings moderate benefits for the parallel slow-fading
channel without jamming. Thus, by employing optimal power control strategies, the transmitter
can lower the probability of outage for fixed transmission rate and SNR. In this chapter, we study
both the scenarios when the CSI is fed back by the legitimate receiver – and hence all M channel
coefficients characterizing a frame are available to both transmitter and jammer in a non-causal
fashion (it is only natural to assume that if the transmitter has full CSI, the jammer can get the
same information by eavesdropping) – and the scenario when no feedback takes place and thus the
CSI is only available to the receiver.
In addition to fading, the transmission is affected by additive white complex Gaussian noise
(AWGN), and by a jammer. The jammer has no knowledge about the transmitter’s output, or even
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FIGURE 3.1. Channel model
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the codebook that the transmitter is using, and hence it deploys its most harmful strategy: it trans-
mits white complex Gaussian noise [30] (AWGJ in Figure 3.1).
The transmitter (Tx) uses a complex Gaussian codebook. Over a given frame, it allocates power
Pm to block m, 0 ≤ m ≤ M − 1, while the jammer (Jx) invests power Jm in jamming the same
block with noise. As assumed in [32], the number of channel uses per block is large N → ∞ in
order to average out the impact of the Gaussian noise. Under these assumptions, the instantaneous
mutual information characterizing a subchannel m is given by I(hm, Pm, Jm) = log(1 + hmPmσ2N+Jm ),
where σ2N is the variance of the ambient AWGN. The following denotations will be repeatedly used
in the sequel:
• Power allocated by the transmitter over a frame:
PM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Pm;
• Power allocated by the jammer over a frame:
JM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Jm;
• Instantaneous mutual information between the transmitter and the receiver over a frame:
IM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 I(hm, Pm, Jm).
Note that PM is a function of the channel realization h, so we often write PM(h) when this
relation needs to be explicitly emphasized. PM(h) can also be interpreted as the function giving
the power distribution across different frames. We also use PM(h) and JM(h) to denote inter-frame
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power allocation for the case M = 1, since in this case a frame only contains one block. Like in
Chapter 2, throughout this chapter we shall also use the notation c = exp(MR) for simplicity.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, our channel model is similar to that of [9]. The difference, however, is
that we investigate the jamming problem in slow-fading channels and hence the probability of out-
age, defined as the probability that the instantaneous mutual information IM of the channel is lower
than the fixed transmission rate R [32] is considered as an objective function Pout = Pr(IM < R)
(while [9] assumes fast fading and uses the ergodic capacity as objective). Our problem is still for-
mulated as a two-player, zero-sum game. The transmitter wants to achieve reliable communication
and hence minimize the outage probability, while the jammer wants to induce outage and maximize
the outage probability. Strategies consist of varying transmission powers based on the CSI (i.e. the
perfect knowledge of h) if available, or solely on the channel’s statistics if CSI is not available. The
properties of our different objective function make our new jamming and anti-jamming problem
much more challenging to solve.
It is easy to find similarities to the fixed rate system with fast fading which was studied in
Chapter 2. In fact, the fast fading scenario of Chapter 2 can be obtained as a particular case of
the current setup, by allowing a large number of blocks per frame M → ∞ (corresponding to
an infinite number of subchannels). In doing so, the different frames are no longer characterized
by their respective channel realizations, but instead they become long enough to display the sta-
tistical properties of the channel coefficient and thus become equivalent. This is why our present
parallel slow fading scenario is more involved than the fast fading model of Chapter 2, especially
when it comes to resolving the optimal power allocation between different frames. Sometimes this
additional complexity leads to an additional level of power control, as we shall see in Section 3.4.
Our contributions are summarized below:
• We first investigate the case where the receiver feeds back the channel state information
(CSI) which becomes available to both transmitter and jammer. For the short-term power
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constraints case we show the existence of and find a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies.
Note that for a two-person, zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria have the same value [33].
Since an equilibrium of pure strategies is also an equilibrium of mixed strategies, our Nash
equilibrium of pure strategies provides the complete solution of the game.
• For the case with long-term power constraints we find the maximin and minimax solutions
of pure strategies, and show they do not coincide (hence the non-existence of a Nash equilib-
rium of pure strategies). Traditional methods of optimization, such as the KKT conditions,
cannot be applied to solve for these solutions completely. Therefore we provide a new, more
intuitive approach based on the special duality property discussed in Section 2.8.4 of Chapter
2. As argued in Chapter 2, Nash equilibria of mixed strategies may not always be the best
solutions to jamming problems. A smart jammer could eavesdrop the channel and detect
both the legitimate transmitter’s presence and its power level. Therefore, we believe that the
maximin and minimax problem formulations with pure strategies are of great importance in
understanding and resolving the practical jamming situations (in the worst case, they provide
upper and lower bounds on the system’s performance).
• The optimal pure strategies of allocating power between frames, for the maximin and min-
imax formulations, are found as the solutions of two simple numerical algorithms. These
algorithms function according to two different techniques which we explain in the sequel
and we dub as “the vase water filling problems”.
• Mixed strategies are discussed next. We show that for completely characterizing this scenario
we need three different levels of power control. We then particularize and obtain numerical
results for the special simple case with only one block per frame (M = 1).
• Finally, we compare our results to the case when the channel state information is only avail-
able to the receiver. We derive a Nash equilibrium for M = 1, and show that unlike in the
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fast fading scenario (where CSI feedback brings negligible improvements), under our cur-
rent parallel slow fading channel model, perfect knowledge about the CSI at all parties can
substantially improve performance.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 deals with the short term power constrained
problem when full CSI is available to all parties. Section 3.3 studies the scenario with long term
power constraints and pure strategies under the same assumption of available CSI. Mixed strategies
are discussed in Section 3.4. For comparison purposes, Section 3.5 presents results for the case with
no CSI feedback. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 3.6.
3.2 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with
Short-Term Power Constraints
The game with short-term power constraints is the less complex of the two games we discuss in
the sequel. In this game, the transmitter’s goal is to: Minimize Pr(IM(h, P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to PM(h) ≤ P ,with prob. 1 (3.1)
while the jammer’s goal is to: Maximize Pr(IM(h, P (h), J(h)) < R)Subject to JM(h) ≤ J ,with prob. 1. (3.2)
We shall prove that this game is closely related to a different two player, zero-sum game, which
has the mutual information between Tx and Rx as a cost/reward function:
Tx
 Maximize IM(h, P (h), J(h))Subject to PM(h) ≤ P , (3.3)
Jx
 Minimize IM(h, P (h), J(h))Subject to JM(h) ≤ J . (3.4)
This latter game is characterized by the following proposition:
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Proposition 3.1. The game of (3.3) and (3.4) has a Nash equilibrium point given by the following
strategies:
P ∗(hm) =
 (
1
η
− σ2N
hm
)+ if hm < σ
2
Nη
1−σ2Nν
hm
η(hm+
η
ν
)
if hm ≥ σ
2
Nη
1−σ2Nν
(3.5)
J∗(hm) =
 0 if hm <
σ2Nη
1−σ2Nν
hm
ν(hm+
η
ν
)
− σ2N if hm ≥ σ
2
Nη
1−σ2Nν
(3.6)
where η and ν are constants that can be determined from the power constraints.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of Section IV.B in [9], and is outlined in Section
3.7.
The connection between the two games above is made clear in the following theorem, the proof
of which follows in the footsteps of [32] and is given in Section 3.7.
Theorem 3.2. Let P ∗(h) and J∗(h) denote the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game described
by (3.3) and (3.4). Then the original game of (3.1), (3.2) has a Nash equilibrium point, which is
given by the following pair of strategies:
P̂ (hm) =
 P
∗(hm) if h ∈ U(R,P ,J )
Pa(hm) if h /∈ U(R,P ,J )
(3.7)
Ĵ(hm) =
 Ja(hm) if h ∈ U(R,P ,J )J∗(hm) if h /∈ U(R,P ,J ) (3.8)
where U(R,P ,J ) = {h ∈ RM+ : IM(h, P ∗(h), J∗(h)) ≥ R}, and where Pa(h) and Ja(h) are
some arbitrary power allocations satisfying the power constraints respectively.
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3.3 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with
Long-Term Power Constraints: Pure Strategies
The long-term power constrained jamming game can be formulated as:
Tx
 Minimize Pr(IM(h, {Pm}, {Jm}) < R)Subject to E[PM(h)] ≤ P (3.9)
Jx
 Maximize Pr(IM(h, {Pm}, {Jm}) < R)Subject to E[JM(h)] ≤ J (3.10)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector of channel coefficients
h = (h0, h1, . . . , hM−1) ∈ RM+ , and P and J are the upper-bounds on average transmission power
of the source and jammer, respectively.
Contrary to the previous short-term power constraints scenario, if long-term power constraints
are used it is possible to have PM(h) > P for a particular channel realization h, as long as the
average of PM(h) over all possible channel realizations is less than P .
Let m denote the probability measure introduced by the probability density function (p.d.f.) of
h, i.e., for a setA ⊆ RM+ , we have m(A ) =
∫
A
f(h)dh. Integrating with respect to this measure is
equivalent to computing an average with respect to the p.d.f. given by f(h), i.e., dm(h) = f(h)dh.
Both transmitter and jammer have to plan in terms of power allocation, considering both the
instantaneous realization and the probability distribution of the channel coefficient vector, as well
as their opponent’s strategy.
If the number of blocks M in each frame is larger than 1, the game between transmitter and
jammer has two levels. The first (coarser) level is about power allocation between frames, and has
the probability of outage as a cost/reward function. This is the only level that shows up in the case
of M = 1. The second (finer) level is that of power allocation between the blocks within a frame.
An important comment similar to that in Chapter 2 needs to be made. We should point out
that decomposing the problem into several (two or three) levels of power control, each of which
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is solved separately, does not restrict the generality of our solution. In proving our main results
we take a contradictory approach. That is, instead of directly deriving each optimal strategy, we
assume an optimal solution has already been reached and show it has to satisfy a set of properties.
We do this by first assuming that the properties are not satisfied, and then showing that under this
assumption at least one of the players can improve its strategy (and hence the original solution
cannot be optimal). The properties are selected such that they are not only necessary, but also
sufficient for the completely characterizing the optimal solution (i.e. there exists a unique pair of
strategies that satisfy these properties).
3.3.1 Power Allocation between the Blocks in a Frame
In this subsection we only deal with the second (intra-frame) level of power allocation for the
maximin and minimax problems. The first (inter-frame) level will be investigated in detail in the
following two subsections.
The probability of outage is determined by the m-measure of the set over which the transmitter
is not present or the jammer is successful in inducing outage. This set is established in the first
level of power control. Note that the first level power allocation strategies cannot be derived before
the second level strategies are available.
In the maximin case (when the jammer plays first), assume that the jammer has already allocated
some power JM to a given frame. Naturally, the transmitter knows JM (the maximin problem
assumes that the transmitter is fully aware of the jammer’s strategy). Depending on the channel
realization, the value of JM , and its own power constraints, the transmitter decides whether it wants
to achieve reliable communication over that frame. If it decides to transmit, it needs to spend as
little power as possible (the transmitter will be able to use the saved power for achieving reliable
communication over another set of positive m-measure, and thus to decrease the probability of
outage). Therefore, the transmitter’s objective is to minimize the power PM spent for achieving
reliable communication. The transmitter will adopt this strategy whether the jammer is present
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over the frame, or not. The jammer’s objective is then to allocate JM between the blocks such that
the required PM is maximized.
In the minimax scenario (when transmitter plays first) the jammer’s objective is to minimize the
power JM used for jamming the transmission over a given frame. The jammer will only transmit
if the transmitter is present with some PM . The transmitter’s objective is to distribute PM between
blocks such that the power required for jamming is maximized.
The two problems can be formulated as:
Problem 1 (for the maximin solution - jammer plays first)
max
{Jm≥0}
[
min
{Pm≥0}
PM =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Pm, s.t. IM({Pm}, {Jm}) ≥ R
]
s.t.
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Jm ≤ JM ; (3.11)
Problem 2 (for the minimax solution - transmitter plays first)
max
{Pm≥0}
[
min
{Jm≥0}
JM =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Jm, s.t. IM({Pm}, {Jm}) ≤ R
]
s.t.
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Pm ≤ PM . (3.12)
These problems can be solved by methods very similar to those presented in Chapter 2. For the
brevity of this presentation, we shall only point out the main results, and defer all proofs to the
Section 3.8. The following propositions fully characterize the solutions.
Proposition 3.3. The optimal solution of either of the two problems above satisfies both constraints
with equality.
Proposition 3.4. (I) Take the game given by (3.3) and (3.4) and set the constraints to PM(h) ≤
PM,1 and JM(h) ≤ JM,1. Denote the resulting value of the objective by IM(h, P (h), J(h)) = R1.
Then solving Problem 1 above with the constraints 1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Jm ≤ JM,1 and IM({Pm}, {Jm}) ≥
R1 yields the objective PM = PM,1. Moreover, any pair of power allocations across blocks that
makes an optimal solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4) is also an optimal solution of Problem 1,
and conversely.
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(II)Take the game given by (3.3) and (3.4) and set the constraints to PM(h) ≤ PM,1 and
JM(h) ≤ JM,1. Denote the resulting value of the objective by IM(h, P (h), J(h)) = R1. Then
solving Problem 2 above with the constraints 1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Pm ≤ PM,1 and IM({Pm}, {Jm}) ≤ R1
yields the objective JM = JM,1. Moreover, any pair of power allocations across blocks that makes
an optimal solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4) is also an optimal solution of Problem 2, and
conversely.
(III) If JM,1 is the value used for the second constraint in Problem 1 above, and PM,1 is the
resulting value of the cost/reward function, then solving Problem 2 with PM = PM,1 yields the
cost/reward function JM = JM,1. Moreover, any pair of power allocations across blocks that
makes an optimal solution of Problem 1, should also make an optimal solution of Problem 2, and
conversely.
Proposition 3.5. The optimal solutions of Problem 1 and Problem 2 above are unique.
Proposition 3.6. (I) Under the optimal maximin second level power control strategies (Problem
1), the “required” transmitter power PM over a frame is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave
and unbounded function of the power JM that the jammer invests in that frame.
(II) Under the optimal minimax second level power control strategies (Problem 2), the “re-
quired” jamming power JM over a frame is a strictly increasing, continuous, convex and un-
bounded function of the power PM that the transmitter invests in that frame.
Although under the same transmitter/jammer frame power constraints PM and JM the second
level optimal power allocation strategies for the maximin and minimax problems coincide, this
result should not be associated with the notion of Nash equilibrium, since the two problems solved
above do not form a zero-sum game, while for the game of (3.9) and (3.10), first level power control
strategies are yet to be investigated.
As in Chapter 2, we shall henceforth denote the function that gives the “required” transmitter
power PM over a frame where the jammer invests power JM byPM(JM ,h) and its “inverse”, i.e.
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the function that gives the “required” jamming power over a frame where the transmitter invests
PM by JM(PM ,h). Note that unlike in Chapter 2, these functions are now also dependent on
the channel realization h. A particular channel realization can be characterized in terms of the
second level power allocation technique. For instance, considering the maximin problem, we can
map each channel vector h to a unique curve PM(JM) in the plane. That is, for fixed h, we
increase the jamming power allocated to the frame from 0 to∞, and compute the transmitter power
PM(JM ,h) required for achieving reliable communication. We have already mentioned that, for
any fixed h,PM(JM) is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave and unbounded function.
Next we take a closer look at the PM(JM ,h) curves. By inspecting the proofs of Propositions
3.3 - 3.6, we notice that j denotes the index of the first block on which the jammer allocates
nonzero power, while p is the index of the first block on which the transmitter allocates nonzero
power (the blocks are indexed in increasing order of their squared channel coefficients hm, and
both transmitter and jammer allocate more power to blocks with larger values of hm). Note also
that p ≤ j. If for a given h we have p = j over an interval of JM , then thePM(JM) curve is linear
over that interval. However, if p < j, the curve is strictly concave.
We can think of the PM(JM) curve that characterizes a given channel realization h as being
“built” in the following manner. We increase the jamming power allocated to the corresponding
frame, starting from JM = 0. We already know that without the jammer’s presence the transmitter
transmits over the “best” blocks , i.e. the ones having the largest channel coefficients. Even as the
jammer starts interfering, its optimal strategy is such that the blocks with the largest coefficients
remain the most attractive for the transmitter. However, they do become worse than before. Hence,
if without the presence of the jammer the transmitter would normally ignore some of the blocks,
as the jammer’s power increases, those blocks may slowly become more attractive. At some point,
the transmitter will choose to increase the number of blocks over which it allocates non-zero power
(i.e. decrease p). Similarly, as the jammer’s power JM increases, the jammer moves from the best
block to the best two blocks, and so on (i.e. the jammer decreases j).
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FIGURE 3.3. Typical PM (JM ) curves, for different channel realizations
The transmitter’s and the jammer’s transitions do not have to be simultaneous. Recall that the
relationship between the values of p and j decide whether the PM(JM) curve is linear or strictly
concave over an interval of JM . Therefore, we expect the PM(JM) curves to look like a concate-
nation of linear and strictly concave segments, as in Figure 3.3. As JM increases, the transmitter
decreases the value of p whenever the slope of thePM(JM) curve can be decreased by this move
and similarly, the jammer decreases the value of j whenever the slope can be increased. In other
words, as JM increases, the transitions from linear portions to nonlinear portions are caused by the
transmitter, while the transitions from nonlinear to linear ones are caused by the jammer.
In the remainder of this subsection we provide the simplest example of optimal power allocation
between the blocks of a frame. Namely, we look at the case when M = 2 – only two blocks per
frame.
Particular case: M = 2
The case of M = 2 is the simplest and most intuitive illustration of the second-level power
control strategy. Since we have already discussed the nice dual property between the second level
minimax and maximin strategies, the following considerations refer to the maximin scenario only.
The jamming power JM has to be allocated between the two blocks in a way that maximizes
the transmitter’s expense, should it decide to achieve reliable communication over the frame. The
jammer and the transmitter can each transmit over either one or both blocks. All possible situations
are considered next.
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Let the two channel coefficients be h0 ≤ h1, and denote the transmitter’s and jammer’s powers
allocated to the blocks by P0, P1 and J0, J1 respectively. Also denote xi = Ji + σ2N , for i ∈ {0, 1},
and c = exp(2R). If we take a closer look at the solutions (3.5) and (3.6) of the game in (3.3) and
(3.4), and if we recall that the solutions of either of our maximin and minimax second layer power
allocation strategies have a similar form (up to the constants η and ν), it is easy to observe that
x0 ≤ x1 and x0h0 ≥ x1h1 . This fact is also noted in Section 3.8.3, where the solution of Problem 1 is
given again, with the new notation λ = 1/η and µ = ν/η. Throughout the rest of this subsection
we shall refer to the notation in Section 3.8.3 and the solution in (3.100) and (3.101).
If the transmitter is active over both blocks, then the constraint IM = R yields(
1 +
h0
x0
P0
)(
1 +
h1
x1
P1
)
= c, (3.13)
and with (3.102) in Section 3.8.3 we obtain λ =
√
cx0
h0
x1
h1
.
Suppose that the jammer is only present on one block of the frame, then that is the block with
coefficient h1. This implies x0 = σ2N , and x1 = (2JM + σ2N). Under these assumptions, the
transmitter will only transmit on the first block, (that is P0 = 2PM and P1 = 0) if and only if
λ =
√
c
x0
h0
x1
h1
<
x0
h0
, (3.14)
which translates to c (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
<
σ2N
h0
.
Otherwise, the transmitter is present over both blocks, performing water-pouring as in (3.102),
with
λ =
√
c
(2JM + σ2N)σ
2
N
h0h1
. (3.15)
Note that the transmitter cannot be present only on the second block.
If the jammer decides to allocate non-zero power over both blocks, its optimal strategy is such
that x0/h0 ≥ x1/h1. If we also have x0/h0 ≤ c(x1/h1) (corresponding to λ ≥ x0/h0), then the
transmitter is present over both blocks. In this case, we can particularize (3.102) to M = 2 and
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obtain:
Pm =
√
c
x0
h0
x1
h1
− xm
hm
, for m ∈ {0, 1}. (3.16)
Define the ratio r = x0/h0
x1/h1
. Since x0 + x1 = 2(JM + σ2N), we can write
PM =
(JM + σ
2
N)(2
√
cr − r − 1)
h0r + h1
, if cx1
h1
≥ x0
h0
. (3.17)
Setting the derivative of PM with respect to r equal to zero, we get the unique solution
ropt =
(√
(h1 − h0)2 + 4h0h1c− (h1 − h0)
2h0
√
c
)2
, (3.18)
which provides the optimal allocation of the jamming power JM between the two blocks. The value
of ropt is between 1 (for h0 = h1) and c (for h0 = 0). Furthermore, PM(r) is strictly increasing
for r ∈ [1, ropt) and strictly decreasing for r ∈ (ropt, c], hence ropt is the maximizing argument in
(3.17).
This also implies that if ropt
(2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
<
σ2N
h1
, the jammer’s optimal strategy is to allocate all of
its power to the second block. If, on the other hand, ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
≥ σ2N
h1
, then the jammer’s best
strategy is to allocate the power JM such that the ratio r = (x0/h0)/(x1/h1) equals the optimal
ratio ropt.
The remarks above conclude in the following algorithm:
• If c (2JM+σ2N )
h1
≤ σ2N
h0
, both transmitter and jammer will only transmit on the second block.
• If c (2JM+σ2N )
h1
>
σ2N
h0
but ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
≤ σ2N
h1
, the jammer will allocate all its power to the
second block, while the transmitter will transmit on both blocks.
• If ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
>
σ2N
h1
, the jammer will transmit over both blocks such that (x0/h0)/(x1/h1) =
ropt, and the transmitter will also be present on both blocks.
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3.3.2 Inter-Frame Power Allocation
In this subsection we present the first level optimal power allocation strategies.
The Maximin Solution
Under our full CSI, average power constraints scenario, the jammer needs to find the best choice
of the set X ⊂ RM+ of channel realizations over which it should be present, and the optimal way
JM(h) to distribute its power overX , such that when the transmitter employs its optimal strategy,
the probability of outage is maximized.
We already know that given the jammer’s strategy, the optimal way of allocating the transmitter’s
power is such that reliable communication is first obtained on the frames that require the least
amount of transmitter power. The jammer’s optimal strategy is presented in Theorem 3.7 below.
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FIGURE 3.4. Maximin vase filling.
The theorem is complemented by the numerical algorithm and the intuition-building analogy that
follows its proof.
Theorem 3.7. It is optimal for the jammer to make JM(h) satisfy the power constraint with equal-
ity. The optimal jammer strategy for allocating power across frames is to increase the required
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transmitter power, starting with those frames whose channel realizations exhibit the steepest in-
stantaneous slope of the characteristic PM(JM) curve. The jamming power should be allocated
such that the required transmitter power over each channel realization where the jammer is present
does not exceed a pre-defined level K. The optimal value for K that maximizes the outage prob-
ability can be found numerically, by exhaustive search in a compact interval of the positive real
line.
Proof. Our proof takes a contradictory approach. Instead of deriving the optimal strategy defined
above in a direct manner, we show instead that any other strategy not satisfying the theorem’s
requirements is suboptimal. Let S ,X ⊂ RM+ denote the sets of channel realizations over which
the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Suppose the jammer picks a certain strategy JM(h). Since the transmitter’s strategy is pre-
dictable, the jammer already knows the transmitter’s optimal strategy. Under this optimal strat-
egy, the transmitter picks a set of frames S over which it will invest non-zero power. This choice
also results in a maximum level of required transmitter power that will actually be matched by
the transmitter. Denote this level by K. Since the transmitter’s strategy is the optimal response
to the jammer’s strategy, the required transmitter power should be larger than or equal to K over
the set of frames X \S where the jammer jams, but the transmitter does not afford to transmit.
Otherwise, the transmitter would be wasting power and its strategy would not be optimal.
But since the jammer knows the transmitter’s strategy, and knows that the transmitter will not
transmit overX \S , its optimal strategy should make the required transmitter power overX \S
at most equal to K. Otherwise the jammer would be wasting power.
We have seen how the jammer’s power should be distributed over X \S . Next we show that
if the jammer’s power allocation overS ⋂X is not done according to the theorem, the jammer’s
strategy is not optimal. For this, we assume that the jammer’s strategy does not satisfy the theorem’s
requirements, and provide a method of improvement (i.e. we prove sub-optimality).
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If the theorem is not satisfied, than there exist two setsA ,B ⊂ S ⋂X of non-zero m-measure
such thatdPM (h1)
dJM
> dPM (h2)
dJM
∀ h1 ∈ A and h2 ∈ B, and such that the required PM is less than K
on A and JM > 0 onB.
Consider a small enough amount of jamming power δJM , such that, for any channel realiza-
tion h ∈ A ⋃B, we can modify the jamming power by δJM without changing the slope of the
PM(JM) curve. Subtracting δJM from all frames in B, the jammer obtains the excess power
δJMm(B), which it can allocate uniformly over A . The jammer’s total average power remains
unchanged. However, the required transmitter power overA
⋃
B is increased (because the slopes
of the PM(JM) curves corresponding to A are all larger than the slopes of the PM(JM) curves
corresponding toB), and thus the modification results in a larger probability of outage.
There exists a closed interval [0, Kmax] ∈ R+ which includes the optimal value of K. This
observation is vital to the existence of a numerical algorithm that searches for the optimal K.
Once such an interval has been set, we can fix the desired resolution and calculate the numerical
complexity of the algorithm. We next show how the upper limit Kmax of this interval can be found.
Consider the set of channel realizations S0 where the transmitter is active when the jammer does
not interfere with the transmission. Next, find the valueKmax for which, when the jammer allocates
its power J according to the rules of the theorem, we obtain a setX0 ⊂ RM+ \S0. This means that
the jammer’s strategy under any K ≥ Kmax has no influence upon the transmitter’s strategy. Note
that such a finite Kmax can be found whenever RM+ \S0 has non-zero m-measure.
The algorithm in Table 3.1 which we used in generating our numerical results in Subsection 3.3.3
helps shed more light into the practicality of Theorem 3.7. In the description of the algorithm, we
assume discrete jamming power levels JkM with k = 0, 1, . . . and J0M = 0, as well as a discrete
and finite channel coefficient space. As a consequence, there exists a finite number of PM(JM)
curves, each characterizing one possible channel realization, and each completely determined by a
finite vector whose components are the values ofPM(JkM) for that particular channel realization.
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An intuitive description of the technique is given in Figure 3.4. Consider the problem where the
jammer has to pour water in a number of vases (a vase for each possible channel realization). The
shape of each vase is such that the vertical section of its wall produces a concave curve similar to
the correspondingPM(JM) curve. The jammer can afford to spend a certain volume of water. The
jammer wants to “annoy” the transmitter, which is deeply concerned with the sum of the heights
that the water levels reach in the vases. Hence, the jammer tries to use its available volume of water,
such that the sum of the water levels’ heights is maximized. However, the jammer cannot pour all
the water in the thinnest vase, because then the transmitter might just ignore that vase. Instead,
the jammer has to set a height limit K which it should not exceed. The jammer pours the water a
cup at a time, starting with the vase in which a cup of water rises the water level the quickest. In
Figure 3.4, the order of adding cups to the vases is shown by numerals from 1 to 11. The first cup
is poured into the thinnest vase (vase A) and incidentally reaches the level K. Thus, no more water
should be added to vase A. The next three cups are added to vase B, and then the next five cups to
vase C. Then the jammer returns to vase B, and adds another cup, for this increases the water level
more than it would increase the level in vase C. Finally, the last available cup is added to vase C.
The way the numerical algorithm works is illustrated in the right part of Figure 3.4.
The Minimax Solution
In Theorem 3.4 we showed that given the transmitter’s and the jammer’s powers PM and JM
allocated to a frame, the optimal strategies for distributing these powers inside the frame are iden-
tical for the minimax and the maximin problems. Hence, by rotating thePM(JM) plane, we get the
characteristicJM(PM) curves for the minimax problem. We already know that given the transmit-
ter’s strategy, the optimal way of allocating the jammer’s power is such that outage is first induced
on the frames that require the least amount of jamming power.
The transmitter’s optimal strategy is presented in the following theorem, which is complemented
by the numerical algorithm and the analogy that follows its proof.
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TABLE 3.1. Numerical algorithm for deriving the maximin solution.
Let P denote a matrix with each row representing
one of the vectors PM (JkM ), for different channel
realizations h. Let Preq be the vector of required
powers for the different frames. The initial Preq is
set equal to the first column of P. Let Kmax be the
upper limit when searching for the optimal K.
Initialize K = 0.
while K ≤ Kmax
pT = 0.
Let L be an index vector, the same size as Preq.
Initialize all components of L to be equal to 1.
We have the relationship Preq(j) = P(j, L(j)).
% Jx strategy:
The amount of jamming power spent at each step is
accumulated into the variable Jc.
while Jx power constraint is satisfied (Jc ≤ J )
Find row j of P with the largest difference
between components L(j) + 1 and L(j),
and such that P(j, L(j) + 1) ≤ K.
Preq(j) = P(j, L(j) + 1).
L(j) = L(j) + 1.
Weigh J jM by probability of row j and add to
Jc.
end
% Tx strategy (Tx picks frames where required
power is minimum first)
The amount of transmitter power spent at each step
is simulated into the variable Pc.
while Tx power constraint is satisfied (Pc ≤ P)
Pick the least component of Preq.
Add probability of corresponding frame to
pT .
Add value of component, weighted by
probability above, to Pc.
Delete component from Preq.
end
Pout(K) = 1− pT
Increment K.
end
Select K that produces the largest Pout.
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Theorem 3.8. It is optimal for transmitter to make PM(h) satisfy the long-term power constraint
with equality. The optimal transmitter power allocation across frames is to increase the required
jamming power up to some pre-defined level K, starting with those frames on which the required
transmitter power to achieve this goal is least.
The optimal value for K that minimizes the outage probability can be found numerically by
exhaustive search.
Proof. As in the case of Theorem 3.7, we take a contradictory approach. Instead of directly deriv-
ing the optimal strategy defined above, we show that any other strategy not satisfying the theorem’s
requirements is suboptimal. Recall that S and X ⊂ RM+ denote the sets of channel realizations
over which the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Suppose the transmitter picks a certain strategy PM(h). Since the jammer’s strategy is pre-
dictable, the transmitter already knows the jammer’s optimal strategy. Under this optimal strategy,
the jammer should pick a set of frames X over which it will invest non-zero power. This choice
also results in a maximum level of required jamming power that will actually be matched by the
jammer. Denote this level by K. Since the jammer’s strategy is optimal, the required jamming
power outside the set X should be larger than or equal to K. Otherwise, the jammer would be
wasting power and hence its strategy would not be optimal. But since the transmitter knows the
jammer’s strategy, it also knows that the jammer will not be present overS \X , so the transmitter
should make the required jamming power over S \X at most equal to K. Otherwise the trans-
mitter would be wasting power. Hence, over S \X the transmitter should allocate power such
that the required jamming power is equal to K.
Next we show that if the transmitter’s power allocation over S
⋂
X is not done according to
the theorem, the transmitter’s strategy is not optimal. For this, we assume that the transmitter’s
strategy does not satisfy the theorem’s requirements, and provide a method of improvement (i.e.
we prove sub-optimality).
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If the theorem is not satisfied, than there exist two setsA ,B ⊂ S ⋂X of non-zero m-measure
such that PM(h1, K) < PM(h2, K) ∀ h1 ∈ A and h2 ∈ B, and such that the required JM is less
than K on A and JM > 0 on B cannot be part of the minimax solution. Denote the original
transmitter power allocation functions over A andB by PAM,0(h) and PBM,0(h) respectively.
For any h1 ∈ A , h2 ∈ B and JM,1, JM,2 < K, we have:
K − JM,1
PM(h1, K)− PM(h1, JM,1)
a)
≥ K
PM(h1, K)
b)
>
K
PM(h2, K)
c)
≥ JM,2
PM(h2, JM,2)
, (3.19)
where both a) and c) follow from the convexity of JM(PM) – Proposition 3.6 – and b) follows
from the assumption in the beginning of this proof.
If the transmitter cuts off transmission over a subset B′ ⊂ B, it obtains the excess power∫
B′ PM(h)dm(h), which it can allocate to a subset A
′ ⊂ A such that the required JM is equal to
K over A ′, i.e. ∫
B′
PBM,0(h)dm(h) =
∫
A ′
[
PM(h, K)− PAM,0(h)
]
dm(h) (3.20)
Replacing PM(h1, JM,1) by PAM,0(h) and PM(h2, JM,2) by PBM,0(h) in (3.19), we see the trans-
mitter improves its strategy by forcing the jammer to allocate more power to the set A ⋃B, and
hence decreases the probability of outage. Note that since B′ ⊂ S ⋂X , the set B′ is in outage,
regardless of whether the transmitter is present or not. Thus, transmitter does not increase Pout by
cutting off transmission onB′.
There exists a closed interval [0, Kmax] ∈ R+ which includes the optimal value of K. As in
the maximin case, the existence of such a closed interval is required for constructing a numerical
algorithm that searches for the optimal K. The upper limit Kmax of this interval can be found and
updated as follows. First solve the problem for an arbitrarily chosen K0, and determine the set
S0 \X0 over which the transmitter achieves reliable communication. We can set Kmax equal to
the value of K that yields a set S of the same m-measure as the set S0 \X0. Note that if K is
increased over this Kmax, the outage probability is at least as large as that obtained for K = K0
(and hence K0 is a better choice).
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FIGURE 3.5. Minimax vase filling.
The algorithm in Table 3.2 which we used for our numerical results in Subsection 3.3.3 illustrates
the application of Theorem 3.8. In the description of the algorithm, we assume discrete jamming
power levels JkM with k = 0, 1, . . . and J0M = 0, as well as a discrete and finite channel coefficient
space. As a consequence, there exists a finite number ofPM(JM) curves, each characterizing one
possible channel realization, and each completely determined by a finite vector whose components
are the values ofPM(JkM) for that particular channel realization.
A description of the technique is given in Figure 3.5, using the same vase analogy as in the
maximin case. This time, the transmitter does the pouring. Its obsession with the sum of the heights
of the water levels imposes a constraint on this sum. Under this constraint, the transmitter wants to
use as much of the jammer’s water as possible. That is, the transmitter attempts to maximize the
volume of water that can be accommodated by the vases, under the constraint that the sum of the
water levels’ heights is less than some given value. Moreover, if the transmitter pours water only in
the thickest vase, it might not feel that it did enough damage to the jammer. Thus, the transmitter
needs to set a limit K. The optimal strategy is to fill (up to volume level K) the thickest vase first
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TABLE 3.2. Numerical algorithm for deriving the minimax solution.
Let P denote the matrix with rows representing the
PM (JkM ) vectors for different channel realizations
h. Let Kmax be value where searching for the opti-
mal K stops.
Initialize K = 0.
while K ≤ Kmax
% Tx strategy:
The amount of transmitter power spent at each step
is accumulated into the variable Pc.
Initialize K = JkM .
Initialize Pc = 0, pT = 0.
while Tx power constraint is satisfied (Pc ≤ P)
Find row j of P with least k-th component.
Add probability of row j to pT .
Add value of the k-th component, weighted
by the probability above, to Pc.
Delete row j from matrix P.
end
% Jx strategy (Jx jams frames where Tx is present,
randomly, until it reaches its power constraints):
pJ = JK .
Pout(K) = pT − pJ .
Increment K.
end
Select K that produces the least Pout.
(note that “thickest” refers to the fact that when filled up to volume level K, the vase displays the
lowest water level height, thus “thickest” is defined with respect to K). The order in which the
transmitter adds cups of water to the vases is depicted in Figure 3.5 by numerals from 1 to 12. The
way the numerical algorithm works is illustrated in the right part of Figure 3.5.
Particular case: M = 1
For this simple scenario, there is no second level of power allocation. All frames consist of only
one block, and the PM(JM) curves have the particular affine form with parameter h (the squared
channel coefficient corresponding to this block):
PM =
exp(R)− 1
h
(JM + σ
2
N). (3.21)
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Since the slopes of the PM(JM) curves are constant with JM and the frames with smaller values
of the channel coefficients have larger characteristic slopes, we can easily particularize Theorems
3.7 and 3.8. With the same notation X ⊂ R+ for the set of channel realizations over which the
jammer invests non-zero power and S ⊂ R+ for the set of channel realizations over which the
transmitter uses non-zero power, we can now define the optimal power allocation strategies. For the
maximin scenario, The jammer should deploy some JM(h) overX such that the required PM(h)
is constant over the whole interval X . The purpose of the jammer being active over X \ S is
to ”intimidate” the transmitter. The transmitter plays second, and hence takes advantage of the
jammer’s weaknesses. It always chooses to be active on the subset of X on which the required
PM(h) is least. This is why the optimal jammer strategy is to display no weakness, i.e. to make
PM(h) constant overX . These considerations are formalized in Proposition 3.9 below.
Proposition 3.9. In the maximin scenario, the jammer should adopt such a strategy as to make
the transmitter’s best choice of S intersect X on the the left-most part of S , and the required
transmitter power equal to some constant K onX
⋂
S and to (c−1)σ2N/h onS \X . Transmit-
ting JM(h), satisfying the power constraint with equality, such that the transmitter power required
for reliable communication is PM(h) = K, ∀h ∈ [h∗1, h∗2], and PM(h) = (c − 1)σ2N/h, ∀h ∈
[0,∞)\(h∗1, h∗2], for some h∗1 < h∗2 ∈ R+ and some constant K ∈ R+
⋃{∞} is an optimal jammer
strategy for the maximin problem. (Note that PM(h) should be continuous at h∗1.) The values K, h∗1
and h∗2 that maximize the outage probability can be found by solving the following problem:
Find min
K
∫ ∞
h0
f(h)dh, where
h0 is given by
∫ h2
h0
Kf(h)dh+
∫ ∞
h2
c− 1
h
σ2Nf(h)dh = P , (3.22)
h1 is given by h1 =
c− 1
K
σ2N , (3.23)
and h2 is given by
∫ h2
h1
(
hK
c− 1 − σ
2
N
)
f(h)dh = J . (3.24)
101
¥The power allocation is depicted in Figure 3.6. The convex decreasing curve represents the
original required transmitter power, without the presence of a jammer and satisfies the equation
PM = (c − 1)σ2N/h. Notice how by picking some K, we can determine h1, h2 and h0 (in this
order), and then find the probability of outage as Pout(h1) = 1 − m[(h0,∞)]. The optimal K,
resulting in h∗1, h∗2 and h∗0, is the one minimizing the m-measure of the set (h0,∞).  
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FIGURE 3.6. Maximin solution for M = 1 - power distribution between frames
For the minimax scenario the jammer will not transmit any power over a frame if outage is
not going to be induced or if the transmitter is not present, i.e. X ⊂ S . The jammer will start
allocating power to the frames over which an outage is easiest to induce, and go on with this
technique until the average power reaches the limit set by its power constraint. Obviously, the
jammer prefers the frames for which the required JM(h) is less. The optimal transmitter’s strategy
is to allocate its power such that the required JM(h) is constant on the whole set S , and hence to
display no weakness.
These considerations are formalized in Proposition 3.10 below.
Proposition 3.10. For the minimax scenario, the transmitter’s optimal way to allocate its power is
to make the required jamming power remain equal to some constant K on all ofX . Transmitting
PM(h), satisfying the power constraint with equality, such that the required JM(h) equals K for
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h ∈ [h∗x,∞), and JM(h) = 0 ∀h ∈ [0, h∗x), for some h∗x ∈ R+, is an optimal transmitter strategy
for the minimax problem. The values K and h∗x that minimize the outage probability can be found
by solving the following problem numerically:
Find max
K
∫ ∞
h0
f(h)dh, where
h0 is given by
∫ h0
hx
Kf(h)dh = J , (3.25)
hx is given by
∫ ∞
hx
(c− 1)(K + σ2N)
h
f(h)dh = P . (3.26)
¥
The numerical problem is described in Figure 3.7. Notice how by picking some K, we can
determine hx and h0 (in this order), and then find the probability of outage as Pout(h1) = 1 −
m[(h0,∞)]. The optimal K, resulting in h∗x and h∗0, is the one maximizing the m-measure of the
set (h0,∞). Note that the jammer does not necessarily have to jam on an interval of the form
[hx, h0]. The jammer’s choice space (the set of frames out of which the jammer picks its setX ) is
an indifferent one, i.e. the jammer can randomly pickX ⊂ [hx,∞) as long as its measure satisfies
Km(X ) = J . However, for the purpose of computing the outage probability, the representation
ofX as an interval is convenient and incurs no loss of generality. 
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3.3.3 Numerical Results
We have computed the outage probabilities for both minimax and maximin problems when M = 1
and M = 2. The channel coefficients are assumed i.i.d. exponentially distributed with parameter
λ = 1/6. Figure 3.8 shows the outage probability vs. the maximum allowable average transmitter
power P for fixed J = 10 when R = 1. For comparison purposes, we also plotted the results for
the case when M =∞, which are readily available from Chapter 2.
Numerical results demonstrate a sharp difference between the minimax solutions and the maxmin
solutions, which demonstrates the non-existence of Nash-equilibria of pure strategies for our two-
person zero-sum game with full CSI. Note the behavior of the outage probability when the number
of blocks per frame M is increased. At low transmitter powers, the increase of M produces an
increase in the outage probability for both the minimax, and the maximin scenarios.
On the contrary, at higher transmitter powers a lower outage probability is obtained for both the
minimax and the maximin cases when M is larger. This behavior can be summarized as follows:
the more powerful player will use the available diversity to its own advantage.
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3.4 CSI Available to All Parties. Jamming Game with
Long-Term Power Constraints: Mixed Strategies
We have already seen that the maximin and minimax solutions of the jamming game when only
pure strategies are allowed do not agree, and thus our game has no Nash equilibrium of pure
strategies. However, recall that the solution of the minimax problem with pure strategies can often
be a good characterization of a practical jamming situation (e.g. when the jammer does not transmit
unless it senses that the transmitter is on) and can always serve as a lower bound on the system’s
performance.
This aside, a Nash equilibrium is still the preferred characterization of jamming games, and
since such an equilibrium exists for our problem only when mixed strategies are allowed, the
current section is dedicated to the derivation of such a saddlepoint.
Unlike the fast fading scenario of Chapter 2, the frames in our slow-fading parallel-channels
model are not equivalent. Each frame is characterized by a different realization of the channel
vector h. This is why our present scenario is even more involved than the one in Chapter 2, and
requires three levels of power control instead of two.
As before, our approach to the problem is a contradictory one. We study the power control
levels starting with the “finest” one, and show that if our conditions for power allocations are
not satisfied, then the strategy is suboptimal. The reason why an additional (third) level of power
control appears here is a combination of the facts that we study mixed strategies and the frames
are not all equivalent as in Chapter 2. Namely, to cover all possible probabilistic strategies, we
need to dedicate a level of power control to the power allocation between frames with the same
channel realizations (i.e. equivalent frames) and an additional level of power control for the power
allocation between frames with different channel realizations. Along with the power allocation
within frames, these problems cover all possible cases.
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3.4.1 Power Allocation within a Frame
The third level of power control deals with the optimal power allocation between the blocks in a
frame, once the transmitter is given the channel vector h characterizing the frame and allocated
power PM , and the jammer is given the channel vector and its allocated power JM .
At this point, the third level of power control resembles the two-player, zero-sum game of (3.3)
and (3.4) having the mutual information calculated over a frame IM as cost function. However,
none of the players knows the other player’s constraints, because (PM , JM) is a random event.
Theorem 3.11 below provides the optimal transmitter/jammer strategies for power allocation within
a frame.
Theorem 3.11. Given a frame with channel vector h and a realization (pM , jM) of (PM , JM), let
PM(jM) denote the solution of Problem 1 in Section 3.3 with JM = jM , andJM(pM) denote the
solution of Problem 2 in Section 3.3 with PM = pM .
The transmitter’s optimal strategy is the solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the jam-
mer is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤JM(pM) and the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤
pM . The jammer’s optimal strategy is the solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the transmit-
ter is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ PM(jM) and the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤
jM .
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5 of Chapter 2 and is deferred to Section
3.9.
3.4.2 Power Allocation between Frames with the Same Channel Vector
Due to the form of the optimal second level power allocation strategies described in the previous
subsection, the probability that a given frame is in outage can be expressed as
Pout,h = Pr{JM ≥JM(PM)} = 1− Pr{PM ≥PM(JM)}, (3.27)
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where PM(jM) is the strictly increasing, unbounded and concave function (see Proposition 3.6)
that characterizes the frame. Note that a pair of strategies can only be optimal if Pout,h above
is the Nash equilibrium of a jamming game played over the frames characterized by the same
channel vector h. This means that if the transmitter and jammer decide to allocate powers PM,h
and JM,h respectively to frames with channel vector h, they should not allocate the same amount
of power to each of these frames. Instead, they should use power levels given by the realizations
of two random variables PM and JM with distribution functions (FP (pM), FJ(jM)) given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.12. The unique Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies of the two-player, zero-sum game
with average power constraints described by
min
FP (pM ):EFP PM≤PM (h)
max
FJ (jM ):EFJ JM≤JM (h)
Pout,h, (3.28)
where EFP and EFJ denote expectations with respect to the distributions FP (pM) and FJ(jM), is
attained by the pair of strategies (FP (pM), FJ(jM)) satisfying:
FP (PM(y)) ∼ kpU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− kp)∆0(y), (3.29)
FJ(JM(x)) ∼ kjU([0, JM(2v)])(x) + (1− kj)∆0(x), (3.30)
where U([r, t])(·) denotes the CDF of a uniform distribution over the interval [r, t], and ∆0(·)
denotes the CDF of a Dirac distribution (i.e. a step function), and the parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1]
and v ∈ [max{JM,h,JM(PM,h)/2},∞) are uniquely determined from the following steps:
1. Find the unique value v0 which satisfies:
PM,hJM,h = [PM(2v0)− PM,h](2v0 − JM,h). (3.31)
2. Compute S(v0) =
∫ 2v0
0
PM(y)dy − 2v0PM,h.
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3. If S(v0) < 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM(y)dy − 2vPM,h = 0, (3.32)
kp = 1 (3.33)
and
kj =
JM,hPM(2v)
2v[PM(2v)− PM,h] . (3.34)
4. If S(v0) = 0 then v = v0, kp = kj = 1.
5. If S(v0) > 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM(y)dy −PM(2v)(2v − JM,h) = 0, (3.35)
kp =
2vPM,h
PM(2v)[2v − JM,h] (3.36)
and
kj = 1. (3.37)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.22 in Section 2.9 of Chapter 2, by substituting
x = PM , y = JM , g(y) =PM(y), g−1(x) =JM(x), a = PM,h and b = JM,h. It is also interesting
to note that the condition
∫ b
0
g(y)dy < limz→∞
∫ g(z)
g(b)
g−1(x)dx− b[g(z)− g(b)] is satisfied because
PM(y) is unbounded.
Particular case: M = 1
For M = 1 the first (intra-frame) level of power control is inexistent. For a given channel
realization h we can readily derive the affine function PM(jM) in (3.27) as
PM(jM) =
c− 1
h
(jM + σ
2
N) (3.38)
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where c = exp(R). If we use the particularization of the general solution of Theorem 3.12 to affine
functions, as in the last part of Section 2.9 of Chapter 2, we obtain the outage probability as
Pout,h = 1−
hPM (h)
c−1
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
if hPM(h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N , (3.39)
and
Pout,h =
1
2
JM(h)
hPM (h)
c−1 − σ2N
if hPM(h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N . (3.40)
The transmitter and jammer strategies that achieve these payoffs are such that
FP (x) ∼ kpU([c− 1
h
σ2N , 2v
c− 1
h
+
c− 1
h
σ2N ])(x) + (1− kp)∆0(x),
FJ(y) ∼ 2v
2v + σ2N
kjU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− 2v
2v + σ2N
kj)∆0(y).
The parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [max{JM(h),J ′M(PM(h))/2},∞) are uniquely deter-
mined from the following steps:
1. If
hPM(h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N , (3.41)
then
v =
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 +
2σ2N
JM(h)
]
, (3.42)
kp =
2vPM(h)
c−1
h
(2v + σ2N)(2v − JM(h))
(3.43)
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and
kj = 1. (3.44)
2. If
hPM(h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N , (3.45)
then
v =
PM(h)− c−1h σ2N
c−1
h
, (3.46)
kp = 1 (3.47)
and
kj =
c−1
h
JM(h)(2PM(h)− c−1h σ2N)
2(PM(h)− c−1h σ2N)2
. (3.48)
The special form of this solution will be used in the next subsection to derive the overall Nash
equilibrium of the mixed strategies game for M = 1.
3.4.3 Power Allocation between Frames with Different Channel Vectors
In the previous subsections we have described the optimal power control strategies for given par-
ticular channel realization h, and transmitter and jammer power levels PM,h and JM,h respectively.
The first level of power control,which is the subject of this subsection, deals with allocating the
powers specified by the transmitter and jammer average power constraints P and J between dif-
ferent channel vectors. In other words, we are now concerned with solving the problem
min
PM (h):EhPM (h)≤P
max
JM (h):EhJM (h)≤J
Eh[Pout,h,PM (h),JM (h)] (3.49)
where Pout,h,PM (h),JM (h) (also denoted as Pout,h) is the outage probability of a frame characterized
by the channel vector h and to which the transmitter allocates power PM(h), and the jammer
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allocates power JM(h). Note that Pout,h,PM (h),JM (h) can be easily computed according to the second
and third levels of power control already presented.
However, the Nash equilibrium of the game in (3.49) above is highly dependent on the result of
the second level of power control. Since finding a closed form solution for the second level is still
an open problem, a general solution for the first level of power control is not available at this time.
However, we next provide a Nash equilibrium for the particular case when M = 1.
Particular case: M = 1
We start by pointing out the following important property of the second-level power control
strategies for M = 1.
Proposition 3.13. The outage probability Pout,h given in (3.39) and (3.40) above is a continuous
function of both arguments. Moreover, Pout,h is a strictly decreasing, convex function of PM(h) for
fixed JM(h) and a strictly increasing, concave function of JM(h) for fixed PM(h).
Proof. In the remainder of this section we shall denote the case when
hPM (h)
c−1 ≤ 12JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N by Case 1 and the case when
hPM (h)
c−1 >
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N by Case 2.
It is straightforward to check that when hPM (h)
c−1 =
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N we get
Pout,h =
1
1+
r
1+2
σ2
N
JM (h)
by using either of the relations in (3.39) or (3.40). Thus, the continuity of
Pout,h follows immediately.
If we evaluate the derivatives for Case 1
dPout,h
dPM(h)
= −
h
c−1
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
(3.50)
and for Case 2
dPout,h
dPM(h)
= −
c−1
h
JM(h)
2(PM(h)− c−1h σ2N)2
(3.51)
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we note that when JM(h) is fixed, Pout,h is a strictly decreasing function of PM(h), affine in Case
1 and strictly convex in Case 2. Moreover, dPout,h
dPM (h)
is continuous, which makes Pout,h an overall
strictly decreasing, convex function of PM(h).
Similar (but symmetric) properties hold for the derivatives
dPout,h
dJM(h)
=
h
c−1
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
· PM(h)
JM(h)
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
, (3.52)
for Case 1 and
dPout,h
dJM(h)
=
1
2
1
h
c−1PM(h)− σ2N
(3.53)
for Case 2, yielding Pout,h an overall strictly increasing, concave function of JM(h) (strictly con-
cave in Case 1 and affine in Case 2).
The result of Proposition 3.13 implies that the overall outage probability EhPout,h is a convex
function of {PM(h)} for fixed {JM(h)} and a concave function of {JM(h)} for fixed {PM(h)}.
Since the set of strategies {PM(h), JM(h)} is convex, there always exists a saddlepoint of the
game in (3.49) [39]. The importance of this result should be noted, since it implies that a Nash
equilibrium of mixed strategies of the two-person, zero-sum game in (3.49) can be achieved by
only looking for pure strategies. Recall that any Nash equilibrium of pure strategies is also a Nash
equilibrium of mixed strategies, and that for a two-person, zero-sum game all Nash equilibria share
the same value of the cost function [33].
Any saddlepoint of (3.49) has to satisfy the KKT conditions associated with the maximiza-
tion and minimization problems of (3.49) simultaneously. The next Proposition shows these KKT
conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient for determining a saddlepoint. The proof is
deferred to Section 3.9.
Proposition 3.14. For our two-player, zero-sum game of (3.49), any solution of the joint system
of KKT conditions associated with the maximization and minimization problems yields a Nash
equilibrium.
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We can now solve the KKT conditions associated with the maximization and minimization prob-
lems of (3.49) simultaneously. For Case 1, these are
−
h
c−1
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
+ λ− γ(h) = 0 (3.54)
and
−
h
c−1
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
· PM(h)
JM(h)
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
+ µ− δ(h) = 0, (3.55)
where γ(h) and δ(h) are the complementary slackness conditions satisfying γ(h)PM(h) = 0 and
δ(h)JM(h) = 0, and where µ, λ ≥ 0. From (3.55) we get
PM(h) =
µ
λ
JM(h)
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
, (3.56)
resulting in
JM(h) =
√(λ
µ
)2
PM(h)2 + σ4N − σ2N

+
, (3.57)
which in combination with (3.54) yields
PM(h) =
[
h
c− 1
µ
2λ2
− µ(c− 1)
2h
σ4N
]
+
, (3.58)
where we denote [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Under this solution, the condition for being under Case 1,
hPM(h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N (3.59)
translates to
2µh
λ(c− 1) ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4σ2Nµ
2
(
σ2N +
1
µ
)
= 2(1 + σ2Nµ). (3.60)
Note that PM(h) = 0 if and only if JM(h) = 0, and this happens when h ≤ h0/1, where
h0/1 = λ(c− 1)σ2N . (3.61)
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Writing the KKT conditions for Case 2 under the assumption that PM(h), JM(h) ≥ 0 we obtain
−
h
c−1JM(h)
2
(
h
c−1PM(h)− σ2N
)2 + λ− γ(h) = 0 (3.62)
and
− 1
2
(
h
c−1PM(h)− σ2N
) + µ− δ(h) = 0, (3.63)
which yield
JM(h) =
c− 1
h
λ
2µ2
(3.64)
and
PM(h) =
c− 1
h
(
1
2µ
+ σ2N
)
. (3.65)
Note that in this case both PM(h) and JM(h) are strictly positive for finite h. Under this solution,
the condition for being under Case 2,
hPM(h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM(h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N (3.66)
translates to
2µh
λ(c− 1) > 1 +
√
1 + 4σ2Nµ
2
h
λ(c− 1) . (3.67)
Forcing the right-hand side of (3.60) to equal the right-hand side of (3.67) we get the value of h
which is at the boundary between Case 1 and Case 2:
h1/2 = λ(c− 1)( 1
µ
+ σ2N). (3.68)
A close inspection of the expressions of PM(h) and JM(h) for the two cases shows that they
are both increasing functions of h under Case 1 and decreasing functions of h under Case 2, and
moreover, they are both continuous in h1/2. To summarize the results above, the optimal trans-
mitter/jammer first level power control strategies are given in (3.69) and (3.70) below, respec-
tively. The constants λ and µ can be obtained from the power constraints EhPM(h) = P and
EhJM(h) = J .
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PM(h) =

0, if h ≤ h0/1
h
c−1
µ
2λ2
− µ(c−1)
2h
σ2N , if h0/1 < h ≤ h1/2
c−1
h
(
1
2µ
+ σ2N
)
, if h > h1/2
(3.69)
JM(h) =

0, if h ≤ h0/1√(
λ
µ
)2
( h
c−1
µ
2λ2
− µ(c−1)
2h
σ2N)
2 + σ4N − σ2N , if h0/1 < h ≤ h1/2
c−1
h
λ
2µ2
, if h > h1/2
(3.70)
3.4.4 Numerical Results
Figure 3.9 shows the probability of outage obtained under the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium,
versus the transmitter power constraint P , when M = 1, for a fixed rate R = 1, noise power
σ2N = 10, a jammer power constraint J = 10 and a channel coefficient distributed exponentially,
with parameter λ = 1/6. The maximin and minimax solutions of the pure strategies game are
shown for comparison.
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FIGURE 3.9. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P for M = 1 when J = 10, R = 2,
σ2N = 10 and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
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As expected, the solution of the of mixed strategies game is better (from the transmitter’s point
of view) than the minimax and worse than the maximin solutions of the pure strategies game.
3.5 CSI Available Receiver Only. Jamming Game with
Long-Term Power Constraints: Mixed Strategies
In this section we investigate the scenario when the receiver does not feed back any channel state
information. Since we have already shown that the problem with long-term power constraints is the
more interesting and challenging one, and since the purpose of this section is to offer a comparison
with previous results, we further focus only on the scenario of average power constraints and mixed
strategies.
Unlike in the corresponding Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, where all frames were equivalent because
of the fast fading channel, in our present scenario each frame is characterized by a particular
channel realization. Since this channel realization is not known to either the transmitter or the
jammer, they both have to allocate some power over each frame, in a random fashion, such that the
transmitter minimizes and the jammer maximizes the probability that the mutual information over
the frame is less than the transmission rate R. In its most general form, the game can be written as
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JM[
min
Pm:
P
Pm≤MPM
max
Jm:
P
Jm≤JM
Pr{
M−1∑
m=0
log
(
1 +
Pmhm
Jm + σ2N
)
≤MR}
]
, (3.71)
where EPM ,JM denotes statistical expectation with respect to the probability distribution of PM
and JM . The form of (3.71) suggests two levels of power control: a first one which deals with the
allocation of power between different frames, and a second one which allocates the powers within
each frame.
In solving the game, we start as before with the second level of power control. However, this level
requires an exact expression of Pr{∑M−1m=0 log (1 + PmhmJm+σ2N ) ≤ MR}. Note that this probability
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depends upon the probability distribution of the channel vector h. A practical way of solving the
problem is the following.
Denote Sm = log
(
1 + Pmhm
Jm+σ2N
)
the random variable (depending on hm) which characterizes
the instant mutual information over the m-th block of the frame. We can write the cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.) of Sm as
FSm(x) = Pr{Sm ≤ x} = Pr{hm ≤ (ex − 1)
Jm + σ
2
N
Pm
} = Fh
(
(ex − 1)Ji + σ
2
N
Pi
)
(3.72)
where Fh(x) is the c.d.f. of the channel coefficient hm and we assume that the channel coefficients
over all the blocks of a frame are independent and identically distributed random variables.
We can now compute the p.d.f. (assuming it exists) of Sm as
fSm(x) =
dFSm(x)
dx
=
dFh
(
(ex − 1)Jm+σ2N
Pm
)
dx
. (3.73)
Finally, our probability can be written as
Pr{
M−1∑
m=0
log
(
1 +
Pmhm
Jm + σ2N
)
≤MR} = (FS0 ∗ fS1 ∗ . . . ∗ fSM−1) (MR) (3.74)
where ∗ denotes regular convolution. Due to the intricate expression of this probability, as well as
its dependence on the statistical properties of the channel, we next focus exclusively on the simple
case when M = 1.
Particular case: M = 1
For M = 1, we are only concerned with the first level of power control. The game can be written
as
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JMPr{P ≤ (c− 1)
JM + σ
2
N
h
} (3.75)
or equivalently,
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JMPr{h ≤ (c− 1)
JM + σ
2
N
PM
}. (3.76)
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In order to provide a good numerical comparison with the results of the previous sections, as-
sume that the channel coefficient h has an exponential probability distribution with parameter λ.
Its cumulative distribution function can thus be written as F (h) = 1 − e−λh, which enables us to
write
Pr{h ≤ (c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
} = 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
. (3.77)
Denote H(PM , JM) = 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM+σ2N
PM
]
.
By computing the derivatives
dH
dPM
= −λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P 2M
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
< 0, (3.78)
d2H
dP 2M
= λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P 3M
[
λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
+ 2
]
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
> 0, (3.79)
dH
dJM
= λ(c− 1) 1
PM
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
> 0, (3.80)
and
d2H
dJ2M
= −(λ(c− 1) 1
PM
)2 exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
< 0, (3.81)
we notice that H is a strictly decreasing, convex function of PM for a fixed JM , and a strictly
increasing, concave function of JM for a fixed PM . Hence, a Nash equilibrium is achieved by
uniformly distributing the transmitter’s and jammer’s powers between the frames:
EPM :EPM≤P
{
1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)J + σ
2
N
PM
]}
≤ 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)J + σ
2
N
P
]
≤
≤ EJM :EJM≤J
{
1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P
]}
(3.82)
This saddlepoint is an equilibrium of pure strategies, and hence also an equilibrium of mixed
strategies. Note that the existence of such an equilibrium of pure strategies might no longer hold
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for different probability distributions of h, and this would demand a search for purely probabilistic
strategies. For example, when the c.d.f. of the channel coefficient F (h) is not concave, then F ((c−
1)
JM+σ
2
N
PM
) is no longer a concave function of JM , and hence the optimal jammer strategy is not
deterministic.
Numerical evaluations of the system’s performance under the present scenario are presented in
the next subsection.
3.5.1 Numerical Results
The probability of outage as a function of the transmitter’s power constraint P is shown in Figure
3.10 for M = 1, and under the assumption that both the transmitter and the jammer distribute their
powers uniformly over the frames.
For comparison, the maximin and minimax solutions of the pure strategies game and the mixed
strategies Nash equilibrium, all under the scenario that channel state information is fed back by the
receiver, are also shown in the figure.
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FIGURE 3.10. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P for M = 1, with and without CSI
feedback when J = 10, R = 2, σ2N = 10 and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6.
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Note that when the receiver does not feed back the CSI, the system performance suffers degra-
dation. Unlike in the fast fading scenario of Chapter 2, in the present slow fading scenario the
increase in the outage probability is significant. The difference is most visible at low transmitter
powers, when not feeding back the channel state information amounts to worse performance than
the pessimistic (minimax) scenario with full CSI.
3.6 Conclusions
We have studied the jamming game over slow fading channels, with the outage probability as
objective. Similarly to the fast fading scenario, the game with full CSI and average (or long term)
power constraints does not have a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. Nevertheless, we derived
the minimax and maximin solutions of pure strategies, which provide lower and upper bounds on
the system performance, respectively.
In addition, we investigated the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies. Compared to the fast
fading scenario Chapter 2, the Nash equilibrium for the slow fading, full CSI game is much more
involved. The difference comes from the fact that frames are not equivalent. In fact, instead of
being characterized by the channel statistics as in Chapter 2, the frames are now characterized by
different channel realizations. This results in the existence of an additional third level of power
control.
We also showed that for parallel slow fading channels, the CSI feedback helps in the battle
against jamming, since if the receiver does not feed back the channel state information, the sys-
tem’s performance suffers a significant degradation. We expect this degradation to decrease as the
number of parallel channels M increases, until it becomes marginal for M → ∞ (which can be
considered as the case in Chapter 2).
These results, along with our conclusions from Chapter 2, reveal an interesting duality between
the ways that different communication models behave with and without jamming. As remarked in
Chapter 2, under a fast fading channel with jamming, the feedback of channel state information
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brings little benefits in terms of the overall probability of outage. The same tendency is observed for
the fast fading channel without jamming in [35] (although the performance measure therein is the
ergodic capacity). However, [32] shows that for a parallel slow fading channel, the CSI feedback
is quite important. The improvement of the probability of outage when the channel coefficients are
perfectly known to the transmitter is no longer negligible. The results of this chapter demonstrate
that even in the presence of a jammer (which can eavesdrop the feedback channel and hence obtain
the same CSI as the transmitter), CSI feedback improves the transmission considerably.
3.7 Additional Results for Short-Term Power Constraints -
Proofs of Main Results
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof is an adaptation of the results in Section IV.B of [9], regarding uncorrelated jamming
with CSI at the transmitter. The only difference is that in our case, the power constraints and
cost function involve short-term, temporal averages, while in [9], they are expressed in terms of
statistical averages. Nevertheless, the same techniques can be applied.
The set of all pairs (P (h), J(h)) satisfying the power constraints is convex, since the power
constraints are linear functions of P (h) and J(h), respectively. Moreover, the cost function
IM(h, P (h), J(h)) =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
log(1 +
hmPm
σ2N + Jm
)
is a convex function of J(h) for fixed P (h), and a concave function of P (h) for fixed J(h). These
properties imply that there exists at least one saddle point of the game.
Writing the KKT conditions for both optimization problems we get [9]:
− h
σ2N + J(h) + hP (h)
+ λ− γ(h) = 0 (3.83)
and
− hP (h)
(σ2N + J(h))(σ
2
N + J(h) + hP (h))
+ ν − δ(h) = 0, (3.84)
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where γ(h) and δ(h) are the complementary slackness variables for P (h) and J(h), respectively.
The three possible cases are [9]: Case 1: P (h) > 0, J(h) > 0; Case 2: P (h) > 0, J(h) = 0 and
Case 3: P (h) = J(h) = 0.
For Case 1 both complementary slackness variables are 0, and solving (3.83) and (3.84) together
we get
λ
µ
=
J(h) + σ2N
P (h)
, (3.85)
and
P (h) =
h
λ(h+ λ/µ)
, (3.86)
while for Cases 2 and 3, the solution is plain water-filling [9].
These considerations result in the solutions (3.5) and (3.6).
3.7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
This proof follows the one described in the Appendix B of [32]. The probability of outage can be
written as:
Pr(IM(h, P (h), J(h)) < R) = E[χ{IM (h,P (h),J(h))<R}], (3.87)
where χ{A } denotes the indicator function of the set A . Replacing the power allocations by the
solutions of the game described by (3.3) and (3.4), we define
χ∗(h) = χ{IM (h,P ∗(h),J∗(h))<R}. (3.88)
Then the region U(R,P ,J ) can be written as:
U(R,P ,J ) = {h ∈ RM+ : χ∗(h) = 0}. (3.89)
We next use the fact that the pair (P ∗(h), J∗(h)) determines an equilibrium of the game (3.3),
(3.4). Thus, for any random power allocation P (h) satisfying the power constraint, we can write:
χ∗(h) ≤ χ{IM (h,P (h),J∗(h))<R},with probability 1. (3.90)
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Similarly, for any random J(h), we have
χ∗(h) ≥ χ{IM (h,P ∗(h),J(h))<R},with probability 1. (3.91)
Now pick some arbitrary power allocation functions Pa(h) and Ja(h), which satisfy the short-
term power constraints, and set
P̂ (h) = (1− χ∗(h))P ∗(h) + χ∗(h)Pa(h), (3.92)
and
Ĵ(h) = (1− χ∗(h))Ja(h) + χ∗(h)J∗(h), (3.93)
It is easy to see that 1/M
∑M−1
m=0 P̂ (hm) ≤ P with probability 1 , 1/M
∑M−1
m=0 Ĵ(hm) ≤ J with
probability 1, and moreover that
χ∗(h) = χ{IM (h, bP (h), bJ(h))<R}. (3.94)
Note that transmitter and jammer could pick Pa(h) = 0 and Ja(h) = 0 respectively, but this
strategy would not improve their performances (power cannot be saved), since the only power
constraints are set over frames.
Now, using (3.87), (3.90) and (3.91), we get:
Pr(IM(h, P (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥ Pr(IM(h, P̂ (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥ Pr(IM(h, P̂ (h), J(h)) < R),
(3.95)
which proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
3.8 Additional Results for Long-Term Power Constraints:
Pure Strategies
3.8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Take Problem 1. Let (P∗, J∗) =
(
(P ∗0 , P
∗
1 , . . . , P
∗
M−1), (J
∗
0 , J
∗
1 , . . . , J
∗
M−1)
)
be a solution such
that
∑M−1
m=0 P
∗
m = PM,1 and
∑M−1
m=0 J
∗
m = JM,1, and assume that IM(P∗, J∗) > R. Since IM is a
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continuous, strictly increasing function of P0, without loss of generality, we can find P ′0 < P ∗0 such
that IM((P ′0, P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗M−1), J∗) = R.
But then P ′0 +
∑M−1
m=1 P
∗
m < MPM,1, which means that (P∗, J∗) is suboptimal (from the trans-
mitter’s point of view), and hence not a solution.
Therefore, the first constraint IM ≥ R has to be satisfied with equality, i.e. IM = R.
Now take the solution (P∗, J∗), and assume that 1
M
∑M−1
m=0 J
∗
m < JM . Then we can find J ′0 > J∗0 ,
such that J ′0+
∑M−1
m=1 J
∗
m =MJM . In order for the first constraint IM = R to be satisfied, the value
and distribution of PM will have to be modified.
We prove next that the value of PM should be increased, which makes the pair (P∗, J∗) subop-
timal (from the jammer’s point of view), thus contradicting the hypothesis that it is a solution, and
proving that the second constraint should hold with equality.
Assume there is a distribution P′′ = (P ′′0 , P ′′1 , . . . , P ′′M−1) that minimizes PM , under the con-
straint IM({Pm}, (J ′0, J∗1 , . . . , J∗M−1)) = R, such that
M−1∑
m=0
P ′′m ≤ PM,1. (3.96)
Then, replacing J0 by its old value J∗0 , we have that (P′′, J∗) is either a second solution of Problem
1 (if (3.96) is satisfied with equality), or a better choice (if (3.96) is satisfied with strict inequality).
We can readily dismiss the latter case. For the former case, IM is a strictly decreasing function of
J0, thus IM(P′′, J∗) > R, which contradicts the first part of this proof. The same arguments work
for Problem 2.
3.8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proposition 3.4 is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.21 in the Section 2.8.4 of Chapter 2. We
restate the theorem here for completeness. For a complete proof, see Chapter 2.
Theorem 3.15. Take x, y ∈ L2[R] and define the order relation x > y if and only if x(t) >
y(t) ∀t ∈ R. Consider the continuous real functions f(x), g(y) and h(x, y) over L2[R], such that
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f is a strictly increasing function of x, g is a strictly increasing function of y, and h is a strictly
increasing function of x for fixed y and a strictly decreasing function of y for fixed x.
Define the following minimax and maximin problems:
max
y≥0
[
min
x≥0
f(x) s.t. h(x, y) ≥ H
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G, (3.97)
max
x≥0
[
min
y≥0
g(y) s.t. h(x, y) ≤ H
]
s.t.f(x) ≤ F, (3.98)
min
y≥0
[
max
x≥0
h(x, y) s.t. f(x) ≤ F
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G. (3.99)
(I) Choose any real values for G and H . Take problem (3.97) under these constraints and let
the pair (x1, y1) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function
f(x1) = F1. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (3.98) and (3.99)
to F = F1, then the values of the objective functions of problems (3.98) and (3.99) under their
optimal solutions are g(y) = G and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x1, y1) is also an
optimal solution of all problems.
(II) Choose any real values for F and H . Take problem (3.98) under these constraints and let
the pair (x2, y2) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function
g(y2) = G2. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (3.97) and (3.99)
to G = G2, then the values of the objective functions of problems (3.97) and (3.99) under their
optimal solutions are f(x) = F and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x2, y2) is an optimal
solution of all problems.
(III) Choose any real values for F and G. Take problem (3.99) under these constraints and
let the pair (x3, y3) denote one of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function
h(x3, y3) = H3. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints in problems (3.97) and (3.98)
125
to H = H3, then the values of the objective functions of problems (3.97) and (3.98) under their
optimal solutions are f(x) = F and g(y) = G, respectively. Moreover, (x3, y3) is an optimal
solution of all problems.
3.8.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Take Problem 1. By Proposition 3.4, if there exists PM,1 such that solving the game in (3.3) and
(3.4) with the constraint ∑M−1m=1 Pm ≤ MPM,1 yields the objective IM(h, {Pm}, {Jm}) = R, then
the solution of Problem 1 coincides with the solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4).
We write this solution as in (3.5) and (3.6), but we denote λ = 1/η and µ = ν/η:
P ∗m =
 (λ−
σ2N
hm
)+ if hm <
σ2N
λ−σ2Nµ
µ λhm
1+µhm
if hm ≥ σ
2
N
λ−σ2Nµ
(3.100)
J∗m =
 0 if hm <
σ2N
λ−σ2Nµ
λhm
1+µhm
− σ2N if hm ≥ σ
2
N
λ−σ2Nµ
(3.101)
where λ and µ are constants that can be determined from the constraints
∑M−1
m=1 Jm = MJM and∑M−1
m=1 I(hm, Pm, Jm) =MR.
We shall use the following conventions and denotations:
• Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the blocks in a frame are indexed in increas-
ing order of their channel coefficients. That is, h0 ≤ h1 ≤ . . . ,≤ hM−1.
• Denote xm = Jm + σ2N and x∗m = J∗m + σ2N . Note that x
∗
0
h0
≥ x∗1
h1
≥ . . . ,≥ x∗M−1
hM−1
.
• Denote by hp the first block on which the transmitter’s power is strictly positive, and by hj
the first block on which the jammer’s power is strictly positive. Note that hp ≤ hj .
Note that
P ∗m =
[
λ− x
∗
m
hm
]
+
(3.102)
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for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}, where [z]+ = max{z, 0}.
Given these and (3.100) and (3.101) above, we can write:
σ2N
hp
≤ λ < σ
2
N
hp−1
, (3.103)
σ2N
1 + µhj
hj
≤ λ < σ2N
1 + µ(hj−1)
hj−1
, (3.104)
MR =
j−1∑
m=p
log
(
λhm
σ2N
)
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
, (3.105)
Denote by QU [h] denotes the index of the smallest channel coefficient in the frame that is larger
than h. With this notation, we can write
p ≥ QU
[
hj−1
1 + µhj−1
]
(3.106)
hp−1 <
hj
1 + µhj
(3.107)
1
M
M−1∑
m=j
[
hm
1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
]
≤ JM
σ2N
≤ 1
M
M−1∑
m=j
[
hm
1+µhm
hj−1
1+µhj−1
− 1
]
, (3.108)
j−1∑
m=QU
ů
hj
1+µhj
ÿ log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
≤MR ≤
≤
j−1∑
m=QU
ů
hj−1
1+µhj−1
ÿ log
(
hm
1 + µ(hj−1)
hj−1
)
−
M−1∑
j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
, (3.109)
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where (3.108) follows from JM =
∑M−1
m=j
[
λhm
1+µhm
− σ2N
]
, and the first inequality in (3.109) follows
since hp−1 < hj1+µhj implies p ≤ QU
[
hj
1+µhj
]
because there is no other channel coefficient between
hp−1 and hp.
It is straightforward to show that for fixed hj the left-most and the right-most terms of inequal-
ity (3.108) are strictly decreasing functions of µ, while the left-most and the right-most terms of
inequality (3.109) are strictly increasing functions of µ.
Note that
M−1∑
m=j
[
hm
1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
]
=
M−1∑
m=j+1
[
hm
1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
]
, (3.110)
and
j−1∑
m=QU
ů
hj
1+µhj
ÿ log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
=
=
j∑
m=QU
ů
hj
1+µhj
ÿ log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
M−1∑
m=j+1
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
. (3.111)
That is, by keeping µ constant and replacing hj by hj−1 in both first terms of (3.108) and (3.109),
we get exactly the last terms of (3.108) and (3.109), respectively.
Finally, we take a contradictory approach. Suppose there exist two different pairs (hj1, µ1) and
(hj2, µ2) that satisfy both (3.108) and (3.109) and assume, without loss of generality that hj1 < hj2.
Then, in order for (hj2, µ2) to satisfy (3.108) we need µ2 > µ1, while in order for (hj2, µ2) to satisfy
(3.109) we need µ<µ1. Thus hj is unique. Note however that the relations above do not guarantee
the uniqueness of µ.
For the optimal hj , the constraint
∑M−1
m=1 Jm =MJM translates to
M−1∑
m=j
λhm
1 + µhm
=MJM + (M − j)σ2N . (3.112)
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while the constraint IM(h, {Pm}, {Jm}) = R is already given in (3.105). The left hand side of
(3.112) is a strictly increasing function of λ for fixed µ and a strictly decreasing function of µ for
fixed λ, while being equal to a constant.
Again, for a contradictory approach, suppose there exist two different pairs of (µ1, λ1) and
(µ2, λ2) that can generate different solutions. If we assume, without loss of generality that µ1 > µ2,
then, in order for (3.112) to be satisfied by both pairs, we need λ1 > λ2. But this can only mean
that under (µ2, λ2) the transmitter allocates non-zero power to more channel coefficients than un-
der (µ1, λ1). This remark simply says that the index p at which the transmitter starts transmitting
is a decreasing function of λ, and can easily be verified by (3.102). Looking now at (3.105), we
observe that its right hand side is a strictly increasing function of λ for fixed µ and a strictly in-
creasing function of µ for fixed λ, while being equal to a constant. In other words, if (3.105) is
satisfied by the pair (µ1, λ1), then it cannot also be satisfied by (µ2, λ2). Thus, the pair (λ, µ) that
satisfies both (3.105) and (3.112) is also unique. But once hj , λ and µ are given, hp is uniquely
determined. Therefore there cannot exist more than one solution to Problem1. Similar arguments
can be applied to show that the solution of Problem2 is unique.
3.8.4 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Since the solution is unique, it follows thatPM(JM) is a strictly increasing function. By closely in-
specting the form of the solution in (3.100) and (3.101), it is straightforward to see that if JM →∞,
then Jm → ∞ for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}. If the required PM were finite, this would imply
IM → 0, which violates the power constraints of Problem 1. For Problem 1 we prove that the re-
sultingPM(JM) function is continuous and concave in several steps. We first show in Lemma 3.16
that the optimal jammer strategy {x∗m}M−1m=0 is a continuous function of the given jamming power
JM . Lemma 3.17 proves that PM({xm}) is continuous and has continuous first order derivatives.
This implies that PM(JM) is in fact continuous and has a continuous first order derivative. Finally,
Lemma 3.18 shows that for any fixed hp and hj the function PM(JM) is concave.
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Lemma 3.16. The optimal jammer power allocation {x∗m}M−1m=0 within a frame is a continuous
increasing function of the given jamming power JM invested over that frame.
Proof. It is clear that x∗m is continuous and increasing as a function of JM if hp and hj are fixed. At
any point where either hp or hj change as a result of a change in JM , the optimal jamming strategy
{x∗m}M−1m=0 maintains continuity as a result of the uniqueness of the solution (Proposition 3.5).
Lemma 3.17. Both PM({xm}) and the derivatives dPMdxm are continuous functions of {xm}M−1m=0 .
Proof. Consider any two points X1 = (x1,m)M−1m=0 and X2 = (x2,m)M−1m=0 and any trajectory T that
connects them.
For a given vector X = (xm)M−1m=0 , the required transmitter power is
PM =
M − p
M
 c(∏M−1
m=p hm
)
 1M (M−1∏
m=p
xm
) 1
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=p
xm
hm
. (3.113)
Note that p depends upon the choice of X. For fixed p, the continuity and differentiability of PM(X)
are obvious. Thus, it suffices to show that these properties also hold in a point of T where p changes.
If we can show continuity and differentiability when p is decreased by 1, then larger variations
of p can be treated as multiple changes by 1, and continuity still holds.
Recall the assumption that the channel coefficients are always indexed in decreasing order of
the quantities xm
hm
. Let Xk = (xk,m)M−1m=0 be a point of T where the transmitter decreases the index
of the block over which it starts to transmit from pk to pk − 1, and denote by T1 the part of the
trajectory T that is between X1 and Xk, and T2 = T \ T1.
Since Ppk−1 = 0, we know that λ does not change in this point, since
1
M
M−1∑
m=p
[
λ− xm
hm
]
=
1
M
M−1∑
m=p−1
[
λ− xm
hm
]
= PM . (3.114)
Define the “left” and “right” limits PM(Xk−) and PM(Xk+) as:
PM(Xk−) = lim
X→Xk
X∈T1
PM(X), (3.115)
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PM(Xk+) = lim
X→Xk
X∈T2
PM(X). (3.116)
Since RM+ is Hausdorff [40], there exists a small enough neighborhood U ⊂ RM+ of Xk, such that
p(X) = pk to the “left” and p(X) = pk − 1 to the “right” of Xk on U. We can now write:
PM(Xk+) = λ
M − pk + 1
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=pk−1
xk,m
hm
=
= λ
M − pk
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=pk
xk,m
hm
+
1
M
(λ− xk,pk−1
hpk−1
) = PM(Xk−), (3.117)
where the last equality follows because λ = xk,pk−1
hpk−1
. This proves continuity.
Similar arguments can be used to show the continuity of the derivatives
dPM
dxn
=
1
M
(
λ
xn
− 1
hn
)
(3.118)
in Xk (note that λxk,pk−1 =
1
hpk−1
).
Therefore, PM(X) is continuous and has first-order derivatives that are continuous along any
trajectory T between any two points X1 and X2.
Finally, for the last part of our proof:
Lemma 3.18. For fixed p and j, the function PM(JM) is concave.
Proof. We can write
MJM + (M − j)σ2N =
[
c
j−1∏
m=p
(
σ2N
hm
) 1
M
·
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
M
] M
j−p M−1∑
m=j
hm
1 + µhm
, (3.119)
and denote
g(µ) =
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
j−p M−1∑
m=j
hm
1 + µhm
(3.120)
Note that for fixed p and j, JM is a linear function of g.
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A similar relation can be found for the required transmitter power PM :
MPM +
1
M
j−1∑
m=p
σ2N
hm
=
[
c
j−1∏
m=p
(
σ2N
hm
) 1
M
·
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
M
] M
j−p
·
·
[
M − p
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=j
1
1 + µhm
]
. (3.121)
Denote
f(µ) =
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
j−p
·
[
(M − p)−
M−1∑
m=j
1
1 + µhm
]
(3.122)
and note that for fixed p and j, PM is a linear function of f .
It suffices to show that f(g) is concave. For this purpose, the derivative df
dg
= df
dµ
(dµ
dg
)−1 should
be a decreasing function of g, and hence an increasing function of µ.
Computing the derivatives from (3.119) and (3.121) we get:
df
dg
=
df
dµ
dg
dµ
=
1
j−p
(
(M − p)−∑M−1m=j 11+µhm)− PM−1m=j hm(1+µhm)2PM−1m=j hm1+µhm
1
j−p
∑M−1
m=j
hm
(1+µhm)2
+
PM−1
m=j
h2m
(1+µhm)2PM−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
(3.123)
Arguments similar to those in Chapter 2 apply in proving that above the derivative increases
with µ. Looking at the right hand side of (3.123) (the “large fraction”), we notice that the first
term in the numerator increases with µ. For the second term in the numerator, it is clear that
as µ increases, its numerator decreases faster than its denominator. This implies that the whole
numerator of the “large fraction” is an increasing function of µ. Similarly, the first term in the
denominator is clearly a decreasing function of µ. The only thing left is the second term of the
denominator. It is straightforward to show that its derivative with respect to µ can be written as
d
dµ
∑M−1
m=j
h2m
(1+µhm)2∑M−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
=
1[∑M−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
]2 ·
·
{[
M−1∑
m=j
h2m
(1 + µhm)2
]2
−
M−1∑
m=j
h3m
(1 + µhm)3
·
M−1∑
m=j
hm
(1 + µhm)
}
(3.124)
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If we consider the fact that for any two real numbers a and b we have
(a2 + b2)2 − (a+ b)(a3 + b3) = −ab(a− b)2 (3.125)
and the summations in (3.124) are positive, it is easy to see that the second term of the denominator
of the “large fraction” is decreasing with µ. Hence overall the derivative in (3.123) increases with
µ.
3.9 Additional Results for Long Term Power Constraints:
Mixed Strategies
3.9.1 Proof of Theorem 3.11
Denote the solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the jammer is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤
JM(pM) and the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM by ({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}), and the
solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the transmitter is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤
PM(jM) and the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM by ({Pm,2}, {Jm,2}).
Denote the solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the jammer is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤
jM and the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM by ({Pm,0}, {Jm,0})..
By the Proposition 3.3, we must have IM({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}) = R and IM({Pm,2}, {Jm,2}) = R,
where IM({Pm}, {Jm}) = 1M
∑M−1
m=0 log(1 +
Pmhm
Jm+σ2N
).
We will show that (i) even if the jammer’s power jM is different from JM(pM), the transmitter’s
strategy is still optimal; (ii) even if the transmitter’s power pM is different from PM(jM), the
jammer’s strategy is still optimal.
Assume the transmitter plays the strategy given by {Pm,1}.
If jM = JM(pM), it is clear that the optimal solution for both transmitter and jammer is the
solution of the game in (3.3) and (3.4), where the jammer is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM and
the transmitter is constrained to 1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM . In this case, it is as if each player knows the
other player’s power constraint.
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If jM < JM(pM), then by Lemma 3.16 we have that Jm,0 < Jm,1 ∀m. Since IM({Pm}, {Jm})
is a strictly decreasing function of {Jm} (under the order relation defined in the Section 2.8.4 of
Chapter 2), this implies that IM({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}) > R. Note that {Jm,0} is the jammer’s strategy
when the jammer knows the transmitter’s power constraint pM . Thus we have shown that when the
transmitter plays {Pm,1} and jM < JM(pM), the jammer cannot induce outage over the frame even
if it knew the value of pM .
Assume that the jammer plays the strategy given by {Jm,2}. A similar argument shows that if
pM < PM(jM), or equivalently jM > JM(pM), the transmitter cannot achieve reliable communi-
cation over the frame even if it knew the exact value of jM .
This shows that ({Pm,1}, {Jm,2}) is a Bayes equilibrium [33] for the game with incomplete
information describing the power allocation within a frame.
3.9.2 Proof of Proposition 3.14
Take any solution {PM(h)∗}, {JM(h)∗} of the KKT conditions and denote by P ∗out the outage prob-
ability obtained under these strategies. By maintaining {JM(h)∗} constant and changing {PM(h)∗},
the resulting probability of outage can only be greater than or equal to P ∗out, since the original
{PM(h)∗} is the solution of a minimization problem with convex cost function and linear con-
straints.
Similarly, by maintaining {PM(h)∗} constant and changing {JM(h)∗}, the resulting probability
of outage can only be less than or equal to P ∗out, since the original {JM(h)∗} is the solution of a
maximization problem with concave cost function and linear constraints.
These arguments imply that {PM(h)∗}, {JM(h)∗} is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Chapter 4
Feedback-Based Collaborative Secrecy Encoding
over Binary Symmetric Channels
4.1 Introduction
In the context of a broadcast channel with confidential messages, it was shown in [13] that a
strictly positive secrecy capacity cannot be achieved for any arbitrary pair of receiver/eavesdropper
channels. In particular, [14] proves that whenever the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the
receiver’s channel, no secret messages can be exchanged between the legitimate transmitter and
receiver by the conventional method of [12].
This motivated several works [41], [20], [21], [42], [1] to focus on alternative methods of achiev-
ing positive secrecy rates even when the legitimate receiver has a worse channel than the eaves-
dropper. All these works exploit the idea of feedback channels.
The simple and interesting method of [41] is based on making the receiver jam the eavesdropper.
The receiver can subtract its own jamming signal from the received signal, while the wiretapper
is kept totally ignorant of the confidential information flowing between the legitimate users. The
drawback of this approach is that the receiver has to function in full duplex mode. Although an
extension to half-duplex mode is presented in [41] for binary symmetric channels, it relies on the
assumption that the transmission of symbol 0 is equivalent to the absence of a physical signal. We
believe that under this assumption, the binary symmetric channel is no longer valid as a simplified
model for a physical wireless channel.
More recently, [42], [1] both use a secret key to enhance the secrecy throughput of Wyner’s
scheme. In [42] the secret key is communicated through an error-free secure channel, while in [1]
it is transmitted using Wyner’s scheme on the feedback channels (and thus its secrecy is subject to
Alice’s feedback channel being better than Eve’s). An interesting idea of [1] is to use time-sharing
on the feedback link. Part of the feedback transmission is used to generate the secret key, while
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the remaining channel uses transmit random symbols with the purpose of providing the “common
randomness” necessary for our secrecy encoding scheme described in this chapter. A mixed se-
crecy encoding strategy is proposed in [1]. The main idea behind this strategy is to simultaneously
transmit a combination of secret messages, encoded by different methods. However, while a mes-
sage encrypted by a secret key can be transmitted at the same time as a secret message encoded
by Wyner’s scheme, the additional secret message encrypted with the use of a random feedback
sequence does not maintain secrecy. The exact reasons why the proposed scheme of [1] is incorrect
will be revealed in Section 4.4. None of the previously mentioned works considers the impact of
feedback transmission on the overall bandwidth use. This drawback becomes critical in [1], where
it results in the “secrecy rates” bearing no physical meaning, as will be shown in Section 4.7.
The concept of common randomness is introduced in [20, 21]. Such randomness can be acquired
if all terminals attempt to decode (note that a necessary condition is that the eavesdropper cannot
decode perfectly) a sequence of random bits, as for example a data stream transmitted by a satellite
at very low signal to noise ratio (SNR) [20]. Both [20] and [21] study the case when the legitimate
users agree on a secret key by employing repetitive protocols, which are not efficient for regular
data transmission.
The idea developed in this chapter is inspired by a particular case in [20]. As an example and
motivation for the feedback approach to secrecy in the classical Alice (transmitter) - Bob (receiver)
- Eve (eavesdropper) scenario, [20] develops a scheme where the common randomness is not re-
ceived from some external source (like a satellite), but introduced by Alice herself, and functions
as a secret key which allows Bob to share a secret message with Alice over a public, error free
channel. Our model changes the roles of Alice and Bob. Although at some point we make use
of the same concept of public error free channel, we show how the techniques that create such a
channel impact the overall secrecy rate. Our results explicitly count the loss in the total rate due to
the transmission of feedback.
136
While sharing functional similarities with the well-known one-time pad [43] encryption scheme,
our approach is radically different in that it requires no secret key to be shared by the legitimate
parties before the initiation of the transmission protocol (except maybe a small secret key that guar-
antees authenticity as in [20]). Instead it exploits the channel randomness as means of confusing
the eavesdropper.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We show how an adaptation of Maurer’s scheme [20] can be used to achieve a non-empty
rate-equivocation region and hence a strictly positive secrecy rate over binary symmetric
channels (BSCs) even when the forward channel between Alice and Eve is less noisy than
the forward channel between Alice and Bob, regardless of the feedback channel quality
between Bob and Alice or Bob and Eve.
• Our results also indicate how the forward channel capacities scale the overall secrecy rate
and what penalties are incurred by the transmission of feedback sequences.
• We show that even if the forward channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel
from Alice to Eve, feedback can sometimes further improve the achievable rate-equivocation
region obtained using Wyner’s classical method [12]. This is done by dividing the transmis-
sion over the forward channel into two parts, as in [13]. Thus, we transmit a secret message
at a rate less than the secrecy capacity [12], and allow room for an additional common mes-
sage, which carries information “encrypted” with the help of the feedback sequence. The
optimal way of splitting the forward message rate is found numerically.
• We prove that, for a two-user broadcast channel with both channels binary and symmetric,
the optimal auxiliary channel of [13], needed to encode both a secret and a common message
into the transmitted sequence is a binary symmetric one, and its optimal input distribution is
uniform.
137
• Finally, we take our scheme a step further and implement it on the reverse channel (from
Bob to Alice, rather than from Alice to Bob), in order to generate a secret key. Alice uses
this key as a one-time pad for the transmission of a secret message.
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FIGURE 4.1. System model.
The sequel is organized into seven sections. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 describe the kernel of our
scheme. Our adaptation of Maurer’s idea [20], including the channel model and the transmission
protocol are presented in Section 4.2.1 under the assumption that the forward channels are error
free. The public error free channel and the overall rate-equivocation region are discussed in Section
4.2.2 for a general value of the forwarding rate. Section 4.3 deals with the special case when the
eavesdropper’s forward channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s forward channel, while
section 4.4 extends the model to the case when the eavesdropper’s forward channel is worse than
the legitimate receiver’s. An alternative scheme, which reverses our protocol to generate a secret
key, is provided in Section 4.5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Kernel
4.2.1 The Unscaled Rates
Consider the classical Alice (transmitter) - Bob (receiver) - Eve (eavesdropper) scenario with bi-
nary symmetric channels (BSCs) between any pair of users. We assume that Eve’s only form of
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interfering with the transmission is eavesdropping. Although our present treatment is restrictive to
binary channels, the principles and results therein can be easily extended to more complex models.
A simple extension to additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels is provided in Section 4.9.
The proposed model is depicted in Figure 4.1. The transmitter (Alice) wants to communicate
the outputs of a source S of entropy Hs to the legitimate receiver (Bob), and maintain some
level of secrecy towards the wiretapper (Eve). The channel A → B from Alice to Bob is a BSC
characterized by its crossover probability ²f , while the binary symmetric channel A → E from
Alice to Eve is characterized by the crossover probability δf . Similarly, the feedback BSCs B → A
(Bob to Alice) and B → E (Bob to Eve) are characterized by their crossover probabilities ²b and
δb, respectively.
The transmission protocol associated with the channel model in Figure 4.1 is an adaptation of
Maurer’s scheme [20] and is described as follows. Bob feeds back a sequence x of n bits represent-
ing the independent realizations of a Bernoulli random variable X with expectation E[X] = 0.5.
Since the bits are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), Alice’s and Eve’s estimate of each
bit should be based solely on the corresponding received bit. Therefore, the bit error probabilities
that affect Alice’s and Eve’s decoding are ²b and δb respectively. Denote the feedback sequences
received by Alice and Eve as y and z, respectively.
At this point, our feedback-based protocol assumes that Alice can share information with both
Bob and Eve through an error free public channel, just like in [20]. The implications of achieving
such an error free channel are discussed in Section 4.2.2.
Since an error free public channel cannot protect Alice’s information from the eavesdropper Eve,
the protocol has to artificially create a pair of channels that are adequate for the transmission of
secret messages.
For this purpose, if Alice needs to send an n-dimensional sequence v to Bob, she first computes
v ⊕ y, where ⊕ denotes addition mod 2, and feeds this signal through the error free channel.
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Since x is a sequence of i.i.d. symbols with a uniform distribution over {0, 1}, the same property
holds for the BSC output y and, by the Crypto lemma1 [44], [41], for v ⊕ y.
Both Bob and Eve receive v ⊕ y with no errors. In order to obtain the original message v, the
optimal strategy for Bob is to compute v⊕y⊕x, while Eve’s best strategy is to compute v⊕y⊕z
[20].
As a consequence, a bit error probability of ²B = ²b will affect Bob’s estimate of v, while a bit
error probability of ²E = ²b+ δb− 2²bδb will affect Eve’s estimate [20]. The result is an equivalent
system in which Eve’s channel is a degraded version of Bob’s channel, and which is therefore
adequate for the transmission of secret messages from Alice to Bob. In other words, standard
secrecy encoding can be performed for this equivalent system so that the n-sequence v carries a
secret message sk1 (which will hence forth be represented as a sequence of k1 source symbols). A
total transmission rate arbitrarily close to
Rt,u = 1− h(²b) (4.1)
can be achieved as n→∞, where h(·) represents the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log2(x)−
(1− x) log2(1− x).
We shall now restate some of the definitions in [12] and then show how Theorem 2 of [12] can
be readily applied to our scenario.
Definition 4.1. The equivocation of the sourceS of entropy Hs at Eve is defined as:
∆ =
1
k
H(sk|wME ), (4.2)
where the sequence sk of k source symbols are encoded into a codeword wMA of length M which is
transmitted over the broadcast channel, and received by Eve as wME .
1Special care should be applied when using the Crypto lemma [44]. For instance, if C is a compact Abelian group and X and E are random
variables over C such that X is independent of E and uniformly distributed over C, then X + E is uniform and independent of E. However, E is
not independent of (X,X + E).
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Definition 4.2. The rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is achievable if for any ν > 0 there exists an
(M,k,∆, Pe) code as defined in [12] such that:
kHs
M
≥ R− ν, ∆ ≥ d− ν, Pe ≤ ν (4.3)
where Pe is the average error probability in decoding for sk at Bob.
Theorem 4.3. (Theorem 2 from [12]) A rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is achievable for Wyner’s
scheme with discrete memoryless symmetric channels if and only if
0 ≤ R ≤ CM , 0 ≤ d ≤ Hs, Rd ≤ HsCs, (4.4)
where Cs = CM − CMW is the secrecy capacity (representing the maximum rate at which the
outputs of the source S can be conveyed from Alice to Bob, while remaining perfectly secret to
Eve) achievable by Wyner’s scheme in this case, CM is the capacity of Bob’s channel, and CMW is
the capacity of Eve’s channel.
The following corollary, which will prove useful in the sequel, follows directly from Theorem
4.3 and Definition 4.2.
Corollary 4.4. If (R, d) is an achievable rate-equivocation pair, then the number of secret source
symbols k that can be encoded into the M -sequence wMA has to satisfy:
k ≤ MCs
d
. (4.5)
Proof. Take an achievable rate-equivocation pair (R, d) such that Rd = HsCs. If k > MCsd , then
there exists R′ > R such that the same code that achieves the (R, d) pair satisfies Hsk
M
≥ R′−ν, for
any ν > 0. This implies that (R′, d) is an achievable rate. But then R′d > HsCs, and this violates
Theorem 4.3.
If we apply Theorem 4.3 to the pair of equivalent channels derived above, we can conclude that
there exists a (n, k1,∆1, Pe,1) code satisfying k1Hsn ≥ R− ν, ∆1 ≥ d− ν, and Pe,1 ≤ ν if and only
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if 0 ≤ R ≤ Rt,u, 0 ≤ d ≤ Hs, Rd ≤ HsRs,u, where Rs,u is the maximum achievable secrecy rate
[13, 20]
Rs,u = h(²b + δb − 2²bδb)− h(²b). (4.6)
Several comments are in order. First, note that Rs,u > 0 – and therefore the rate-equivocation
region as defined in [12] is non-empty – unless δb ∈ {0, 1} (the assumption that feedback channels
exist implies ²b 6= 0.5)
Second, the rates Rt,u and Rs,u do not represent the overall transmission and secrecy rates of our
model, since a pair of binary symmetric channels such as the forward A→ B and A→ E channels
cannot provide error free transmission at infinite rates. The information encoded in the sequence
v mentioned above has to be passed through one of these channels in order to be available at the
other two terminals. While this “correction” will be considered in Section 4.2.2, we shall denote
the rates Rt,u and Rs,u as the unscaled transmission and secrecy rates, respectively.
Third, note that under the above protocol, an independent feedback sequence x is transmitted
every time for each new information-carrying sequence v. Eve’s resulting error sequence is always
different and independent, and acts like a one-time pad [43]. As is the case with a one-time pad,
the feedback sequence cannot be recycled. If only one feedback sequence is transmitted and used
for a set of several messages, Eve’s equivocation about the whole set will be the same as her
equivocation about any one message in the set.
Therefore, an additional rate penalty has to address the channel uses required for the feedback
of x, as will be shown in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 The Overall Rate-Equivocation Region and Secrecy Rate
This section shows how the overall transmission rates of our model depend on the unscaled rates
of the equivalent system presented in Section 4.2.1 and on the transmission rates used over the
forward binary symmetric channels.
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In Section 4.2.1 we showed that, if feedback is allowed, we can artificially form an equivalent
system that allows encoding by Wyner’s scheme [12]. All that is needed is an error free public
channel to support the transmission of the n-sequence v⊕ y. By the channel coding theorem, this
channel is readily available if v⊕ y is transmitted at a rate RAB,fb (the notation stands for the rate
at which the feedback processed signal is transmitted from Alice to Bob) less than the capacity of
the A→ B channel CAB = 1− h(²f ).
For a more formal proof, denote the error sequences introduced by the feedback channels by
ebA – for Alice – and ebE – for Eve. According to [12] if the rate of the secret message is less than
Rs,u, then there exists an encoding/decoding technique such that for any ν > 0 there exists N0 > 0
such that the average probability of correctly decoding for the secret message sk1 is∑
s
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1} · Pr{ψ(v ⊕ ebA) = sk1} ≥ 1− ν (4.7)
for n > N0, where ψ(·) is Bob’s secrecy decoder.
Moreover, according to Gallager’s second corollary of Theorem 5.6.2. [45], there exists a code
for Bob’s forward channel with the property that if the transmission rate is RAB,fb < CAB, then
for any ν > 0 there exists N1 > 0 such that the average probability of correctly decoding a given
transmitted message t is∑
wB,t
Pr{t}Pr{wB|t}Pr{φ(wB) = t} ≥ 1− ν (4.8)
for n > N1, where φ(·) is Bob’s channel decoder and wB is Bob’s received sequence over
the forward channel (when wA is transmitted by Alice). Note that our decoding method con-
sists of separate channel and secrecy decoding. That is, Bob estimates the secret message s, as
ŝ = ψ(φ(wB) ⊕ x). There is no guarantee that this separate decoding method is optimal. We
define Bob’s optimal (joint) decoder ξ(·), yielding the optimal estimate s˜ = ξ(wB). Given the
feedback sequence x, we can lower bound
Pr{ξ(wB) = sk1} ≥
∑
t
Pr{φ(wB) = t}Pr{ψ(t⊕ x) = sk1}. (4.9)
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Thus given the feedback sequence x, Bob’s average probability of correctly decoding for the
secret message sk1 can be lower bounded as
∑
sk1
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1}
∑
x
Pr{x} ·
·
∑
wB
Pr{wB|v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x}Pr{ξ(wB) = sk1}
(a)
≥
≥
∑
sk1
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1}
∑
x
Pr{x} ·
·
∑
wB
Pr{wB|v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x}
∑
t
Pr{φ(wB) = t} · Pr{ψ(t⊕ x) = sk1}
(b)
≥
≥
∑
sk1
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1}
∑
x
Pr{x} ·
∑
wB
Pr{wB|v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x} ·
· Pr{φ(wB) = v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x} · Pr{ψ(v ⊕ ebA)} = sk1} (c)=
=
∑
sk1
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1} · Pr{ψ(v ⊕ ebA)} = sk1} ·
·
∑
x
Pr{x}
∑
wB
Pr{wB|v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x} · Pr{φ(wB) = v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x}
(d)
≥
≥ (1− ν)
∑
sk1
Pr{sk1}
∑
v,ebA
Pr{ebA}Pr{v|sk1} · Pr{ψ(v ⊕ ebA)} = sk1}
(e)
≥ (1− ν)2.(4.10)
Inequality (a) follows from (4.9), inequality (b) from the fact that∑t F (t) ≥ F (t)|t=v⊕ebA⊕x for
any positive function F , while the equality (c) from simply re-arranging the terms. In inequality
(d) we used (4.8) and the fact that Pr{v ⊕ ebA ⊕ x} = Pr{x} (due to the Crypto lemma [44]),
while inequality (e) follows directly from (4.7). The resulting average error probability at Bob is
thus
Pe < 2ν − ν2, (4.11)
which goes to zero as ν → 0.
Denote CAE = 1 − h(δf ) the capacity of Eve’s forward channel. Note that if CAE ≥ CAB,
Eve will also be able to decode the sequence v⊕ y with no errors asymptotically. However, Eve’s
equivocation about the secret message sk1 is maintained due to the feedback processing. On the
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other hand, if CAE < CAB, Eve cannot decode for the message v⊕y. Under this scenario, a secret
message can be transmitted from Alice to Bob by Wyner’s scheme, without using any feedback.
The optimal tradeoff between the rate of encoding a secret message directly through Wyner’s
scheme and the rate RAB,fb at which a feedback-processed secret message should be forwarded to
Bob will be discussed in Section 4.4. In what follows, we prove that Eve’s equivocation about the
feedback-processed secret message sk1 is maintained regardless of the forwarding rate RAB,fb.
LetwE denote Eve’s received signal over the forward channel and sk1 denote the secret message.
Also, recall the error sequences corresponding to the feedback channels were denoted by ebA (for
Alice’s feedback channel) and ebE (for Eve’s feedback channel).
Eve’s equivocation about the secret message is
H(sk1|wE,x⊕ ebE) ≥ H(sk1|v ⊕ y,x⊕ ebE) = H(sk1|v ⊕ ebE ⊕ ebA), (4.12)
where the inequality follows since sk1 → v ⊕ y → wE form a Markov chain, and the equality
is due to the Crypto lemma [44] and the fact that the probability distribution of x is uniform over
{0, 1}n (implying that x⊕ebE is independent of (sk1 , v⊕ebE⊕ebA)). Hence Eve’s equivocation
can only increase because of the imperfect forward channels.
The impact of the forward channel finite transmission rate on the overall achievable rates is
reflected in a scaling of the unscaled rates by the rate used over the forward link RAB,fb. That is,
a sequence of m1 bits carrying k1 = nRs,u/Hs secret symbols is mapped to an n-sequence v by
Alice’s secrecy encoder, such that m1
n
≈ Rt,u. Next, Alice computes v⊕y, and feeds this signal to
the channel encoder. Since v ⊕ y is a sequence of i.i.d. uniform bits (as shown in Section 4.2.1),
its error free transmission requires an approximate number of M = n
RAB,fb
channel uses. Hence,
the m1 source bits are transmitted in M channel uses.
An additional number of n channel uses have to be considered for the transmission of the re-
quired feedback sequence x. Noting that n
M+n
=
RAB,fb
RAB,fb+1
, we can state the following result.
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Theorem 4.5. For any ν0, by choosing ν such that ν0 > max{ν, 2ν − ν2}, we can find a code
comprising the original (n, k1, d, Pe,1) secrecy code, the forward channel code and the feedback,
which encodes the k1-sequence sk1 into the M -sequence wMA , such that if Bob receives wMB and
Eve receives wME , we have k1HsM+n ≥ nM+nR− ν0, ∆1 ≥ d− ν0, and Pe,1 ≤ ν0, as long as
0 ≤ n
M + n
R ≤ RAB,fb
RAB,fb + 1
Rt,u, (4.13)
0 ≤ d ≤ Hs, (4.14)
n
M + n
Rd ≤ Hs RAB,fb
RAB,fb + 1
Rs,u. (4.15)
This yields an overall secrecy rate of
Rs,0 = Rs,u
RAB,fb
RAB,fb + 1
. (4.16)
4.3 The First Approach: Eavesdropper’s Forward Channel
Less Noisy than Legitimate Receiver’s Channel
In this section we show a first approach to increasing the secrecy rate by using our feedback-
based scheme. We prove that it can achieve a strictly positive secrecy rate and a non-empty rate-
equivocation region even if the eavesdropper’s forward channel A → E is less noisy than the
legitimate receiver’s channel A→ B. The case when A→ B is less noisy than A→ E is studied
in Section 4.4.
If Eve’s forward channel is less noisy than Bob’s forward channel, or equivalently δf ≤ ²f ,
then no messages can be transmitted at any level of secrecy over the A → B channel by Wyner’s
method [12]. If we take the forwarding rate RAB,fb arbitrarily close to Bob’s forward channel
capacity CAB, we obtain the following result which is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem
4.5.
Corollary 4.6. For any ν0 > 0 there exists a code which encodes the k-sequence sk1 into the M -
sequence wMA , such that if Bob receives wMB and Eve receives wME , we have k1HsM+n ≥ nM+nR − ν0,
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∆1 ≥ d− ν0, and Pe ≤ ν0, as long as
0 ≤ n
M + n
R ≤ CAB
CAB + 1
Rt,u, (4.17)
0 ≤ d ≤ Hs, (4.18)
n
M + n
Rd ≤ Hs CAB
CAB + 1
Rs,u. (4.19)
This yields an overall secrecy rate of
Rs,0 = Rs,u
CAB
CAB + 1
. (4.20)
The following remark is in order. Maurer’s “secrecy capacity with public discussion” [20] is
upper-bounded as follows:
Ĉs(PY Z|X) ≤ max
PX
I(X;Y |Z) (4.21)
where X , Y and Z denote the input and the outputs of the non-perfect channel (in our case the
input to feedback channel at Bob and the outputs at Alice and Eve, respectively), and PX denotes
the probability distribution of X input. It is also noted in [20] that in the case of binary symmetric
channels, the upper-bound is achieved. For our case, this means that the unscaled secrecy rate
Rs,u = h(²b + δb − 2²bδb)− h(²b) can be increased no further.
However, for a practical system with imperfect forward channels, the objective should be to
maximize the overall secrecy rate rather than the unscaled secrecy rate. In the remainder of this
section we provide a simple example to prove that by altering the feedback sequence we can
increase the overall secrecy rate of the system over the value
Rs,0 = [h(²b + δb − 2²bδb)− h(²b)] CAB
CAB + 1
(4.22)
provided by the maximization of the unscaled secrecy rate.
Processing the feedback sequence improves performance
So far we assumed that the feedback i.i.d. uniform sequence of bits x is transmitted by Bob with
no further processing.
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FIGURE 4.2. The operator corresponding to the repetition coding preprocessing.
Further processing of the feedback sequence results in equivalent feedback channels with altered
error probabilities. Although the overall achievable secrecy rate depends on the rate at which the
feedback is transmitted, an error and rate reducing encoding/decoding scheme for the feedback
sequence implemented among the three parties can improve the system’s performance. One such
simple scheme, which preserves the independence between the symbols of y after decoding, is
obtained if Bob encodes the feedback sequence x using repetition coding of rate 1/N , and Alice
and Eve employ the optimal decoding scheme, which is majority decoding. The scheme results in
equivalent BSCs with crossover probabilities
²′b =
2K+1∑
i=K+1
 2K + 1
i
 ²ib(1− ²b)2K+1−i (4.23)
and
δ′b =
2K+1∑
i=k+1
 2K + 1
i
 δib(1− δb)2K+1−i, (4.24)
where N = 2K + 1 if N is odd and N = 2K + 2 if N is even, and K ≥ 0.
The optimum N that maximizes the overall secrecy rate can be obtained numerically. The im-
provement in the overall secrecy rate due to repetition coding, as well as the optimal choice of N
will be shown in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 of Section 4.4. However at this point we note that a processing
method that decreases equivalent crossover probabilities is better when ²b is decreased more than
δb, i.e. when the strength of Bob’s channel is increased relative to that of Eve’s. By inspecting
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(4.23) and (4.24), we notice that the operator corresponding to our preprocessing method is expo-
nential. It is therefore expected that the method gives better results when ²b < δb, as can be seen
from Figure 4.2 (this phenomenon is indeed observed in our numerical results of Section 4.4) .
Although the above result may seem counter-intuitive (in light of Maurer’s Theorem 4 [20]),
the improvement in our case results exactly from the imperfection of the forward channels, which
translates to scaling coefficients for all achievable rates, as shown in Section 4.2.2.
Note that if a rate 1/N repetition coding is used for the transmission of the feedback sequence,
the total number of channel uses needed for feedback is Nn, leading to the overall secrecy rate
Rs,c =
nRs,u
n/RAB,fb + nN
= Rs,u
RAB,fb
NRAB,fb + 1
. (4.25)
The unscaled secrecy rate Rs,u increases with N , while the correction factor CABNCAB+1 decreases
with N , hence the need to find the optimal value of N that maximizes Rs,c.
Some numerical results
Since the secrecy rate is simpler to represent than the rate-equivocation region, throughout this
chapter we focus on illustrating the improvements in the achievable secrecy rate due to feedback.
We first consider a model in which the forward channels have crossover probabilities ²f = 0.02
and δf = 0.01, respectively. In this scenario, Wyner’s scheme cannot deliver a secret message
from Alice to Bob at any positive rate. However, the secrecy rates achievable by our feedback
based scheme (in Figure 4.3) are strictly positive (except in the pathological cases when δb = 0 or
²b = 0.5).
In Figures 4.4 and 4.5 we show the additional improvement in the overall achievable secrecy
rate obtained if we use repetition coding for the transmission of the feedback sequence, and the
optimal repetition order N . Although the improvement is marginal, it proves that Maurer’s upper
bound on the secrecy capacity with public discussion [20] does not hold if the forward channels
are imperfect.
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FIGURE 4.3. Overall secrecy rate achievable by our feedback scheme for ²f = 0.02 and δf = 0.01.
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FIGURE 4.4. Secrecy rate improvement due to feedback repetition coding.
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FIGURE 4.5. The optimal value of N for feedback repetition coding.
4.4 The Second Approach: Legitimate Receiver’s Forward
Channel Less Noisy than Eavesdropper’s Channel
If ²f < δf , a non-empty rate-equivocation region and a strictly positive secrecy rate less than Cs =
CAB−CAE are asymptotically achievable without feedback [12]. In this section we show that even
under this scenario, sometimes feedback can improve the achievable secrecy rate. For example,
when Cs is small compared to CAB,and the unscaled secrecy rate achievable with feedback Rs,u is
relatively large (i.e. when the channelB → A is significantly better than the channelB → E, while
the channelA→ B is only slightly better than the channelA→ E) , we can haveCs < Rs,u CABCAB+1 .
However, in general, neither Wyner’s original scheme, nor our feedback based scheme is opti-
mal. Instead, as we shall see shortly, encoding a combination of a secret message and a feedback-
processed message into the forwarded sequence wA can achieve a higher overall secrecy rate.
The method behind the direct part of Wyner’s Theorem 2 [12] assumes the transmission of m2
bits, containing k2 = n2Cs secret bits, by mapping the k2-bit secret message sk2 to a specific coset.
The rest of m2−k2 bits correspond to the index of the randomly picked coset representative which
is transmitted. Since Bob can decode the transmitted codeword perfectly, he has access to all m2
bits. The m2 − k2 non-secret bits are neither secret to, nor can they be decoded by Eve without
errors [13]. It was assumed in [12] that these bits are picked randomly (according to a uniform
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distribution) and carry no information. In their extension of Wyner’s work, Csiszar and Korner
[13] observe that these bits can actually be picked according to the output message of a uniform
source of entropy Hx = m2 − k2, which can carry useful information for Bob [13].
At a first glance, it would appear that by encoding the message v ⊕ y into the m2 − k2 non-
secret bits, we could transmit it asymptotically error free to Bob, at a rate arbitrarily close to
CAB − Cs = CAE , in addition to the original secret message sk2 . In this case, even if Eve had
perfect access to these bits (which she has not), the equivocation of both secret messages would
be preserved. This argument is the starting point of the proposed mixed secrecy scheme of [1] (see
Section 4.7 for more remarks on [1]). Unfortunately, the argument above is false. By using the
sequence v⊕ y = v⊕ x⊕ ebA to pick the coset representative to be transmitted over the forward
channel, the equivocation of the secret message sk2 encoded into the other k2 bits is compromised.
As shown in Section 4.7, this happens because Eve has access to a distorted version of the feedback
sequence x⊕ ebE, which is correlated with v ⊕ y.
Therefore we need an encoding technique in which Eve’s information about the message v ⊕
y, obtained through x ⊕ ebE, does not influence the secrecy of sk2 . Such a technique is readily
provided by [13]: we can treat the sequence v ⊕ y as a common message, intended for both Bob
and Eve. In addition to the common message, a secret message sk2 can be transmitted to Bob.
Since the common message is designed to be perfectly decoded by Eve, the additional information
contained in x⊕ ebE cannot compromise the secrecy of sk2 . The drawback is that the transmission
of a common message decreases the rate at which the secret message sk2 can be conveyed to Bob
[13]. However, the transmission of an additional secret message sk1 , encoded in the sequence v,
can make up for this loss and, in many circumstances, bring noticeable improvements over Wyner’s
scheme [12].
In order to pursue this path, we first need to establish what is the optimal tradeoff between the
common message rate and the secret message rate. Denote by WA, WB and WE the input to the
forward channel and the outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. According to Theorem 1 of [13], the
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two rates have to satisfy:
Re ≤ I(V ;WB|U)− I(V ;WE|U), (4.26)
Rc ≤ min[I(U ;WB), I(U ;WE)], (4.27)
whereRe is the secret message rate, Rc is the common message rate, and U and V are two auxiliary
random variables such that U → V → WA → WB,WE form a Markov chain.
For our special BSC case, and under the scenario where ²f < δf , we can further simplify (4.27):
Rc ≤ I(U ;WE). (4.28)
Following the proof of Corollary 3 in [13], we can write (4.26) as:
Re ≤ I(V ;WB|U)− I(V ;WE|U) =
= I(V ;WB)− I(V ;WE)− [I(U ;WB)− I(U ;WE)] =
= [I(WA;WB)− I(WA;WE)]− [I(WA;WB|V )− I(WA;WE|V )]−
−[I(U ;WB)− I(U ;WE)], (4.29)
where the equalities follow from the fact that if X → Y → Z form a Markov chain, then
I(Y ;Z) = I(X;Z)+I(Y ;Z|X) (Lemma 1 in [13]). Note that the term [I(WA;WB|V )−I(WA;WE|V )]
is always positive [13], and is minimized for V = WA. The condition in (4.29) is thus reduced to
Re ≤ [I(WA;WB)− I(WA;WE)]− [I(U ;WB)− I(U ;WE)], (4.30)
or equivalently
Re ≤ I(WA;WB|U)− I(WA;WE|U). (4.31)
At this point we are looking for the auxiliary random variable U , and its relationship with the
channel input random variable WA, that achieve the points on the boundary of the (Re, Rc) region
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described above. The only information about U that is provided in [13], is that its alphabet size
may, without loss of generality, be assumed to be at most three letters larger than the alphabet of
WA (in our binary case, the alphabet of U would have at most five letters). In Theorem 4.7 below,
which is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 4.8 in the Section 4.8, we present an interesting
result, namely that the optimal U is in fact a binary, uniformly distributed random variable, and
moreover, it is linked to WA through a simple binary symmetric channel.
Theorem 4.7. Any point on the boundary of the (Re, Rc) region described above can be achieved
by a binary random variable U with a uniform distribution over {0, 1}. Moreover, the channel
input random variable WA can be obtained by passing U through a binary symmetric channel of
crossover probability γ that satisfies 1− h(γ + δf − 2γδf ) = R∗c (where h(·) is the binary entropy
function).
As a consequence of Theorem 4.7, once we pick the auxiliary channel crossover probability γ
we can compute
R∗c = 1− h(γ + δf − 2γδf ) (4.32)
and
R∗e = [h(δf )− h(²f )]− [h(γ + δf − 2γδf )− h(γ + ²f − 2γ²f )]. (4.33)
Similar arguments to those in the previous section apply to show that the messages v ⊕ y,
containing the secret message sk1 , can now be transmitted to Bob asymptotically error free at a
rate arbitrarily close to R∗c , in the form of a common message. In addition, another secret message
sk2 can be transmitted simultaneously to Bob at rate close to R∗e . In the remainder of this section
we calculate the resulting overall secrecy rate.
Define the equivocations ∆1 = 1k1H(s
k1|wME ,xn+ebEn) and ∆2 = 1k2H(sk2|wME ), where sk2 is
the k2-sequence of secret source symbols that are encoded in the codewordwMA as a secret message,
and sk1 is a distinct k1-sequence of secret source symbols that are encoded in the sequence v ⊕ y
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by our feedback scheme. The sequence v ⊕ y is in turn mapped into the same codeword wMA as
a common message. The transmitted codeword wMA is received by Eve as wME . We know that for
any ν > 0 there exists such an encoding technique which satisfies
k2Hs
M
≥ R2 − ν, ∆2 ≥ d2 − ν, Pe,2 ≤ ν, (4.34)
as long as
0 ≤ R2 ≤ CAB, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ Hs, R2d2 ≤ HsR∗e, (4.35)
and
k1Hs
M+n
≥ R1 − ν, ∆1 ≥ d1 − ν, Pe,1 ≤ ν, (4.36)
as long as
0 ≤ R1 ≤ CABRt,u, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ Hs, R1d1 ≤ HsRs,u R∗cR∗c+1 . (4.37)
The equivocation of the secret message at Eve is now defined as:
∆ =
1
k1 + k2
H(sk1 , sk2|wME ,xn + eben). (4.38)
Since sk1 and sk2 are independent, we can write
∆ =
k1
k1 + k2
∆1 +
k2
k1 + k2
∆2. (4.39)
Note that the overall rate at which the secret source is transmitted is now (k1+k2)Hs
M+n
. Therefore, a
correction of M
M+n
has to be applied to the rate R2. As a result, the rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is
achievable if R = min{ M
M+n
R2+R1, CAB} and d = k1k1+k2d1+ k2k1+k2d2. Note that this implies R <
CAB and d < Hs. Also, due to Corollary 4.4 we have k2d2 ≤MR∗e and k2d2 ≤ (M +n) R
∗
c
R∗c+1
Rs,u.
Due to (4.34) and (4.36) we have k1 + k2 ≥ M+nHs ( MM+nR2 + R1 − ν(1 + MM+n)), so we can
upper-bound
d =
k1d1 + k2d2
k1 + k2
≤ Hs 1
R− ν(1 + M
M+n
)
(R∗e +R
∗
cRs,u)
R∗c + 1
, (4.40)
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and
Rd ≤ Hs R
R− ν(1 + M
M+n
)
(R∗e +R
∗
cRs,u)
R∗c + 1
, (4.41)
If we take ν → 0, we get
Rd ≤ Hs (R
∗
e +R
∗
cRs,u)
R∗c + 1
. (4.42)
Equality can be asymptotically achieved (as ν → 0) in (4.42) above if the two levels of secrecy
operate at R2d2 = HsC∗e and R1d1 = Hs
R∗c
R∗c+1
Rs,u respectively.
To conclude, our scheme yields an overall asymptotically achievable secrecy rate
Rs,0 = max
[
max
γ
(R∗e +R
∗
cRs,u)
R∗c + 1
,
CABRs,u
CAB + 1
]
, (4.43)
where R∗e and R∗c are given by (4.32) and (4.33), respectively.
Several comments are in order. If γ = 0, we obtain R∗c = CAE , and R∗e = 0. However in this
case, since no secret message is transmitted directly by Wyner’s scheme, we can safely transmit
the feedback-processed message at a rate RAB,fb = CAB just like in (Subsection 4.3). This dis-
continuity in γ = 0 is why in (4.43) we have to compare the result of the maximization over
γ (corresponding to the mixed scheme) with the rate achieved by the pure feedback scheme. If
γ = 0.5, we have R∗c = 0, and R∗e = CAB − CAE = Cs, resulting in Wyner’s original scheme
[12] – hence no discontinuity in γ = 0.5. Any value of γ in the open interval (0, 0.5) results in a
combination of the two schemes.
Some more numerical results
To illustrate the performance of our second approach to implementing the feedback-based se-
crecy scheme, we consider a model in which the forward channels have crossover probabilities
²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02, respectively. The secrecy rate achievable by Wyner’s original scheme is
Cs = 0.06.
In Figure 4.6 we show the overall achievable secrecy rate when we use our feedback scheme,
for different values of the crossover probabilities characterizing the feedback channels. The corre-
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FIGURE 4.6. Secrecy rate achievable by the feedback scheme for ²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02.
sponding optimal value of the parameter γ is given in Figure 4.7. Recall that whenever γ = 0.5, our
feedback scheme reduces to Wyner’s scheme, and hence the achievable secrecy rate is Cs. Also,
when γ = 0, our scheme uses the whole capacity CAB of Bob’s forward channel to convey a secret
message encoded with the help of the feedback sequence (no additional directly encoded secret
message is present). The improvements are significant.
4.5 The Third Approach: The Reversed Feedback Scheme
The feedback-based scheme discussed in the previous section encodes two secret messages into the
sequence transmitted over the forward channel. The main idea behind this construction is based
on the capability of the legitimate transmitter (Alice) to transmit two types of messages simulta-
neously [13]: a first secret message to Bob, and a common message to both Bob and Eve. In our
case, the common message carries a second secret message, the encoding of which is based on
artificially degrading Eve’s equivalent channel by the use of a feedback sequence. But on a deeper
level, the encoding of both secret messages uses the same principle developed in [12], and none of
them uses an explicit secret key.
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FIGURE 4.7. The optimal value of γ for the feedback scheme when ²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02.
In this section, we discuss another approach to increasing the secrecy rate, namely when the
feedback-based scheme is used on the reversed channel (in the sense that the secret message en-
coded with the help of our feedback-based scheme is now transmitted from Bob to Alice instead
of from Alice to Bob) to send a secret key from Bob to Alice, much like in [42] and [1] (in fact the
scenarios of [42] and the correct part of [1] can be considered as special cases of our reversed mixed
feedback scheme.). Alice can subsequently use this secret key as a one-time pad, for transmitting
a secret message of the same entropy [43] to Bob.
Although this new protocol requires more bandwidth than the previous one, it can sometimes
achieve better overall performance in terms of rate-equivocation region and secrecy rate. However,
this can only happen under the (necessary but not sufficient) condition that the rate at which the
secret key is transmitted from Bob to Alice exceeds the secrecy rates achievable by the original
feedback scheme.
Denote by Rs,p the supremum of the rates at which Bob can transmit a secret key (or a one-
time pad) to Alice by using the feedback scheme developed in the previous section on the reversed
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channel. Note that Rs,p can be obtained from the expression of Rs,0 in (4.43) by replacing ²f by ²b,
δf by δb, and vice versa.
To acquire this secret key, Alice and Bob engage in a protocol which is the reversed version of
the one described in the previous sections. Alice broadcasts a random feedback sequence of n bits.
Bob can then encode k1 secret bits into an n-sequence, which is added mod 2 to Bob’s received
feedback sequence, and then the result is further encoded into an M -sequence for asymptotically
error free transmission over the B → A and B → E channels.
If CBA > CBE , the same M -sequence can carry an additional secret message of k2 bits. A
number of M + n channel uses are thus required for the transmission of a kr = k1 + k2-bit secret
key rkr , and are accounted for in the expression of Rs,p (that is, Rs,p = krM+n).
After adding the secret key rkr to a secret message srkr of her own (also a kr-bit sequence), Alice
encodes the result into an M ′-sequence for the forward channel. Note here that because Alice uses
a secret key, the secrecy of srkr is preserved (by the Crypto lemma [44]) even if Eve has perfect
access to the resulting kr-bit sum sequence rkr ⊕ srkr .
At this point, Alice could choose to encrypt everything she transmits to Bob. However, that
strategy would require the generation of a long secret key, and hence cause a large rate loss due to
feedback – recall that in our results we count the bandwidth expenditure due to feedback. Instead,
a mixed secrecy encoding strategy on the forward link may be optimal. For example, a special
adaptation of our reversed feedback scheme is possible when CAB > CAE . Recall that in Section
4.4 we made a comment about the possibility to transmit a secret message, encoded in the cosets
of a code, at a rate arbitrarily close to the secrecy capacity Cs = max{CAB−CAE, 0}, while using
the feedback-processed sequence v⊕y (that was carrying a separate secret message) for selecting
the exact coset representative to be transmitted. In Section 4.4 this was not possible due to the fact
that Eve had some information about v ⊕ y, from its received feedback sequence x⊕ ebE. In the
present scenario, however, the message rkr ⊕ skr is totally unknown to Eve, and can be safely used
for selecting the coset representative.
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Thus, a first k0-bit secret message – denote it by s0k0 – can be transmitted from Alice to Bob
using Wyner’s original scheme [12], at a rate k0
M ′ ' Cs. A second secret message srkr can be
transmitted at a rate kr
M ′ ' CF (we denoted CF = min{CAB, CAE}) by using the secret key rkr
generated through a reversed feedback scheme.
With this notation, and taking into account all n+M+M ′ channel uses involved in the protocol
(i.e. n for the reversed feedback sequence from Alice to Bob, M for the transmission of the secret
key from Bob to Alice, and M ′ for the transmission of the secret message from Alice to Bob), we
can write the overall achievable secrecy rate as
Rs,rf =
k0 + kr
n+M +M ′
=
M ′
n+M +M ′
(Cs + CF ) = CAB
Rs,p
CF +Rs,p
, (4.44)
where in the second equality we used the fact that CF + Cs = CAB and that
M ′
n+M +M ′
=
kr/(n+M)
kr/M ′ + kr/(n+M)
=
Rs,p
CF +Rs,p
. (4.45)
An observation is now in order. Note that employing Wyner’s original scheme, when possible,
in addition to the encryption by the secret key generated by the reversed feedback-based scheme, is
always optimal. Indeed, Wyner’s scheme guarantees the transmission of a secret message without
wasting any resources other than the M ′ bits of the forward channel sequence, while encrypting
a message by a secret key generated as above requires additional resources that grow linearly
with the size of the secret key. Therefore, for instance, generating a secret key long enough to
encrypt the whole secret message (of size M ′CAB bits) yields an achievable secrecy rate equal to
CAB
Rs,p
CAB+Rs,p
, thus is always outperformed by our combination of encryption and Wyner’s scheme.
Numerical Results
For the first data set, of Section 4.3, (²f = 0.02 and δf = 0.01), the achievable secrecy rate and
the optimal γ for the reversed feedback scheme are given in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.
The improvement in the overall secrecy rate when using the reversed feedback scheme instead
of the regular feedback scheme, i.e. the function max{0, Rs,rf−R0}, is shown in Figure 4.10. Note
160
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
δb
Secrecy rate achievable with reversed feedback scheme: εf=0.02, δf=0.01
εb
Se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
FIGURE 4.8. Overall secrecy rate achievable by the reversed feedback scheme for ²f = 0.02 and δf = 0.01.
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FIGURE 4.9. The optimal value of γ for the reversed feedback scheme when ²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02.
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FIGURE 4.10. Improvement in overall secrecy rate when using the reversed feedback scheme instead of the
regular feedback scheme: ²f = 0.02 and δf = 0.01. Represented is the function max{0, Rs,rf −R0}.
that the reversed mixed feedback scheme is usually a better choice when Eve’s feedback channel
is worse than Alice’s (i.e. δb > ²b).
For the second data set, of Section 4.4, (²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02), the secrecy rate Rs,f achiev-
able by the reversed mixed feedback scheme is given in Figure 4.11, and the improvement over
the regular mixed feedback scheme is depicted in Figure 4.9. Once again, the reversed feedback
scheme performs better when δb > ²b. It is also interesting to note the existence of a region in
the (²b, δb) plane (around the diagonal ²b = δb), where our regular mixed feedback scheme beats
Wyner’s scheme even when ²b > δb, and it also beats the reversed mixed feedback scheme even
when ²b < δb.
4.6 Conclusions
We presented a scheme that achieves a strictly positive secrecy rate even if the eavesdropper’s
channel is better than the legitimate receiver’s channel, and improves the achievable secrecy rate if
the eavesdropper’s channel is worse.
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FIGURE 4.11. Secrecy rate achievable by the reversed feedback scheme for ²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02.
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FIGURE 4.12. Improvement in secrecy rate when using the reversed feedback scheme instead of the regular
feedback scheme: ²f = 0.01 and δf = 0.02. Represented is the function max{0, Rs,rf −R0}.
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TABLE 4.1. Possible implementation of our feedback-based secrecy scheme.
Channel conditions Possible implementation
CBA ≤ CBE Pure feedback scheme
CAB ≤ CAE
CBA > CBE Pure feedback scheme OR
CAB ≤ CAE Reversed mixed feedback scheme
CBA ≤ CBE Mixed feedback scheme OR
CAB > CAE Reversed pure feedback scheme
CBA > CBE Mixed feedback scheme OR
CAB > CAE Reversed mixed feedback scheme
We proposed several collaborative secrecy encoding methods, all of which use our feedback
scheme. Depending on the channel conditions, the possible ways in which the feedback-based
scheme can be used are summarized in Table 4.1. The term pure feedback scheme in Table 4.1 de-
notes the feedback scheme as implemented in Section 4.3, i.e. without being mixed with Wyner’s
scheme, while mixed feedback scheme refers to the implementation of Section 4.4, under the opti-
mal mixture between the pure feedback scheme and Wyner’s scheme. Similar considerations hold
for the reversed pure/mixed feedback scheme (see Section 4.5).
Our scheme requires a new random sequence to be fed back from Bob, for each codeword that
Alice wants to send over the forward channel, in a manner similar to the one-time pad. We have
shown that Theorem 4 in [20], which provides an upper bound on the achievable secrecy rate when
the public channel is error free, does not hold if this condition is not satisfied. The derivation of
such an upper bound for the more realistic scenario with imperfect public channels is still under
our investigation.
The main advantage of our scheme is that it makes physical layer security protocols imple-
mentable with only minor restrictions imposed on the eavesdropper’s channel, restrictions which
can be easily ensured by perimeter defense (transmission power is low enough to guarantee a
minimum error probability for any terminal situated outside a safe perimeter).
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4.7 Additional Results. Why the Approach of [1] Is Wrong
Since the ideas of [1] are closely related to our feedback secrecy encoding scheme, and since [1]
suffers from several subtle flaws, we dedicate this section to pointing out the following three.
First, all the rates of [1] are expressed without considering the expense of channel uses due to
feedback. While this may seem like a minor inconvenience as far as the forward channel rates
are involved, it becomes a problem when the forward channel rates are mixed with orthogonal
feedback channel rates, as in sections 3 and 4 of [1]. More specifically, the secrecy rate achievable
by Wyner’s scheme on the forward channel cannot be added to the rate at which the secret key is
generated over the orthogonal feedback channel unless both channels use the exact same codeword
length.
Second, even if both the feedback and forward channels used the same codeword length, the time
sharing idea of [1] is meaningless. It is claimed in [1] that time sharing is performed between two
modes of operation on the feedback channel: Wyner’s regular scheme, and our feedback secrecy
scheme. With the notation of [1], the two modes of operation would normally yield secrecy rates
Cbs = [h(δb) − h(²b)]+ (Wyner’s scheme) and Rfbs = h(²b + δb − 2²bδb) − h(²b) (our feedback
scheme). Thus, the optimal time sharing between these schemes is to always use our feedback
secrecy scheme (i.e. α = 0 always in [1]) since Rfbs > Cbs regardless of the channel parameters.
Third, our secrecy feedback scheme cannot be mixed with Wyner’s secrecy scheme the way that
was claimed in section 4 of [1]. If mixing is desired, special care should be taken to ensure that
Eve’s information about the random feedback sequence, obtained on the feedback channel, does
not compromise the secrecy of Wyner’s scheme. We have already mentioned this in Section 4.4. In
the following, we give a more detailed explanation of this account. With the notation on Section 4.4,
consider the secret message encoded by Wyner’s scheme sk2 , Alice’s transmitted sequence wMA ,
and Eve’s received sequence wME . The key to Wyner’s secrecy scheme is to employ an encoding
scheme that guarantees that H(wMA |wME , sk2) is arbitrarily small, and that H(wMA |sk2) is arbitrarily
close to I(wMA ;wME ) [12]. Indeed, this is how the encoding in [1] is performed.
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However, recall that due to the feedback scheme, Eve also has access to a distorted version z of
Bob’s feedback sequence x. Although H(wMA |wME , z, sk2) remains arbitrarily small, H(wMA |sk2)
is not arbitrarily close to I(wMA ;wME , z). This is because
I(wMA ;w
M
E , z) > I(w
M
A ;w
M
E )⇔ H(wMA |wME , z) < H(wMA |wME ).
Note that if we had H(wMA |wME , z) = H(wMA |wME ), then z→ wME → wMA would form a Markov
chain. But by the very construction of the feedback scheme, we have that z→ wMA → wME form a
Markov chain, and hence H(z|wMA ) = H(z|wME ), which would imply that no information about z,
or equivalently about x is lost over the forward channel. In other words, Eve has perfect access to
the auxiliary message that picks the exact bin representative to be transmitted by Wyner’s scheme
[12], and this contradicts the results of [13].
4.8 Additional Results. The Optimal Tradeoff between the
Secret Rate and the Common Rate
In Section 4.4 we have already shown that for an eavesdropper channel with input (at Alice) X
and outputs Y at the legitimate receiver (Bob) and Z at the eavesdropper (Eve), for which the
Bob’s channel is less noisy than Eve’s channel, a pair of one secret and one common messages can
be transmitted with asymptotically zero average error probability if and only if the rate Re of the
secret message and the rate Rc of the common message satisfy
Re ≤ I(X;Y |U)− I(X;Z|U) (4.46)
and
Rc ≤ I(U ;Z), (4.47)
where U is an auxiliary random variable such that U → X → Y Z form a Markov chain. This
result is a straightforward particularization of Theorem 1 in [13], for the case when Bob’s channel
is less noisy and we are only concerned with common and secret messages. From an application
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point of view, an efficient communications system that uses the framework in [13] to transmit two
such messages should operate on the boundary of the (Re, Rc) rate region. For example, once Rc
is set to a fixed value R∗c , the system should aim to use the maximum secrecy rate Re available
under these circumstances. This is equivalent to finding the optimal auxiliary random variable U ,
and the optimal relation (we shall henceforth denote this relation by the term “channel”) between
U and X , that maximize Re for a given value of Rc.
To the best of our knowledge, at present there exist no studies that solve the above problem, even
for the simplest of cases. In this section, we do just that: we prove that when all channels are binary
and symmetric (BSC), the boundary of the (Re, Rc) rate region is achieved by a binary auxiliary
random variable U , which is connected to the channel input random variable X through a BSC.
Theorem 4.8 below formalizes our results.
Theorem 4.8. Consider a main channel and an eavesdropper channel modeled as BSCs with
crossover probabilities ² and δ, respectively, such that ² < δ and ², δ ∈ [0, 0.5]. Any point on
the boundary of the (secret message rate, common message rate) rate region can be written as
(R∗e, R
∗
c), where
R∗c = 1− h(γ + δ − 2γδ), (4.48)
R∗e = [h(δ)− h(²)]− [h(γ + δ − 2γδ)− h(γ + ²− 2γ²)], (4.49)
γ is a parameter that can take values in [0, 0.5], and h(·) is the binary entropy function.
Proof. We prove the theorem in two steps. First we show that no generality is lost by taking U to
be a binary random variable in (4.46) and (4.47). Next we prove that only a uniform distribution
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of U , combined with a binary symmetric channel between U and X can achieve a point on the
boundary of our rate region.
Step I: The random variable U can be considered binary
Following the proof of the admissibility of the size constraints in [13], we make the following
denotations:
fx(p) = Pr(X = 0|p) = p(0) = p, (4.50)
fy(p) = H(Y |p) = h(²+ p− 2²p), (4.51)
fz(p) = H(Z|p) = h(δ + p− 2δp), (4.52)
where p denotes the probability mass function (p.m.f.) of X , while fy(p) and fz(p) are the respec-
tive entropies of Y and Z, when X has the p.m.f. given by p. In the remainder of this section we
shall denote a → b = a + b − 2ab, as the formula is the same as that of the crossover probability
of a concatenation of two BSCs with respective crossover probabilities a and b.
Think of p as a function under the control of the random variable U . Thus, for any u in the
alphabet of U , if U = u, then the p.m.f. of X becomes pu. We can now write, as in [13],
Pr(X = 0) =
∑
u
Pr(U = u)fx(pu), (4.53)
I(U ;Z) = H(Z)−H(Z|U) = H(Z)−
∑
u
Pr(U = u)fz(pu), (4.54)
I(X;Y |U) = H(Y |U)−H(Y |X) =
∑
u
Pr(U = u) [fy(pu)− h(²)] , (4.55)
and
I(X;Z|U) = H(Z|U)−H(Z|X) =
∑
u
Pr(U = u) [fz(pu)− h(δ)] , (4.56)
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where we used the fact that U → X → Y Z form a Markov chain and that H(Z|X) and H(Y |X)
are independent of the actual probability distribution of X (the variables are related through BSCs).
Note that H(Z) is completely determined by the channel coefficients ² and δ and by Pr(X = 0)
defined in (4.53).
Consider the triple (fx(p), fy(p), fz(p)) = (p, h(²+ p− 2²p), h(δ+ p− 2δp)) and note that all
of the quantities in (4.53) - (4.56) above are expressed in terms of the same convex combination
of one of the members of our triple. In other words, any set of feasible values for the quantities in
(4.53) - (4.56) is uniquely determined by a point in the convex hull of the set C = {(p, h(² + p−
2²p), h(δ + p− 2δp))|p ∈ [0, 0.5]}, which is a 3D space curve. Note here that for any p ∈ [0.5, 1]
we can find a p′ ∈ [0, 0.5] that yields the same values for I(U ;Z), I(X;Y |U) and I(X;Z|U).
By Caratheodory’s theorem, since C ⊂ R3, any point in the convex hull of C can be expressed
as a convex combination of only four points belonging to C . Using the same strengthened version
of Caratheodory’s theorem, due to Eggleston (Theorem 18 (ii) on page 35 of [46]), as in [13], we
can state that, since C is a connected subset of R3, any point in its convex hull can be expressed
as a convex combination of only three points belonging to C . In Lemma 4.9 following this proof
we conjecture that, due to the special form of the set C , we can actually express any point in its
convex hull as the convex combination of only two of its points.
This implies that it is enough to consider only two values of p to be able to produce any triple
of feasible values for the quantities in (4.55) - (4.56). But since p is controlled by the value of the
auxiliary random variable U , we can therefore let U be binary. This completes the first step of our
proof.
Step II: The optimal distribution of U is uniform and the optimal channel from U to X is
a BSC
We have established that the auxiliary random variable U can be considered binary. Let U belong
to {0, 1}, and denote q = Pr(U = 0). Since X is also binary, the channel between U and X can
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be completely characterized by two transition probabilities. Denote α = Pr(X = 1|U = 0) (this
implies Pr(X = 0|U = 0) = 1 − α), and β = Pr(X = 0|U = 1) (this implies Pr(X = 1|U =
1) = 1− β).
Note that (4.46) and (4.47) can be rewritten as:
Re ≤ [H(Z|X)−H(Y |X)]− [q(H(Z|U = 0)−H(Y |U = 0)) +
+(1− q)(H(Z|U = 1)−H(Y |U = 1))] (4.57)
and
Rc ≤ H(Z)− [qH(Z|U = 0) + (1− q)H(Z|U = 1)], (4.58)
With the notation above, the upper bounds can be written as
Re,u(q, α, β) = [h(δ)− h(²)]− [q(h(α→ δ)− h(α→ ²)) +
+(1− q)(h(β → δ)− h(β → ²))] (4.59)
and
Rc,u(q, α, β) = h([qα + (1− q)(1− β)]→ δ)− [qh(α→ δ) + (1− q)h(β → δ)], (4.60)
where a → b stands for a(1 − b) + b(1 − a) = a + b − 2ab as before, and we emphasized the
dependence of the upper bounds upon the triple (q, α, β).
In what follows we take a contradictory approach. Consider any triple (q, α, β) and denote
Rx(q, α, β) = 1− [qh(α→ δ) + (1− q)h(β → δ)]. (4.61)
We show that if we replace this triple by the triple (0.5, γ, γ) (corresponding to a uniform distribu-
tion of U over {0, 1} and a BSC between U and X), such that
Rx(q, α, β) = Rx(0.5, γ, γ) (4.62)
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(we also prove that such a γ exists always), we haveRe,u(q, α, β) ≤ Re,u(0.5, γ, γ) andRc,u(q, α, β) ≤
Rc,u(0.5, γ, γ). Therefore, a triple (q, α, β) for which either q 6= 0.5 or α 6= β holds cannot be op-
timal, and hence the last part of our theorem is proved.
Note that Rx(q, α, β) = Rx(0.5, γ, γ) translates to
qh(α→ δ) + (1− q)h(β → δ) = h(γ → δ), (4.63)
Since qh(α → δ) + (1 − q)h(β → δ) ∈ [0, 1], the binary entropy function is a bijection over
[0, 0.5] and f(γ) = γ → δ with δ ∈ (0, 0.5) is also a bijection over [0, 0.5], we can always find a γ
that satisfies (4.63). Since h([qα + (1− q)(1− β)] → δ) ≤ 1 and h([0.5γ + 0.5(1− γ)] → δ) =
h(0.5→ δ) = 0 it is straightforward to see that
Rc,u(q, α, β) ≤ Rx(q, α, β) = Rx(0.5, γ, γ) = Rc,u(0.5, γ, γ). (4.64)
We can now write
Re,u(0.5, γ, γ)−Re,u(q, α, β) = h(γ → ²)− qh(α→ ²) + (1− q)h(β → ²). (4.65)
Define g(x) = h(γ → x)− qh(α→ x)+ (1− q)h(β → x). From (4.62) we have that g(δ) = 0,
and it is straightforward to see that g(0.5) = 0. Since we only discuss the case when δ < 0.5, we
now know that g(x) has two different zeros over the interval [0, 0.5]. We need to show that for any
² < δ we have g(²) > 0.
Denote g′(x) = dg(x)
dx
and g′′(x) = d
2g(x)
dx2
the first and second order derivatives of g. With the
notation µ(x) = x(1−x)
(1−2x)2 , we can write g
′′ as in (4.66) below.
g′′(x) =
q
x(1− x) + µ(α) +
1− q
x(1− x) + µ(β) −
1
x(1− x) + µ(γ) =
=
x(1− x)[µ(γ)− qµ(α)− (1− q)µ(β)] + µ(γ)(qµ(β) + (1− q)µ(α))− µ(α)µ(β)
(x(1− x) + µ(α))(x(1− x) + µ(β))(x(1− x) + µ(γ)) (4.66)
Since the denominator of g′′ is always positive, the equation g′′(x) = 0 reduces to a second
degree equation in x. Thus g′′ has at most two real zeros, which are symmetric with respect to
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the point 0.5, and hence at most one zero (denote it by z′′) in the interval [0, 0.5]. Moreover, since
µ(x) is a strictly convex function of x, the coefficient −[µ(γ)− qµ(α)− (1− q)µ(β)] of x2 in the
numerator of g′′ is strictly positive. This implies that g′′(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, z′′].
Now suppose that g(x) had more than two zeros on the interval [0, 0.5]. Then g′(x) would have
at least two zeros on the open interval (0, 0.5), and hence a total of three zeros in [0, 0.5] (it is
straightforward to check that g′(0.5) = 0). Thus g′′ would need to have at least two zeros in
(0, 0.5). But we have already shown that this is impossible. Therefore, g(x) has only two zeros in
the interval [0, 0.5] (these are δ and 0.5).
As a consequence, g′ has at least one zero in (δ, 0.5) – denote this zero by z′. Since g′ has a zero
in 0.5, this implies that the zero z′′ of g′′ is in the interval (z′, 0.5). We can now write δ < z′ < z′′.
We already know that g′′(x) > 0 on [0, z′′), thus g′(x) is strictly increasing on [0, z′], and since
g′(z′) = 0, this means that g′(x) < 0 on [0, δ]. But since g(δ) = 0, this means that for any ² < δ
we have g(²) > 0.
Our proof is now complete.
At this point, the following lemma remains a conjecture. However, it is stated as a lemma due
to the fact that its proof reduces the problem tackled therein to the much simpler problem stated in
Remark 4.10 below. Although we currently do not have a sound theoretical proof of Remark 4.10,
its validity has been proved numerically for an extensive number of parameters.
Lemma 4.9. Consider the 3D space curve given by C = {(p, h(²+ p− 2²p), h(δ+ p− 2δp))|p ∈
[0, 0.5]}. Any point in the convex hull of C can be expressed as the convex combination of only two
points belonging to C .
Proof. Recall the denotation x→ p = x+ p− 2xp. The space curve C , along with its projections
onto the (p, h(²→ p)) and (p, h(δ → p)) planes, is represented in Figure 4.13. We shall henceforth
call the p axis the “abscissa” axis, because it is the common abscissa axis of both (p, h(² → p))
and (p, h(δ → p)) planes. Also represented in the figure is a random point M in the convex hull of
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FIGURE 4.13. The space curve and its projections onto the (p, h(²→ p)) and (p, h(δ → p)) planes.
C , which was obtained as the convex combination of three points A,B and C belonging to C . Due
to Eggleston’s extension of Caratheodory’s theorem [46], we know that any point in the convex
hull of C can be obtained in this manner. Note that throughout this proof, we shall denote by Pd
the projection of the point P onto the (p, h(δ → p)) plane, and by Pe the projection of the point
P onto the (p, h(²→ p)) plane, for any point P ∈ {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,M,X, Y }. Moreover, we
denote by Cd and Ce the projections of the space curve C on the two planes, respectively.
The present lemma shows that in fact the point M can be obtained as the convex combination of
only two points of C - in Figure 4.13 these points were denoted by X and Y .
This is equivalent to showing that there exist two values px and py of p, such that if we denote the
points Xe = (px, h(² → px)), Xd = (px, h(δ → px)), Ye = (py, h(² → py)) and Yd = (py, h(δ →
py)), then Me belongs to the line segment connecting Xe and Ye, and simultaneously Md belongs
to the line segment connecting Xd and Yd. At this point, assume that the following remark is true.
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FIGURE 4.14. Projections of the space curve: simplified problem.
Remark 4.10. (This remark has been checked numerically. However, we currently do not have
a theoretical proof.) Consider four random points A,D,B,C on the space curve C , such that
their respective abscissae p1, p4, p2, p3 satisfy p1 < p4 < p2 < p3, and construct their projections
Ae, De, Be, Ce and Ad, Dd, Bd, Cd on the planes (p, h(² → p)) and (p, h(δ → p)), respectively.
Then the abscissa of the intersection of the segments AeBe and DeCe is greater than the abscissa
of the intersection of the segments AdBd and DdCd. The result is illustrated in Figure 4.14 for two
tuples of points, namely (A,D,B,C) and (A,B, F,C).
Recall that the points A,B and C determine our point of interest M , that is M = aA+bB+cC,
where a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] and a + b + c = 1. This implies that the intersection between the segments
AeBe and CeMe, and the intersection between AdBd and CdMd have the same abscissa, namely
ap1+bp2
a+b
. Due to Remark 4.10 above, this means that the segment CeMe intersects the curve Ce at
a point Ee which has an abscissa p1,e which is less than the abscissa p1,d of the intersection Dd
between CdMd and Cd, as illustrated in Figure 4.15.
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FIGURE 4.15. Projections of the space curve: existence of a solution.
Denote by De the point of Ce with the same abscissa p1,d as Dd. It is clear that the segment DeCe
passes above the point Me, while DdCd passes through Md.
By a similar rationale, the intersection between the segments AeMe and BeCe, and the inter-
section between AdMd and BdCd have the same abscissa, namely bp2+cp3b+c . Due to Remark 4.10,
this means that the segment AeMe intersects the curve Ce at a point Ge which has an abscissa p2,e
which is less than the abscissa p2,d of the intersection Fd between AdMd and Cd (see Figure 4.15).
Denote by Fe the point of Ce with the same abscissa p2,d as Fd. It is clear that the segment AeFe
passes below the point Me, while AdFd passes through Md.
This implies that there exists a value px ∈ [p1, p1,d] of p such that, if we denote Xe = (px, h(²→
px)) and Xd = (px, h(δ → px)), then the segments XeMe and XdMd intersect the curves Ce and
Cd, respectively, at points Ye and Yd with the same abscissa py ∈ [p2,d, p3]. Hence Xe and Xd are
the projections of a point X ∈ C , and Ye and Yd are the projections of a point Y ∈ C , and the
segment XY goes through M .
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4.9 Additional Results. Extension to AWGN Channels –
Binary Feedback
In this section we provide a simple (although not optimal) way to extend our previous results to the
case where all channels are modeled as AWGN channels. Note that most of our arguments hold
true for any type of forward A → B and A → E channels. Therefore, since the only difference
is in the feedback B → A and B → E channels, we shall assume that the forward channels are
error-free, as in Section 4.2.1.
Although modeled as AWGN channels, the actual behavior of the feedback channels depends
on the feedback signal constellation. For simplicity, and as a first step toward an optimal scheme,
we assume that Bob transmits a sequence of independent uniformly distributed bits, via a BPSK
signal constellation. Denote by xb the sequence of random bits transmitted by Bob, and by x the
corresponding BPSK signal.2
Since the transmitted symbols are not correlated, and since Alice needs discrete alphabet se-
quences that act as input messages to her channel encoder, her best strategy is to perform hard
decision on each symbol. Equivalently, the B → A AWGN channel is artificially transformed
into a BSC with crossover probability ²b = Q(
√
Pb
NBA
), where Q(x) = 1/
√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−x
2/2dx, Pb is
Bob’s transmission power and NBA is the variance of the white Gaussian noise characterizing the
B → A channel. We denote yb = xb⊕eBA,b, where eBA,b is the error sequence, the components of
which are independent realizations of the binary random variableEBA, having Pr(EBA = 1) = ²f .
The rest of Alice’s secrecy encoding works similarly to the binary case.
The actual difference from the all-BSC scenario however is that the hard decision decoding of
the feedback signal is not optimal for Eve. Instead, Eve wants to use both her received feedback
sequence z ∈ Rn (recall Eve’s feedback channel remains an AWGN channel) and her received
2Throughout this section, bold letters will denote sequences, capital letters will denote random variables, and the subscript b will be used to
emphasize that the sequence or the random variable is binary. For example, x is a continuous waveform, xb is its discrete, binary version, X is a
random variable with an arbitrary alphabet, and Xb is a binary random variable.
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FIGURE 4.16. Eve’s hybrid channel.
forward sequence yb ⊕ vb ∈ {0, 1}n (which is correlated with z through the term yb), for a soft
detection of vb.
After performing the mod 2 addition yb ⊕ vb ⊕ xb, Bob’s equivalent forward channel yields
v̂b = vb⊕ eBA,b. A more subtle approach will be used to derive Eve’s equivalent forward channel.
Consider Eve’s received forward sequence yb⊕vb. Given yb⊕vb, decoding for the data sequence
vb is equivalent to decoding for the noise-distorted feedback sequence yb, since any one of them is
a deterministic function of the other when yb ⊕ vb is known. The number of messages that can be
transmitted from Alice to Bob with asymptotically zero probability of error is given by the number
of binary n-sequences yb that can be supported by Bob’s equivalent BSC. In other words, Bob
estimates the sequence yb based on the output xb of his equivalent forward channel and the BSC
crossover probability ²f (we can write xb = yb ⊕ eBA,b).
Since Eve does not have perfect access to x, she first needs to estimate it from her received
sequence z. Thus, Eve’s equivalent forward channel with input Yb and output Z can be written as
Z = X +GBE where
X =
 PB, if Xb = 1−PB, if Xb = 0, , (4.67)
Xb = Yb ⊕ EBA,b and GBE is the B → E additive white Gaussian noise with probability distribu-
tion pG(q) of zero mean and variance NBE . In other words, Eve’s equivalent channel is a degraded
version of Bob’s equivalent channel, formed by concatenating Bob’s BSC with an AWGN channel
with noise variance NBE , as in Figure 4.16
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For this “hybrid” channel we can write the conditional probability densities:
p(z|Yb = 0) = (1− ²f )pG(z + PB) + ²fpG(z − PB), (4.68)
p(z|Yb = 1) = ²fpG(z + PB) + (1− ²f )pG(z − PB), (4.69)
and denoting α = P (Yb = 0), the entropies:
H(Z|Y ) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
[
αp(z|Yb = 0) log p(z|Yb = 0) +
+ (1− α)p(z|Yb = 1) log p(z|Yb = 1)
]
dz, (4.70)
H(Z) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
[
αp(z|Yb = 0) log[αp(z|Yb = 0)] +
+ (1− α)p(z|Yb = 1) log[(1− α)p(z|Yb = 1)]
]
dz (4.71)
At this point we assume that the conjecture in [13] regarding the extension of all results to infinite
alphabets holds true. This implies that the secrecy capacity of this system of degraded equivalent
channels equals the maximum of the difference of mutual informations:
Cs,u = max
pYb(y)
[I(Yb;Xb)− I(Yb;Z)] . (4.72)
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Chapter 5
Active Eavesdropping in Fast Fading Channels.
A Block-Markov Wyner Secrecy Encoding Scheme
5.1 Introduction
A great number of recent works have been fueled by the still growing interest in physical layer
secrecy. Most of them attempt to overcome the limitations of the classical wiretapper/eavesdropper
scenarios of [12] or [13] (namely that no secret message can be successfully transmitted if the
eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s channel) by using some form of
diversity.
The benefits of the ergodic-fading diversity upon the achievable secrecy rates have been exposed
by works like [22], [23], [24] or [25]. A fast-fading eavesdropper channel is studied in [22] un-
der the assumption that the main channel is a fixed-SNR additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel. Although the secrecy capacity for fast-fading eavesdropper channels is still unknown,
[22] provides achievable secrecy rates and shows that sometimes noise injection at the transmitter
can improve these rates.
The different approach of [23] models both the main and the eavesdropper channels as ergodicly-
fading AWGN channels. However, the fading is assumed to be slow enough to be considered
constant for infinitely long blocks of transmitted symbols. The secrecy capacity is derived for this
model, and the achievability part is proved by using separate channel encoding for each of the
blocks. A similar approach is taken in [24] and [25], where the fading broadcast channel with
confidential messages (BCC) is considered equivalent to a parallel AWGN BCC.
However, the slow fading ergodic channel model is quite restrictive. Although the model can
be artificially created by a multiplexing/demultiplexing architecture as in [35], it still requires ei-
ther coarse quantization or long delays (e.g. under fine quantization, for a channel state with low
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FIGURE 5.1. Channel model
probability it may take forever to gather a large enough number of transmitted symbols to enable
almost-error-free decoding).
With these considerations, we focus instead on the more practical scenario where both the main
and the eavesdropper’s channel are affected by fast stationary fading. However, unlike [22], we are
concerned with a much stronger adversary: an active eavesdropper.
In our channel model, depicted in Figure 5.1, the eavesdropper (Eve) has two options: either to
jam the conversation between the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob)
– Jx mode – or to eavesdrop – Ex mode – (our eavesdropper cannot function in full duplex mode,
i.e. she cannot transmit and receive on the same frequency slot, at the same time). Both Alice and
Eve (in Jx mode) are constrained by average (over each codeword) power budgets P and J ,
respectively.
Eve’s purpose is to minimize the secrecy rate achievable by Alice, and to that extent she has to
decide on the optimal alternation between the jamming mode and the eavesdropping mode. The
state of each of the main and eavesdropper channels, i.e. the absolute squared channel coefficients
(or simply “the channel coefficients” hence forth), which we denote by hM and hW , respectively,
are assumed to be available to the respective receivers. However, Bob does not know the exact state
of Eve’s channel, nor does Eve have any information about Bob’s channel, except its statistics. In
addition to fading, each channel is further distorted by an independent additive white complex
Gaussian noise of variance σ2N . There exists a low-rate, unprotected feedback channel between
Bob and Alice.
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The present chapter is limited to the following simplifying (although not uncommon) assump-
tions: i) Rayleigh fading: hM and hW are exponentially distributed, with parameters λM and λW
respectively; ii) the channel that links Eve (when in Jx mode) and Bob is error free and does not
experience fading [10],[7]; iii) Eve only uses white Gaussian noise for jamming [38], [10], since
this is the most harmful uncorrelated jamming strategy [30]; iv) Eve’s exact jamming strategy
(i.e. when and with what power she jams) is perfectly known to Bob (a posteriori) so that Bob
can employ coherent detection and communicate Eve’s strategy to Alice, via the low-rate feed-
back link; v) the instantaneous state of the main channel cannot be known to the transmitter Alice
non-causally; vi) the codewords are long enough such that not only the channel fading, but also
the combination of channel fluctuation and Eve’s alternation between jamming and eavesdropping
display ergodic properties over the duration of a codeword; vii) Eve employs an ergodic strategy,
i.e. she uses the same statistics for alternating between Jx mode and Ex mode for every codeword.
Our contributions can be stated as follows:
• In Section 5.2 we study the minimax scenario (where the objective – to be minimized by Eve
and maximized by Alice and Bob – is the achievable secrecy rate), or the best-case scenario,
when Eve’s strategy is known to both Alice and Bob, in advance.
• We show that, even for this scenario, depending on how Eve uses her channel state informa-
tion (about the exact values of hW ) in elaborating her strategy, the active eavesdropper can
induce moderate to severe degradation of the achievable secrecy rate.
• The maximin scenario, or the worst-case scenario, when Alice and Bob have to plan for the
situation where Eve can find out their transmission strategy, is studied in Section 5.3.
• We show that Wyner’s scheme [12] performs poorly (if at all) in these conditions, and we
provide a novel block-Markov Wyner secrecy encoding scheme, which requires a low-rate,
unprotected feedback from Bob to Alice and can improve the secrecy rate significantly.
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5.2 The Best-Case Scenario
In this section we study the scenario where the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate
receiver (Bob) know Eve’s strategy in advance, i.e. they have access to the exact statistical descrip-
tion of how Eve alternates between jamming and eavesdropping (note that the statistical description
is enough to fully characterize Eve’s strategy under our channel model). Although this is not the
most practical assumption, the present scenario is significant for both comparison purposes and
demonstrating the devastating effect of an active eavesdropper upon the achievable secrecy rate.
The fact that Eve can alternate between jamming and eavesdropping causes a modification of the
channel statistics. In other words, we can view the active eavesdropper’s interference as a change
of the channel coefficients. Indeed, whenever Eve is in Ex mode, the main channel instantaneous
SNR is hMP
σ2N
, while the SNR of Eve’s channel is hWP
σ2N
– no change here. However, when Eve is in Jx
mode, the main channel instantaneous SNR is hMP
σ2N+J
, where J is the instantaneous jamming power,
while the SNR of Eve’s channel is zero (recall that whenever Eve jams, she cannot simultaneously
listen on the same frequency slot). We denote the equivalent channel coefficients as
h˜M =
 hM if Ex modehMσ2N
σ2N+J
if Jx mode
(5.1)
and
h˜W =
 hW if Ex mode0 if Jx mode. (5.2)
Note that our equivalent channel coefficient approach is similar to the one in [29] which shows
that a fixed codebook can achieve the power-control ergodic capacity of the fast-fading channel.
Also, our equivalent channel coefficients display ergodic properties over a frame, according to
assumptions vi) and vii) of the previous section.
Denote by X the random variable at the input of the two channels, and by Y and Z the corre-
sponding random variables received by Bob and Eve, respectively. According to [13], the secrecy
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capacity of our model (if the realizations of the random variables representing the equivalent chan-
nel coefficients H˜M and H˜W are known to Bob and Eve respectively, and hence can be considered
as outputs of the channel) is given by
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
[
I(V ;Y, H˜M)− I(V ;Z, H˜W )
]
≥
≥ max
V→X→Y Z
[
I(V ;Y |H˜M)− I(V ;Z|H˜W )
]
, (5.3)
where the maximization is over all joint probability distributions of V and X such that V →
X → Y Z form a Markov chain. The inequality in (5.3) follows from the independence between
V and HW , and holds with equality if V is also independent of HM (i.e. Alice has no channel
state information – CSI). Since the optimal choice of V and X is presently unknown, we shall
henceforth concentrate on the achievable secrecy rate (instead of secrecy capacity) obtained by
setting V = X and picking a complex Gaussian distribution for X , with zero mean and variance
P . Under these constraints, the achievable secrecy rate becomes:
Rs = EghM ,ghW ,P
[
log(1 +
h˜MP
σ2N
)− log(1 + h˜WP
σ2N
)
]
, (5.4)
where P is the instantaneous transmitter scaling power [29] and is subject to the constraint EP ≤
P . Note that the statistical information about Eve’s strategy allows Alice and Bob to design a
codebook, based on Wyner’s encoding scheme [12], tailored to this strategy. We have already
mentioned that the only party that has any control upon the actual equivalent channel coefficients
is Eve. Since Alice has no CSI, her only option of being active against the eavesdropper is to
randomize the scaling power P . However, as we shall see shortly, a constant power allocation is
the optimal strategy for Alice. Eve’s strategy consists of choosing when to eavesdrop and when to
jam, and for the latter case picking a proper distribution (over the channel uses within a codeword)
of her power budgetJ . Depending on whether Eve can use the knowledge about her own channel
coefficient hW for employing her strategy, we have two different cases.
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5.2.1 Channel Coefficients Available to Eve after Decision on Jx or Ex
Mode
In this first case, Eve can know the exact value of hW only after she made her decision to eavesdrop
(Ex mode), and has no information about the value(s) that hW might take while she is in Jx mode.
This scenario models a situation where the training sequences, which are transmitted by Alice
at a low rate, and are used by Bob to estimate the channel coefficient before the transmission
of a block of symbols, is protected against eavesdropping (for instance, by using some form of
secrecy encoding designed for non-coherent reception). Under these circumstances, Eve has to
take the decision on whether to jam or eavesdrop in the absence of any non-causal channel state
information (i.e. randomly).
Denote q = Pr{Ex mode} the probability that Eve is in Ex mode. The equivalent channel
coefficients become
h˜M =
 hM with probability qhMσ2N
σ2N+J
with probability (1− q)
(5.5)
and
h˜W =
 hW with probability q0 with probability (1− q), (5.6)
resulting in the achievable secrecy rate
Rs = EhM ,hW ,P,J
[
q log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
)− q log(1 + hWP
σ2N
) + (1− q) log(1 + hMP
σ2N + J
)
]
. (5.7)
At this point we prove our first result regarding the optimal choice of the instantaneous scaling
power P :
Proposition 5.1. When no channel state information is available to the transmitter, the optimal
transmitter strategy is to allocate constant power P =P to each symbol.
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Proof. Recall our assumption that both hM and hW are exponentially distributed, with parameters
λM and λW , respectively. Denote the probability distributions by fM(x) = λMe−λMx and fW (x) =
λW e
−λW x
.
If λM ≥ λW (Eve’s channel is statistically “better”), then by letting q = 1, Eve can reduce the
achievable secrecy rate to zero. In this case the way Alice distributes her power (without knowledge
of the exact channel coefficients) is irrelevant, and a constant power allocation is as good as any.
Hence we shall concentrate on the case when λM < λW .
We need to prove that whenever λM < λW (Bob’s channel is statistically “better”), the function
Rs(P ) = qEhM log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
)− qEhW log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
) + (1− q)EhM ,J log(1 +
hMP
σ2N + J
) (5.8)
is a concave
⋂
function of P . It is easy to see that the third term in the right-hand side of (5.8) is
concave in P . Since both q and 1− q are non-negative, it is enough to show that
F (P ) = EhM log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
)− EhW log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
) (5.9)
is also concave in P . We can write
F (P ) =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 +
xP
σ2N
)(fM(x)− fW (x))dx. (5.10)
Note that fM(x)− fW (x) is negative for x ∈ [0, x0) and positive for x ∈ [x0,∞), where x0 is the
(unique) solution of fM(x) = fW (x). Moreover,
∫∞
0
fM(x)dx =
∫∞
0
fW (x)dx = 1, which results
in ∫ x0
0
[fW (x)− fM(x)]dx =
∫ ∞
x0
[fM(x)− fW (x)]dx. (5.11)
A graphical representation of these functions is given in Figure 5.2, where we used the notation
f1 = fM and f2 = fW . Take an increasing function G(x). We can write∫ x0
0
G(x)[fW (x)− fM(x)]dx ≤
∫ x0
0
G(x0)[fW (x)− fM(x)]dx =
=
∫ ∞
x0
G(x0)[fM(x)− fW (x)]dx ≤
∫ ∞
x0
G(x)[fM(x)− fW (x)]dx. (5.12)
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Now, taking G(x) = log(1 + xP
σ2N
) we see that F (P ) is a positive function of P , taking G(x) =
dF (P )
dP
= x
σ2N+xP
we see F (P ) is increasing, and taking G(x) = d
2F (P )
dP 2
= −
(
x
σ2N+xP
)2
we see that
F (P ) is concave.
Note that unlike in [22], where noise injection can increase the achievable secrecy rate, in our
scenario (with both main and eavesdropper channels affected by fading) the injection of additive
white Gaussian noise at Alice – which is equivalent to a proportional reduction of both Bob’s and
Eve’s SNRs – would only make things worse. This is because the achievable secrecy rate Rs(P )
is a positive, increasing function of P and a decreasing function of σ2N . Noise injection may only
increase the secrecy rate if fM(x) − fW (x) does not have the particular form of our scenario (i.e.
negative on [0, x0] and positive on [x0,∞) for some x0, as seen in Figure 5.2). This property is quite
restrictive. In fact, in Section 5.2.2 below we study a scenario where the property does not hold
anymore, and we provide an intuitive description of the conditions under which noise injection can
improve the secrecy rate.
A statement similar to Proposition 5.1 can be proved for the distribution of the jamming power
J by Eve:
Proposition 5.2. When in jamming (Jx) mode, Eve’s optimal strategy is to use the same jamming
power J = J
1−q across all channel realizations involved.
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Proof. Recall that Eve adopts the Jx mode with probability 1−q. From (5.7) we notice that only the
last term in the expectation depends on J , and that term is a convex function of J . In the remainder
of this proof we take a contradictory approach. Suppose that an optimal strategy is reached, and J
is not constant over all channel realizations over which Eve is in Jx mode. Since the probability of
the Jx mode (1 − q) is fixed, and for fixed q we have that Rs is a convex function of J , Eve can
improve her strategy (i.e. decrease Rs) by using a constant jamming power J = J1−q whenever in
Jx mode. Thus, the original strategy is not optimal, which creates a contradiction.
The achievable secrecy rate is now simply
Rs = EhM ,hW
[
qopt log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
)− qopt log(1 + hWP
σ2N
) +
+(1− qopt) log(1 + hMP
σ2N +
J
1−qopt
)
]
, (5.13)
where qopt is the the optimal value of q that minimizes Rs. Due to Lemma 5.9 of Section 5.5 it
is easy to see that Rs in (5.13) is a convex function of q (we only need to replace x = hMPσ2N and
y = J
σ2N
and notice that the middle term of the expectation in (5.13) is a linear function of q).
Therefore, qopt can be found as the solution of the equation dRs(q)dq = 0.
Note that the fact that Rs(q) is convex supports our innitial assumption that Eve uses a fixed
value of q, instead of picking random values for q, for each new channel use, according to some
probability distribution over [0, 1].
5.2.2 Channel Coefficients Available to Eve before Decision on Jx or Ex
Mode
This second scenario assumes that the eavesdropper channel coefficient is available to Eve before
she makes her decision about jamming or listening to the corresponding time slot. This assumption
is justified if the transmission protocol requires that an unprotected training sequence be transmit-
ted periodically, to give the legitimate receiver the opportunity to estimate its own channel state.
Although this new scenario brings no benefits to either Alice or Bob, it creates a new opportunity
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for Eve. The eavesdropper can now select the better channel realizations for listening (Ex mode)
and use the worse channel realizations for jamming (Jx mode).
Instead of selecting an optimal q and switch to Ex mode with probability q randomly (as when
she did not have access to the value of hW ), Eve can now select a threshold v and switch to Jx
mode if and only if hW < v. Note that under our current assumptions, i.e. when Eve does not
know Bob’s instantaneous channel coefficient, and when the channel from Eve to Bob does not
experience fading, Eve’s threshold approach is optimal. Denote by q = e−λW v the probability that
hW > v (the probability that Eve is in Ex mode). Note that this new attack strategy is completely
transparent to Alice, since she has no way of finding out the exact value of hW . Nevertheless, the
statistics of the new equivalent eavesdropper channel coefficient:
h˜W =
 hW if hW ≥ v i.e. with probability q0 if hW < v i.e. w. p. (1− q), (5.14)
are known to Alice. The new achievable secrecy rate becomes
Rs = EhM ,P,J
[
q log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
) + (1− q) log(1 + hMP
σ2N + J
)
]
−
−EP
[∫ ∞
1
λW
log 1
q
log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
)fW (hW )dhW
]
. (5.15)
In order to characterize the optimal transmitter and active eavesdropper strategies we need to
prove results similar to those in Subsection 5.2.1. We begin with the most evident of these.
Proposition 5.3. When in jamming (Jx) mode, Eve’s optimal strategy is to use the same jamming
power J = J
1−q across all channel realizations involved.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 5.2 and will be omitted here for brevity.
As far as the optimal distribution of Alice’s power is concerned, this is no longer uniform in
general. With the notation
f1(x) = qfM(x) (5.16)
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and
f2(x) =
 0 if x ≤ vfW (x) if x > v (5.17)
we can write the difference between the first and the last term in the right-hand side of (5.15) as
F (P ) =
∫∞
0
log(1 + xP
σ2N
)(f1(x) − f2(x))dx. The shapes of f1, f2 and f1 − f2 are given in Figure
5.3.
At this point, we can no longer state that for any increasing function G(x) we have a positive∫∞
0
G(x)(f1(x) − f2(x))dx. In fact, in general, the function F (P ) can be negative, decreasing
and/or convex on certain intervals. Note that the middle term of (5.15) is still a concave, increasing
function of P , and does not affect our observations. For many situations, including the one in which
Eve’s channel is statistically better (i.e. λW < λM ), the shape of Rs(P ) (where Rs(P ) is defined in
(5.15)) is that of Figure 5.4 (the black lower curve). As a matter of fact, a similar shape is noticed
for some situations in [22].
It now becomes clear how noise injection can improve the achievable secrecy rate. As shown in
[22], if a part N of the total transmitter power P is used for injecting white Gaussian noise, the
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secrecy rate becomes R′s(P,N) = Rs(P )−Rs(N). To see this,
R′s(P,N) = EhM ,P,J,N
[
q log(1 +
hM(P −N)
σ2N + hMN
) + (1− q) log(1 + hM(P −N)
σ2N + J + hMN
)
]
−
−EP,N
[∫ ∞
1
λW
log 1
q
log(1 +
hW (P −N)
σ2N + hWN
)fW (hW )dhW
]
=
= EhM ,P,J
[
q log(1 +
hMP
σ2N
) + (1− q) log(1 + hMP
σ2N + J
)
]
−
−EP
[∫ ∞
1
λW
log 1
q
log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
)fW (hW )dhW
]
−
−EhM ,N,J
[
q log(1 +
hMN
σ2N
) + (1− q) log(1 + hMN
σ2N + J
)
]
−
−EN
[∫ ∞
1
λW
log 1
q
log(1 +
hWN
σ2N
)fW (hW )dhW
]
.(5.18)
Thus, for example, if P is large enough and we choose N such that Rs(N) is minimized
(N = NM in Figure 5.4), then R′s(P,NM) > Rs(P ), as represented in the red upper curve of
Figure 5.4. Note that even after this improvement, the R′s(P,NM) curve is not concave. There-
fore, an additional improvement would be to randomize the transmitted power between zero and
PM whenever Alice’s power budget satisfies P ∈ [NM , PM ], where PM is chosen such that the
straight line through the origin and the point (PM , Rs(PM)) is tangent to the curve R′s(P,NM),
as in Figure 5.4. Although the curve in Figure 5.4 is the most general representation of Rs(P ),
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for many practical scenarios the actual Rs(P ) can be strictly positive, and even concave (see the
two numerical examples in Figures 5.5 and 5.6). Hence, noise injection cannot always improve the
achievable secrecy rates.
The optimal value of q ∈ [0, 1] that minimizes the achievable secrecy rate in (5.18) can be found
by a numerical algorithm involving exhaustive searching over the interval [0, 1]. However, it would
be helpful if we knew that a unique solution exists, and this solution were reachable by a less
complex algorithm. Although at this point we are not able to prove it, the following conjecture,
which, if true, guarantees the uniqueness of the solution, and the fact that the solution is given by
the equation dR
′
s(P,N,q)
dq
= 0, is supported by our simulation results.
Conjecture 5.4. The achievable secrecy rate in (5.18) is a quasiconvex function of q. By definition,
a real scalar function f : X → R is quasiconvex if its level set [Sc, f ] = {x : x ∈ X, f(x) ≤ c} is
a convex set for any c ∈ R [47].
Two remarks are in order. First, note that the conjecture above also supports our innitial as-
sumption that Eve uses a fixed threshold, instead of changing the threshold for every new channel
realization, according to some probability distribution of v over [0,∞). Second, although the con-
jecture is not proved at this time, our results still function as an upper-bound on the achievable
secrecy rate (note that if the conjecture were false, this upper bound would just be looser, but an
upper bound nevertheless).
5.2.3 Numerical Results
In Figure 5.5 we show the achievable secrecy rates vs. transmitter power budget, in the two sce-
narios outlined in this section: when the channel coefficients are available to Eve before deciding
whether to jam or eavesdrop, and when they are not. The main channel coefficient hM is con-
siderably better than Eve’s channel coefficient hW (λM = 0.2 and λW = 0.8). For comparison,
we also show the achievable secrecy rates when Eve employs either the Jx mode or the Ex mode
exclusively.
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FIGURE 5.5. Achievable secrecy rates with an active eavesdropper. Exponentially distributed channel coef-
ficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 0.8, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
It can be noticed that, in the presence of an active eavesdropper who uses the information about
its own channel to put up a more efficient fight against the transmission of secret messages, the
achievable secrecy rate is seriously reduced. This reduction is even more serious in Figure 5.6,
where the two channel coefficients hM and hW are statistically closer to each other – their param-
eters are λM = 0.2 and λW = 0.27. The benefits of noise injection are also illustrated in Figure
5.6.
5.3 The Worst-Case Scenario and the Block-Markov Wyner
Secrecy Encoding Scheme
In the previous section we considered the scenario when the active eavesdropper “plays first”.
Taking advantage of her a priori knowledge about Eve’s strategy, Alice was able to construct a
codebook for conveying a secret message to Bob. The problem with this approach is that the code-
book used by Alice and Bob (which is a simple Wyner secrecy encoding scheme [12]) needs to be
tailored to Eve’s exact jamming/eavesdropping strategy.
Therefore, under the more practical scenario when Eve’s strategy is not known in advance, the
codebook designed for a specific parameter q0 = Pr{Ex mode} will fail if Eve decides to use any
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tially distributed channel coefficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 0.27, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
different strategy. More precisely, if Eve uses q1 > q0, the perfect secrecy of the message will be
compromised (we call this secrecy outage), while if Eve uses q2 < q0, the secret message becomes
unintelligible to Bob (we call this intelligibility outage).
As a result, the legitimate parties have to use a transmission strategy that can protect both the
secrecy and the intelligibility of the secret message, under any strategy that Eve might use. This
problem is best modeled by the maximin scenario, which uses the assumption that Eve knows
Alice’s strategy in advance.
The simplest encoding scheme that may offer this kind of protection is a Wyner-type encoding
strategy, with a forwarding rate low enough to protect the message against the most powerful
attempt to induce intelligibility outage (i.e. when Eve is in Jx mode all the time), and with a secrecy
rate low enough to offer protection against the most powerful attempt to induce secrecy outage (i.e.
when Eve is in Ex mode all the time). The achievable secrecy rate for this kind of scheme is
Rs,wcs =
[
EhM
[
log(1 +
hMP
σ2N +J
)
]
− qEhW
[
log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
)
]]+
(5.19)
(the subscript “wcs” stands for “worst-case scenario”), where we assumed for simplicity that Eve
does not use the information about her own channel coefficient to decide when to jam and when to
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eavesdrop as in Subsection 5.2.2, but rather takes that decision in a random fashion as in Subsection
5.2.1. This simplifying assumption will be maintained throughout this section for its relative ease
of manipulation. All our results can be easily extended to the more complex model of Subsection
5.2.2.
Note that under the limiting assumptions above, Eve’s optimal strategy is to pick q = 1, i.e.
to remain in Ex mode all the time. In this case, the achievable secrecy rate in (5.19) is rarely
strictly positive. Recalling that the channel coefficients hM and hW are exponentially distributed,
with parameters λM and λW , respectively, the condition Rs,wcs > 0 holds if and only if λW >
λM(1 +
J
σ2N
). For a large jamming-power-to-noise ratio J /σ2N , this implies that Eve’s channel
needs to be impractically worse than Bob’s.
However, the above scheme does not take full advantage of the model characteristics. Recall
the original assumption that Eve can function only as a half-duplex terminal. Therefore, whenever
Eve is in Jx mode, she cannot eavesdrop – so the whole transmission remains perfectly secret
to Eve – and conversely, if she is in Ex mode, Eve cannot simultaneously jam the transmission.
In the remainder of this section we develop an alternative transmission scheme, which greatly
improves the achievable secrecy rate, and is tuned to specifically exploit the active eavesdropper’s
limitations.
5.3.1 The Block-Markov Wyner (BMW) Encoding Scheme for the Active
Eavesdropper Channel
There are two main reasons why Wyner’s scheme [12] does not work in our model. First, Alice
does not know the statistics of Bob’s channel in advance – Eve has control over the signal-to-noise
ratio of this channel. Therefore, the main channel can be modeled as a compound channel. In order
to reliably transmit a message to Bob, Alice should use a special kind of encoding. It was shown
in [16] that the same layered encoding technique that achieves the points on the boundary of the
capacity region for broadcast channels can also be used for transmission over compound channels.
Our scheme uses the broadcast layered encoding of [16] to ensure that reliable transmission is
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possible between Alice and Bob even in the most unfavorable conditions. However, even if such a
scheme is used, Alice cannot know in advance which messages will actually be decodable by Bob.
The second reason is that Alice does not know the statistics of Eve’s channel in advance – due to
the alternation between jamming and eavesdropping Eve’s equivalent channel is actually weaker
than her physical channel. Therefore, Alice cannot directly transmit a secret message at a rate
larger than Rs,wcs in (5.19), because she is not sure whether the secrecy would be compromised or
not.
Our novel BMW secrecy encoding scheme solves both of these problems: it guarantees both
the intelligibility and the secrecy of the message, for a transmission rate much larger than Rs,wcs.
Our approach is a sequential one, and requires that Bob should be actively involved in the secrecy
encoding process. Bob’s involvement consists of estimating and feeding back to Alice the exact
value of Eve’s strategy q. The detailed description is given below. However, before we get to that,
we first make a brief comment on Wyner’s original encoding scheme [12], which will help build
some intuition regarding the principle of our own scheme.
A short comment on Wyner’s secrecy encoding scheme
We begin this comment by studying a scenario where, before the transmission takes place, Alice
and Bob already share a secret key. Then in addition to the secret message that can be encoded by
Wyner’s scheme, another secret message can be transmitted over the channel. This latter message
is encrypted using the secret key. We provide two encoding schemes that can both achieve the
simultaneous transmission of the two secret messages.
Denote the capacities of the channels from Alice to Bob and from Alice to Eve by CM and CE ,
respectively, the achievable secrecy rate (under Wyner’s original scheme) by Rk, the rate of the
encrypted message by Rs and the codeword length by N .
Scheme 1: Wyner’s scheme with an encrypted message. Alice bins the codebook (containing
2NCM codewords) into 2NRk “super-bins”, such that Rk ≤ CM − CE . The first secret message
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FIGURE 5.7. Alternative binning: Wyner’s secrecy encoding scheme with an additional encrypted message,
and the basis of our block-Markov Wyner encoding scheme.
picks the index of a super-bin. The super-bin is then binned again into 2N(CM−Rs−Rk) bins (each
containing 2NRs bin-words). One of the bins is picked randomly, while a specific codeword in that
bin is picked according to the encrypted message.
Scheme 2: An alternative encoding scheme. The codebook is randomly binned into 2N(CM−Rs)
bins – let us denote these as “pre-bins”. Each pre-bin consists of 2NRs bin-words. The bins are
then randomly grouped into 2NRk “super-bins”, such that each super-bin consists of 2N(CM−Rs−Rk)
bins, and where Rk is picked to satisfy Rk ≤ CM − CE . The first secret message picks the index
of a super-bin. A bin inside that super-bin is randomly picked, and the transmitted codeword is the
picked by the encrypted message inside this bin.
The two schemes are equivalent, and they are described in Figure 5.7. However, as we shall
see shortly, the applicability of Scheme 2 is larger. We should recall here that Wyner’s original
encoding scheme [12] involves a random binning of the codebook into bins which are, each of
them, good codes for Eve’s channel. The actual transmission does not contain any information
about the binning itself. Hence, the same “random” binning needs to be done separately at Alice
(before the transmission takes place) and at Bob (before he can begin decoding). The reason why
Alice performs the binning of the codebook before transmitting is because she needs to send a
meaningful secret message over the coming frame. Therefore, the transmitted codeword needs to
belong to the particular bin indexed by the secret message.
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This suggests that if the “secret message” transmitted by Alice had no meaning (i.e. if Alice
picked this message in a random fashion), both Alice and Bob could perform the binning of the
codebook after the transmission ends. The “secret message” generated this way could be thought
of as a secret key for encrypting a meaningful message over the next frame.
Suppose that Eve’s channel is unknown to Alice and Bob until the transmission of the current
codeword ends. The first transmitted codeword is randomly selected from the whole un-binned
codebook. After the transmission ends, Alice and Bob realize that the secrecy capacity was Rs.
Both Bob and Alice can now proceed to the (same) binning of the codebook. As a result, the same
single bin will be identified by both legitimate parties as containing the transmitted message, and
its index will be secret to Eve. Clearly, the secret message conveyed by the index of this bin has no
meaning. Nevertheless, it can be used over the next frame, as a secret key. Over the second frame,
Alice and Bob use Scheme 2 above. The codebook is randomly binned before transmission, into
2N(CM−Rs) bins that could each be regarded as a code for carrying the encrypted message. One of
the bins will be selected randomly, and the encrypted message will select the exact codeword to
be transmitted. This method of transmission ensures that the encrypted message does not overlap
with the secret key that needs to be generated at the end of the frame – the encrypted message
has nothing to do with how the bins are ultimately chosen, as seen in Figure 5.7. The encrypted
message may be decodable, but not decryptable by Eve. After the transmission of the second frame
takes place, Alice and Bob realize that the secrecy capacity was Rk. The indices of the bins are
“randomly” grouped by both Alice and Bob into 2NRk super-bins , and a new secret key is agreed
upon by the legitimate parties. The protocol continues in the same manner.
Three observations are in order. First, the secret key (decided upon at the end of the frame) and
the encrypted message (carried by the frame) cannot overlap and maintain the same equivocation at
Eve – see the one-time pad [43]. Hence, in the above description of the protocol, it is required that
Rs + Rk ≤ CM . Second, if the secrecy capacity is the same Rs = Rk = Cs over each frame, and
our previous condition holds in the form Rs < CM/2, the transmission of the meaningful secret
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message can be done at almost the secrecy capacity, with a small initial penalty (due to the fact
that the first frame does not carry an encrypted message) which becomes negligible as the number
of transmitted frames increases.1 Third, our new protocol can be used whenever Alice does not
have a good description of Eve’s channel over a frame until the transmission of the corresponding
codeword ends, which is precisely the case with our current model.
Detailed description of the BMW encoding scheme
Eve’s strategy consists of choosing the parameter q = Pr{Ex mode}. Once the transmission of
a codeword (we shall denote the span of a codeword by “frame”) is finished, Bob can accurately
evaluate the parameter q used by Eve over that frame. Bob can then feed this value back to Alice.
Note that the knowledge of q provides Alice with the statistical description of both the main channel
– determined by the jamming probability (1 − q) – and the eavesdropper’s channel – determined
by the eavesdropping probability q. Before learning Eve’s strategy, the channel between Alice and
Bob appears like a compound channel to the legitimate parties. The possible states of this channel
are given by Eve’s strategy q, which takes values in the interval [0, 1]. To transform this uncountable
set of possible channel states into a finite set, we divide the interval [0, 1] to which q belongs into
n subintervals such that
[0, 1] = [q0, q1) ∪ [q1, q2) . . . ∪ [qn−1, qn] (5.20)
where q0 = 0 and qn = 1.
For conveying a message to Bob, Alice uses an n-level broadcast-channel-type codebook, as in
[16]. Level i is designed to deal with a jammer which is on with probability 1 − qi−1 over each
channel use. Note that q0 < q1 < . . . < qn. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall say that level
1Assume that Eve’s channel conditions are always the same. As an example, consider a codebook with 10000 codewords, which is used for
transmitting a secret message of length log(50) bits, according to our protocol. Take any random frame. For transmitting the encrypted message, the
codebook is binned into 200 bins, each containing 50 codewords. One of the bins is picked randomly, and the encrypted message picks one of the
50 codewords in the bin. After the transmission takes place, Alice and Bob both group the original 200 bins into 50 “super-bins” (each containing 4
original bins), using the same “recipe”. The secret key is the index of the super-bin to which the transmitted codeword belongs. Note that the actual
codeword that was transmitted inside this super-bin is picked independently of the choice of the super-bin.
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i is “stronger” than level j if i < j, i.e. if level i can deal with a jammer which is on more often.
The notation is fully justified by Lemma 5.5 below.
Denote the rates of the different encoding levels as:
R1 = EhM
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhM
σ2N + α1PhM +J
)] (5.21)
for the strongest level, which can deal with the case when Eve is always in Jx mode, i.e. q = q0 = 0,
Ri = EhM
[
qi−1 log
(
1 +
(1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N + αi . . . α1PhM
)
+
+(1− qi−1) log
(
1 +
(1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N + αi . . . α1PhM +
J
1−qi−1
)]
, (5.22)
for i = 2, 3 . . . n− 1, and finally
Rn = EhM
[
qn−1 log
(
1 +
αn−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N
)
+ (1− qn−1) log
(
1 +
αn−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N +
J
1−qn−1
)]
,(5.23)
for the weakest level, corresponding to the case when Eve is in Jx mode with probability 1 −
qn−1. Note that the encoding levels are designed such that Bob decodes the stronger levels first,
and treats the remaining un-decoded messages as white noise. The codebook for level i contains
2NRi codewords of length N , generated such that each component of each codeword represents an
independent realization of a Gaussian random variable of mean 0 and variance (1−αi)αi−1 . . . α1P ,
where αn = 0 for compatibility.
The relative strength of the encoding levels is established by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. If Eve uses a parameter q ∈ [qi−1, qi) over a frame, then the messages encoded in
levels 1, 2, . . . , i are intelligible by Bob at the end of the frame. Thus the forwarding rate from Alice
to Bob is RM,i = R1 +R2 + . . .+Ri.
Proof. In order to prove that the encoding levels with lower indices are stronger in the sense that
they can deal with a worse jamming situation, it is enough to show that Ri as defined in 5.22 is an
increasing function of q. In other words, encoding level i, transmitting at a rate Ri, is intelligible
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by Bob whenever Eve is in jamming mode with a probability less than (1 − qi−1). But this is a
direct consequence of Lemma 5.9 in Section 5.5, if we simply replace x by (1−αi)αi−1...α1PhM
σ2N+αi...α1PhM
and
y by J
σ2N+αi...α1PhM
. (see Section 5.5).
Consider a first frame, for which the transmitted message carries no useful information, but
rather its symbols are selected in a random, i.i.d. fashion. Once Alice receives the feedback se-
quence from Bob at the end of the frame, describing Eve’s strategy (i.e. the value of q – actually, as
we shall see shortly, only the interval [qi−1, qi) that contains q is enough information for Alice, thus
the length of the feedback sequence need not be larger than log(n)), Alice and Bob can separately
agree on the same secret message, as described in the protocol above. This message will function
as a secret key for encrypting a meaningful secret message over the next frame. In turn, the secret
message agreed upon at the end of the second frame can function as a secret key for the third frame,
and so on.
To formalize the intuitive description above, we begin by stating several definitions:
• The “encrypted message” is a meaningful secret message, encrypted with the help of a secret
key that was generated in the previous frame.
• The “secret key” is a meaningless random message, which is perfectly secret to Eve, is agreed
upon by both Alice and Bob at the end of the frame, and can be used for the encryption of a
secret message (of at most the same length) over the next frame.
• The term “secret key rate” refers to the rate at which a secret key is generated at the end of a
frame – the correspondent of Wyner’s “secrecy capacity”.
• The term “achievable secrecy rate” refers to the rate of transmission of the encrypted mes-
sage.
Our encoding scheme works as follows. First, the n codebooks, indexed by i, with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
are generated as described above, and are made available to all parties. On a given frame, Alice
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transmits an encrypted message, at a rate
Rs ≤ 0.5R1 (5.24)
(we show in Theorem 5.7 below that this constraint does not incur any loss of performance) – note
that the encrypted message is encrypted with the help of a secret key generated over a previous
frame. To transmit the encrypted message, Alice randomly bins codebook 1 into 2N(R1−Rs) bins.
One of the bins (each containing 2NRs codewords) will be picked randomly (uniformly), and the
encrypted message will pick a codeword from this bin for transmission. Recall that the reason
why Alice cannot directly bin the codebook for generating the secret key is because Eve’s strat-
egy (hence her equivalent channel) is unknown until the end of the frame. An additional n − 1
codewords are also chosen randomly, one from each of the remaining n − 1 codebooks of rates
R2, R3, . . . , Rn. Alice’s transmitted sequence is the sum of the n codewords.
At the end of the frame, Bob feeds back to Alice the exact value of Eve’s strategy q over that
frame. In order to agree on a secret key, Alice and Bob first need to know which encoding levels are
decodable by Bob, and which are decodable by Eve. Only the information encoded in those levels
that are decodable by Bob, but are not perfectly decodable by Eve, can contribute to the generation
of the secret key.
Due to the construction of the code (see Lemma 5.5), it is clear that under any jamming/ eaves-
dropping strategy, Bob will be able to decode the strongest level first, treating the other levels as
white noise, and then perform successive interference cancellation to decode increasingly weaker
levels. However, the same statement cannot be made for Eve. Note that Eve’s channel is quite
different from Bob’s. In the general case, it is therefore possible that the order of strength of the
encoding levels, from Eve’s perspective, is not the same as that given by Bob’s perspective. For
example, for a code with 7 levels Bob might be able to decode only levels 1, 2, 3, 4, while Eve may
be able to perfectly decode only levels 1, 4, 6, 7. In this case, we can re-order the levels from Eve’s
perspective, as 1, 4, 6, 7, 2, 3, 5. The first four levels are decodable by Eve perfectly, the next two
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FIGURE 5.8. BMW encoding method – most general case, when 1 ∈ Ine.
are decodable by Bob, but not by Eve, and the last level is decodable by neither. Hence, only levels
2 and 3 can be used for generating the secret key.
For the general case, we shall denote the ordered set of indices corresponding to the encoding
levels specified by their rates in (5.21)-(5.23) by I , and the set of indices corresponding to the
order of strength of the encoding levels from Eve’s perspective by Î . There exists a bijection
(i.e. a re-ordering) B : I → Î , defined as follows: (1) the set of indices (in arbitrary order)
corresponding to levels that are perfectly decodable by Eve is denoted Ie; (2) the set of indices
(in arbitrary order) corresponding to levels that are not perfectly decodable by Eve, but perfectly
decodable by Bob is denoted Ik; (3) the set of indices (in arbitrary order) corresponding to levels
that are not perfectly decodable by either Eve or Bob is denoted In; (4) the ordered set Î is
defined as
Î = {Ie,Ik,In}. (5.25)
Furthermore, we define Ine = {Ik,In} as the set of indices corresponding to encoding levels
which are not perfectly decodable by Eve. The method of encoding is described in Figure 5.8.
Theorem 5.6 below provides the achievable secret key rate for the general case.
202
Theorem 5.6. Suppose that Eve picks a strategy q ∈ [qi−1, qi) over a frame. Then an achievable
secret key rate is
Rk,i =
∑
j∈Ik
[Rj −RE,j], (5.26)
where:
• Rj are defined as in (5.21)-(5.23) for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
• RE,j, j ∈ Ine are selected such that they satisfy the following set of conditions:
RE,1 ≥ 0.5R1 (5.27)
if 1 ∈ Ine,
RE,j ≤ Rj, (5.28)
∑
j∈S
RE,j ≤ qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S (1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
)]
, (5.29)
for any subsetS of Ine, and
∑
j∈Ine
RE,j = qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
∑
j∈Ine(1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
)]− ², (5.30)
with ² positive and arbitrarily close to zero.
The expressions in (5.29) and (5.30) use the convention αn = 0. Note that the bijection B defined
above also depends on Eve’s strategy q, and hence on the interval i to which q belongs. Therefore,
the set of indices Ik depends on i.
Proof. The proof is based on two observations. First, we have already shown that if the secret
message is not a meaningful one, the binning of Wyner’s scheme can be done at the end of the
transmission, when the statistical properties of Eve’s channel are known to both Bob and (through
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feedback) to Alice. To accomplish this, both Alice and Bob will have to memorize a set of “bin-
ning recipes”, one for each possible value of Eve’s strategy (actually only the interval [qi−1, qi) to
which q belongs, and not the exact value of q, matters in our case). This is a bit different from
Wyner’s original scheme [12] where only one such recipe needed to be memorized. Therefore, in
the remainder of the proof, we can and shall treat the encoding as if Eve’s channel were known to
all parties in advance, without losing any generality.
Second, we shall “encode” a secret key K =
⋃
j∈IneKj into all encoding levels j belonging to
Ine, i.e. over both Ik and In, although Bob cannot decode the levels of In. We shall prove that
the whole key K is secret to Eve. Then, following a simple argument in [2], it is straightforward
to see that this also implies the secrecy of
⋃
j∈Ik Kj , which can actually be decoded and used by
Bob.
We use a separate secret key encoding for each of Alice’s encoding levels in Ine. As a conse-
quence, Eve sees a fast fading multiple access channel, where the transmitters have different power
constraints, but the same channel coefficient. In this context, we note that the conditions set forth
for the rates Rj,E in (5.29) and (5.30) are exactly the conditions necessary for these rates to belong
to the boundary of the capacity region of Eve’s equivalent multiple access channel. The problem
of a multiple access eavesdropper AWGN channel was discussed in [2]. However, neither the main
results, nor the method of encoding of [2] are correct. We provide a simple explanation of this
assertion in Section 5.6. Therefore, we continue with describing a correct encoding method which
yields an achievable secret key rate.
For any level of encoding j ∈ Ine, we encode a secret key Kj according to Wyner’s scheme
[12], [15]. That is, if j 6= 1, we randomly bin the randomly generated N -dimensional codebook
of 2NRj codewords into 2N(Rj−RE,j) bins. The secret message corresponds to the index of the bin,
while the exact codeword in the bin is randomly picked. The rates RE,j are selected as in the
statement of the theorem. If j = 1 ∈ Ine (recall that codebook 1 was already binned once), Bob
generates the bins in two steps: first he identifies the 2N(R1−Rs) bins used for transmitting Alice’s
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encrypted message, and then he randomly groups these bins into 2N(R1−RE,1) larger bins. A secret
message is encoded into the indices of the resulting larger bins.
Denote the resulting N -dimensional output sequence of level j byXj , and denote the p-the com-
ponent of Xj by Xj(p). Also denote the union of the N -sequences from all levels (including those
from Ie which do not carry a secret key) by X =
⋃
j∈ bI Xj . The notation X(p) now denotes the
n-dimensional set consisting of the p-th components of the output sequences from every encod-
ing level, that is X(p) =
⋃
j∈ bI Xj(p). Eve’s received sequence is now Z = HW ·∑j∈ bI Xj +Q,
whereHW is the N -dimensional vector of channel realizations corresponding to the N symbols,Q
is Eve’s N -dimensional additive white Gaussian noise sequence , and (·) denotes component-wise
multiplication. The p-th scalar components of these vectors will be denoted by Z(p), HW (p) and
Q(p), respectively. The notationXS will be used for the union of the output sequences correspond-
ing to levels with indices in S , i.e. XS =
⋃
j∈S Xj , and the notation for the p-th components is
extended correspondingly.
Eve’s equivocation about the secret key can be written as follows
∆ =
H(K|Z,HW )
H(K)
=
H(K,Z,HW )−H(Z,HW )
H(K)
(a)
=
=
H(K) +H(Z,HW ,X|K)−H(X|Z,HW ,K)−H(Z,HW )
H(K)
(b)
=
=
H(K) +H(Z,HW |X,K) +H(X|K)−H(X|Z,HW ,K)−H(Z,HW )
H(K)
=
= 1− I(X;Z,HW )− I(X;Z,HW |K)
H(K)
, (5.31)
where both (a) and (b) result from the chain rule for entropy.
Denote D = I(X;Z,HW )− I(X;Z,HW |K). We can now write
I(X;Z,HW ) = H(XIe) +H(XIne)−H(XIe |Z,HW )−H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ), (5.32)
H(X|K) = H(XIe) +H(XIne|K), (5.33)
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and
H(X|Z,HW ,K) = H(XIe |Z,HW ,K) +H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ,K) ≤
≤ H(XIe |Z,HW ) +H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ,K), (5.34)
where we used the fact that {Xj : j ∈ I } are all independent of each other, and that condi-
tioning reduces entropy. Substituting (5.32)-(5.34) in the expression of D above, and noting that
H(XIne) = H(XIne|XIe), we obtain
D ≤ I(XIne ;Z,HW |XIe)−H(XIne|K) +H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ,K). (5.35)
By the code construction, and recalling that the rates Rj,E in the statement of the theorem are
picked such that they belong to the boundary of the capacity region of Eve’s equivalent multiple
access channel, we can use Fano’s inequality and the arguments of [12], to upper bound
H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ,K) ≤ |Ine|NδN , (5.36)
where |Ine| ≤ n < ∞ is the cardinality of Ine, and δN → 0 as N → ∞. This is quite intuitive,
since given the secret key, the other information is transmitted by Alice using codes which are
good for Eve’s multiple access channel. In fact δN is an upper bound on the probabilities of error
for any of these individual codes. Since the random, complementary-to-the-secret-key information
is carried by these codes at a total rate almost equal to the capacity of the virtual MAC between
Alice and Eve, corresponding to the encoding levels in Ine, we also have
H(XIne|K) = NqEhW
[
log
(
1 +
∑
j∈Ine(1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
]
−N². (5.37)
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To upper bound the first term on the right hand side of (5.35), we write
I(XIne ;Z,HW |XIe) = H(Z,HW |XIe)−H(Z,HW |XI )
(a)
=
= H(Z,HW |XIe)−NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XI (p))
(b)
≤
≤ NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XIe(p))−NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XI (p)) =
= NI(XIne(p);Z(p),HW (p)|XIe(p))
(c)
≤
≤ NqEhW
[
log
(
1 +
∑
j∈Ine(1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
]
. (5.38)
Equality in (a) follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless, (b) follows from the chain
rule for entropy and the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and (c) is obtained by
using Jensen’s inequality, as in the proof of the converse to the AWGN channel coding theorem in
Section 9.2. of [48].
Putting together (5.36), (5.37) and (5.38), we obtain
D ≤ N(²+ |Ine|δN), (5.39)
which in turn implies
∆ ≥ 1−N ²+ |Ine|δN
H(K)
. (5.40)
We have thus proved that the key K remains secret from Eve as long as the codeword length N
goes to infinity. However, note that the entire key K cannot be understood by Bob. In fact, Bob
and Alice can only agree on the part KIk of the key. But the secrecy of the entire key guarantees
the secrecy of any part of the key [2]. For the sake of completeness, we restate the following proof
from [2].
H(KIk |Z,HW )
(a)
= H(KIne|Z,HW )−H(KIn|KIk ,Z,HW )
(b)
≥
≥ H(K)−N(²+ |Ine|δN)−H(KIn |KIk ,Z,HW )
(c)
≥
≥ H(KIk) +H(KIn)−N(²+ |Ine|δN)−H(KIn |KIk ,Z,HW )
(d)
≥
≥ H(KIk)−N(²+ |Ine|δN), (5.41)
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where (a) follows from the chain rule, (b) from (5.40) and the definition of ∆, (c) from the inde-
pendence of the keys from different encoding levels, and (d) from the fact that conditioning does
not increase entropy.
This results in
H(KIk |Z,HW )
H(KIk)
≥ 1−N ²+ |Ine|δN
H(KIk)
→ 1 as N →∞. (5.42)
We have seen the best achievable secret key rate if q ∈ [qi−1, qi). The next theorem provides
Eve’s optimal strategy under the maximin scenario, and also Alice’s best achievable secrecy rate.
Theorem 5.7. (1) If Eve chooses a strategy q ∈ [qi−1, qi), then it is optimal for her to choose q
arbitrarily close to qi.
(2) Eve’s optimal strategy under the maximin scenario is the same over all frames.
(3) Denote the achievable secret key rates by {Rk,i : i = 1, 2, . . . , n}, where Rk,i is the best
achievable secret key rate given by Theorem 5.6, under q = qi. Then Eve’s optimal strategy is
qiopt = argminqi{Rk,i}, if minqi{Rk,i} < 0.5R1, and qiopt = q1, otherwise.
(4) Under Eve’s optimal strategy, the maximum achievable secrecy rate (under the current setup)
is
Rs = min{0.5R1, Rk,iopt}. (5.43)
(5) There is no loss of performance incurred by restricting the rate of the encrypted message to
Rs ≤ 0.5R1 in (5.24).
Proof. (1) Using Theorem 5.6, it is easy to check that, given q ∈ [qi−1, qi), the achievable secret
key rate is a decreasing function of q. Therefore, if q ∈ [qi−1, qi), Eve’s optimal strategy is to pick
q arbitrarily close to qi.
(2),(3),(4) We have already seen that the rate at which the encrypted message is transmitted is
restricted to Rs ≤ 0.5R1. If minqi{Rk,i} is achieved by qiopt and is less than 0.5R1, then switching
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to a different Eve’s strategy qd will only increase the rate of generation of the secret key, and hence
the rate of transmission of the encrypted message. On the other hand, if minqi{Rk,i} ≥ 0.5R1, then
no matter what Eve’s strategy is, the secrecy rate will always equal 0.5R1.
(5) Alice has to protect the encrypted message against jamming. But if Eve chooses to constantly
play a strategy q ∈ [0, q1), Bob will only be able to decode level 1 of the code. This message,
transmitted at a maximum rate of R1, has to carry an encrypted message and generate a secret
key, simultaneously. But if Eve’s strategy remains in [0, q1) over the next frames, the rate of the
encrypted message cannot exceed 0.5R1 – there would not be enough secret key bits to encrypt it.
Therefore, the strategy q ∈ [0, q1) can function as a “default” state for Eve, where she could take
refuge if the achievable secrecy rate under any other strategy exceeded 0.5R1.
Theorems 5.6 and 5.7 above offer a good description of the achievable secrecy rates. However,
in Theorem 5.6 we assumed that the set Ine of indices corresponding to the levels that are not
perfectly decodable by Eve is readily available. However, the characterization of the set Ine and
its complementIe is not straightforward. At this time, we conjecture that these sets can be found as
follows. The reasons behind our conjecture, as well as the reasons why it remains just a conjecture,
are presented in Section 5.7.
Conjecture 5.8. The maximal set of indices Ie corresponding to the levels that are perfectly
decodable by Eve is the largest of the sets Ve for which∑
j∈S
Rj ≤ qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S (1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N +
∑
i∈V ce (1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhW
)]
, ∀S ⊆ Ve, (5.44)
where V ce is the complement of Ve with respect to Î
On the complexity of the algorithm
Our results so far facilitate the computation of an achievable secrecy rate, given a partition of
the interval [0, 1] expressed in terms of the parameters {q1, q2, . . . , qn−1}, and a power allocation
between the encoding levels, given by the parameters {α1, α2, . . . , αn−1}. If Alice and Bob wish
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to exploit the full secrecy capabilities of the model, they should first perform a maximization of
the achievable secrecy rate with respect to the parameters {(qi, αi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
Although the optimization problem requires a high complexity numerical algorithm (recall that
for each value of the parameter vector {(qi, αi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1} we need to find the setIne as
in the above Conjecture, which involves combinatorial complexity), it needs to be solved only once
for the desired value of n. The optimal parameters may then be stored at both legitimate parties.
In an effort to reduce the complexity of the algorithm, we propose to pick the parameters {(qi) :
i = 1, . . . , n−1} such that {q0, q1, q2, . . . , qn−1, qn} are all equally spaced, which corresponds to a
uniform partition (or “quantization”) of the interval [0, 1]. With this rule in place, the optimization
needs to be performed only over the (n − 1) parameters α1, . . . , αn−1, hence the complexity is
reduced by half.
From our numerical results for n = 2 and n = 3 (see Figure 5.11), the loss of optimality due
to the uniform partition of [0, 1] is not very significant. We believe that, as n increases, this loss of
performance should become negligible. Our remark is based on the fact that as n→∞ the optimal
partition of the interval [0, 1] approaches a uniform partition (with a vanishing step).
5.3.2 Numerical Results
In Figures 5.9 and 5.10 we show the improvement of our BMW secrecy encoding scheme over the
worst-case scenario approach of (5.19). Note that if Eve’s channel coefficient is close (statistically)
to Bob’s – the case of Figure 5.9 – the worst-case approach of (5.19) – or equivalently the case
n = 1 – cannot achieve a positive secrecy rate.
However, even by Wyner’s pure scheme (5.19) in Figure5.10 can achieve a positive secrecy rate
if λW > λM(1 + Jσ2N ), as discussed in Section 5.3. The merit of our novel encoding scheme is sig-
nificant. The minimax solution of Section 5.2 is given in both Figures 5.9 and 5.10 for comparison.
Figure 5.11 depicts the performance of the BMW secrecy encoding scheme when the partition
of the interval [0, 1] into intervals of the form [qi−1, q1) is done uniformly, i.e. the parameters
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FIGURE 5.9. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme. Exponentially distributed
channel coefficients with λM = 0.3, λW = 0.8, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
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FIGURE 5.10. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme. Exponentially distributed
channel coefficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 1.5, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
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FIGURE 5.11. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme, with uniform and with
optimized partition of the interval [0, 1]. Exponentially distributed channel coefficients with λM = 0.2,
λW = 1.5, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
q0, q1, q2, . . . , qn are equally spaced, instead of being picked in an optimal way. We note that the
degradation of the achievable secrecy rates is quite small and decreasing as n increases. Figures
5.12 and 5.13 show the design parameters used for obtaining the results of Figure 5.11.
5.4 Conclusions
We have seen how an active eavesdropper can seriously decrease the achievable secrecy rate in a
classical scenario of a fast-fading AWGN channel with an eavesdropper. We have described both
the best-case and the worst-case scenario formulations of the problem in which the objective is the
achievable secrecy rate.
While the best-case scenario formulation is given mostly for completeness and comparison pur-
poses, the importance of the worst-case scenario scenario should not be underestimated. This sce-
nario models the most conservative and most practical approach to the active eavesdropper.
We have seen that, in order to take advantage of the non-duplex nature of the eavesdropper’s
terminal, we need a more elaborate, block-Markov Wyner encoding scheme. While in the classical
eavesdropper scenario the legitimate receiver is completely passive, our scheme relies heavily on
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the cooperation of the receiver. That means that at the end of each frame, Bob is required to
feed back to Alice information about Eve’s strategy, and then, based on this information, replicate
Alice’s efforts to distill a secret key.
The improvement of our BMW scheme over the passive-receiver solution to the maximin sce-
nario is significant.
5.5 Additional Results. A Useful Lemma
The following lemma is used several times in this chapter.
Lemma 5.9. The function
f(q) = q log(1 + x) + (1− q) log
(
1 +
x
1 + y
1−q
)
, (5.45)
where x, y > 0, is strictly increasing and strictly convex as a function of q.
Proof. It is straightforward to compute
df(q)
dq
= log
(
(1 + x)
1 + y
1−q
1 + x+ y
1−q
)
− xy
1− q ·
1
(1 + y
1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
, (5.46)
and
d2f(q)
dq2
=
xy
(1−q)2
(1 + y
1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
·
[
1−
1 + x− ( y
(1−q))
2
(1 + y
1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
]
. (5.47)
Since 1 + y
1−q > 1 and 1 + x− ( y(1−q))2 < 1 + x+ y1−q , we can state that d
2f(q)
dq2
> 0. Therefore,
df(q)
dq
is a strictly increasing function of q. But evaluating the first derivative in q = 0 we get
df
dq
(0) = log
(
(1 + x)(1 + y)
1 + x+ y
)
− xy
(1 + y)(1 + x+ y)
=
= log
(
1 +
xy
1 + x+ y
)
− xy
(1 + x+ y)(1 + y)
(a)
≥
≥ xy
(1 + x)(1 + y)
− xy
(1 + x+ y)(1 + y)
(b)
> 0, (5.48)
where inequality (a) follows from log(1 + β) > β
1+β
for any β > −1, β 6= 0, if we replace
β = xy
1+x+y
, while inequality (b) follows since x > 0. Therefore df(q)
dq
is always strictly positive and
strictly increasing, which implies that f(q) is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
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5.6 Additional Results. Why the Encoding Method of [2] Is
Incorrect
The encoding method of [2] uses a separate secret message encoding for each user, much like our
own encoding scheme. However, unlike the present chapter, the secrecy encoding of [2] employs a
“superposition encoding scheme” (see Section III of [2]). In the following paragraphs, we provide
a brief description of this technique.
Take one user with power constraint P . The user generates two independent codebooks, in the
following manner: the first codebook contains 2NRs N -dimensional codewords, and each letter
of each codeword is independently generated, according to the realization of a Gaussian random
variable of zero mean and variance αP ; the second codebook contains 2NR0 N -dimensional code-
words, and each letter of each codeword is independently generated, according to the realization
of a Gaussian random variable of zero mean and variance (1 − α)P . The secret message – trans-
mitted at rate Rs – picks a codeword from the first codebook, while another codeword is randomly
picked from the second codebook. The message transmitted by this user is the summation of the
two codewords.
At a first glance, it appears that the transmitted message belongs to a codebook of 2N(Rs+R0)
N -dimensional codewords, in which each letter of each codeword is the realization of a Gaussian
random variable of variance P . Moreover, the codebook is already binned, like in Wyner’s scheme
[12].
However, if the transmitted message is completely decodable by Bob, the rates Rs andR0 should
be situated within the corresponding MAC rate region. For example, if we had a Gaussian eaves-
dropper channel where the AWGN variances were 1 for both channels, while the absolute squared
channel coefficients are 1 for the main channel and hk for the eavesdropper’s channel, the rates
should satisfy Rs ≤ log [1 + αP ], R0 ≤ log [1 + (1− α)P ], and Rs + R0 ≤ log [1 + P ]. But the
first two conditions do not appear in [2].
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Even if these conditions were satisfied, the “superposition encoding scheme” of [2] is not equiv-
alent to Wyner’s scheme. The key to Wyner’s scheme is that each bin makes a “good” codebook
for the eavesdropper. That is, given the secret key and the eavesdropper’s received message, the
bin chosen by the secret key conveys information to the eavesdropper at a rate arbitrarily close to
the eavesdropper’s channel capacity.
For the same toy model as above, the rate of each bin should be arbitrarily close to log [1 + Phk].
However, under the “superposition encoding scheme” of [2], this rate cannot exceed log [1 + αPhk]2.
To achieve the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel, α would need to be arbitrarily close to 1. But
then the codebook associated with the secret message would be generated with arbitrarily small
power. If a positive secrecy rate Rs is still desired, the intelligibility of the secret message at the
legitimate receiver is compromised. Therefore, the “superposition encoding scheme” of [2] cannot
work for secrecy encoding.
Also, we believe that the specification of the achievable rate region for the GGMAC-WT of [2]
is too restrictive. This is because a subset S – the complement of which is denoted by S c – of
users with powers Pk and transmitting at rates Rk is not necessarily decodable by Eve if
∑
k∈S
Rk < log
[
1 +
∑
k∈S Pkhk
1 +
∑
j∈S c Pjhj
]
, (5.49)
as suggested by condition (28) of [2]. In fact, it is possible to transmit a secret message over the
GGMAC-WT of [2] even if ∑k∈K Pk < ∑k∈K Pkhk, where K denotes the set of all users,
as in [2]. E.g., imagine a two-user scenario, where user 1 has a large channel coefficient h1 >>
1 to the eavesdropper, while user 2 has a channel coefficient h2 < 1. It is intuitive that under
these circumstances a secret message may still be transmitted by user 2, since the eavesdropper’s
extremely good channel from user 1 cannot yield any additional information about user 2.
2Note that although the second codebook has a rate equal to log [1 + Phk] in [2], this rate is not sustainable by the eavesdropper’s channel with
power constraint αP .
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FIGURE 5.14. The capacity region of a MAC.
5.7 Additional Results. About Our Conjecture on the
Maximal Set of Perfectly Decodable Encoding Levels
As we stated earlier, from Eve’s point of view, the different encoding levels are very similar to
different users. Therefore, Eve’s channel can be seen as a multiple access channel (MAC), with n
users, each with a different power, but all sharing the same channel coefficient. However, to the
best of our knowledge, in the current literature there is no treatment of the achievable rate region
for a set of users when the other users are not decodable.
As an example, we look at the two-user Gaussian MAC, the capacity region of which is given in
Figure 5.14. Denote the two user’s N -dimensional transmitted sequences by X1 and X2, respec-
tively, and the received sequence by Z = X1+X2+Q, where Q is a sequence of i.i.d. realizations
of a Gaussian random variable of variance σ2N .
Let the capacity of the first user’s channel (when user 2 is absent) be C1 = log(1+P1/σ2N), and
the capacity of the second user’s channel (when user 1 is absent) be C2 = log(1 + P2/σ2N). We
know that the achievable rate region is given by all pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ C1, (5.50)
R2 ≤ C2, (5.51)
and
R1 +R2 ≤ log(1 + (P1 + P2)/σ2N). (5.52)
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This implies that when user 2 transmits at a rate R2 = C2, user 1 should be decoded by treating
the second user as white Gaussian noise, and by performing successive interference cancellation.
Hence, under this scenario, the first user’s maximum decodable transmission rate is R1 = log(1 +
P1/(σ
2
N + P2)).
We know that user 1 can always be decoded if the pair of rates (R1, R2) falls within region Ω2
of Figure 5.14, and similarly, user 2 can be decoded if (R1, R2) is in Ω1. It is also clear that no user
is decodable in region Ω5. We are now concerned with the regions Ω3 and Ω4 in Figure 5.14.
For example, when user 2 cannot be decoded because R2 > C2, but it still uses a randomly
generated Gaussian codebook, the first user’s maximum decodable transmission rate may be larger
than log(1 + P1/(σ2N + P2)). To justify this statement, consider the following “decoding” method.
First, a list of possible codewords is computed for user 2, by treating user 1 as interference, and
selecting only those codewords of the second user’s codebook that have a non-zero a posteriori
probability. This list may be shorter than the second user’s whole codebook, and the a posteriori
probability of the codewords therein may be non-uniform. Then, using this information about user
2, we attempt decoding for user 1. At this moment, we cannot state that this method is no better
than the one which treats user 2 as interference.
However, our conjecture is equivalent to stating that the optimal strategy for user 1 is to treat user
2 as interference. We base our conjecture on the following arguments. It is clear that if R2 = C2−²,
even if we do not aim at decoding user 2, the maximum achievable rate of user 1 is still log(1 +
P1/(σ
2
N +P2)). To see this, suppose user 1 were decodable at a rate R1 > log(1+P1/(σ2N +P2)).
Then the receiver could subtract the first user’s signal from the received sequence, and decode for
user 2. Note that decoding for user 2 is possible with high probability, since this user employs a
randomly generated Gaussian codebook, with a rate less than the capacity C2. Hence, we would
obtain a pair of rates outside the capacity region [48]. (This comment can also serve to prove that
no user is decodable if (R1, R2) is in ΩN of Figure 5.14.) On the other hand, as R2 increases, the
size of the “list” we might be able to compute for user 2 grows (exponentially with R2). Hence, we
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expect that at some point this list will become useless for decoding the first user. Eventually this
will result in user 1 treating user 2 as interference.
219
Chapter 6
Future Work
While working on the problems treated in the previous chapters, we ran across many intriguing
questions. Although some were answered and presented in this dissertation, several more remain
on our open-problem list. In this final chapter we briefly discuss those which will most probably
become the focus of our research in the near future.
6.1 The Converse to the Channel Coding Theorem and
Transmission at Rates Larger than the Channel Capacity
Due to the nature of the physical layer secrecy problem, transmission has to take place at a rate
larger than the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. In the eavesdropper channel model the emerg-
ing uncertainty phenomenon is studied in the context of Wyner’s special encoding scheme [12].
However, we have often faced the problem of quantifying the receiver’s uncertainty about the trans-
mitted message under a general (non-secrecy) channel encoding scheme with rate exceeding the
channel capacity.
The problem is usually avoided in the related literature. Although sharing similarities with the
concept of list decoding [49], the implications of this problem are quite deeper. For example,
a simple study of the bounds on the error probability [45], [48] shows that for a random code
with rate larger than capacity, both upper and lower bounds approach 1 as the codeword length
approaches infinity. As a consequence, we believe that transmission might be possible at rates
higher than capacity, with acceptable (but non-vanishing) codeword error probability, as long as
the codeword length is not infinitely large.
One of our most recent encounters with this problem is the specification of the achievable rates
under a multiple access channel (MAC) scenario, when not all of the users are perfectly decodable
(see Appendix 5.7 in Chapter 5).
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6.2 Multiuser Extensions of the Active Eavesdropper Channel
Model
As a continuation of our work in Chapter 5, we are planning to extend the active eavesdropper
channel model to multiuser scenarios. These extensions would eventually drive our research to-
wards cooperative jamming and eavesdropping strategies, as we have already mentioned when we
described “the big picture” in Chapter 1.
6.3 Optimal Transmitter-Receiver Collaboration for Secrecy
Although our results in Chapters 4 and 5 describe novel techniques to improve the achievable
secrecy rates by allowing the legitimate parties to work together, we have not yet formulated any
optimality statements. Both the feedback-based secrecy encoding scheme of Chapter 4 and our
BMW scheme in Chapter 5 are suboptimal for several reasons described therein. One common
reson is that the secrecy capacity of an eavesdropper channel with feedback is currently unknown.
We are planning to investigate the optimal collaborative strategies that maximize the secrecy rate.
We believe this might be related to the notion of physical layer secrecy in two-way channels.
6.4 Secrecy and the Rate of Convergence
In the treatment of channel coding [45], the random coding exponent describes the speed at which
the average error probability of random codes approaches zero as the codeword length increases.
The practical importance of this concept is obvious: in a practical scenario, where the codeword
length can be large, but not infinite, the random coding exponent provides an indication of what an
“acceptable” codeword length is, with respect to the achievable average error probability. We intend
to define and formalize a similar concept for physical layer secrecy. Our “secrecy exponent” would
show how fast the conditional entropy of the secret message, given the eavesdropper’s received
sequence, approaches the unconditioned entropy of the secret message, as the codeword length
increases. We believe that this kind of framework will bring the physical layer secrecy one step
closer to practical implementation.
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6.5 Secrecy in Slow-Fading Channels
To the best of our knowledge, the current literature deals with secrecy in slow-fading channels in
two ways. The first direction, represented by papers like [23], [25] or [24], assumes that, although
the fading is slow, the application exhibits enough delay tolerance to consider the channel ergodic.
In other words, piece-wise encoding is performed on the sub-blocks of a codeword, such that fading
is slow over each such sub-block. Moreover, it is assumed that there are enough sub-blocks in a
codeword to exhibit the ergodic properties of the channel. The drawbacks of this direction have
been clearly specified in Chapter 5.
A second, more natural direction is represented by papers like [26] and [27], where the slow
fading channel is also delay constrained. Under these assumptions, there is no way to guarantee ei-
ther the secrecy or the intelligibility (by the legitimate receiver) of a secret message under Wyner’s
encoding scheme [12]. Therefore, [26] and [27] both introduce the notion of secrecy outage. How-
ever, we see this notion as an oxymoron. Sticking to the notion of “perfect secrecy”, under the
scenario where some secret messages will inevitably be compromised, seems somewhat artificial.
We believe that a more appropriate objective for the scenario of slow-fading, delay-constrained
channels would be a secrecy mask. We define a secrecy mask as a pair of ordered sets: a set
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of probabilities, such that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1, and a set D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} of
equivocation values, such that 0 < d1 < d2 < . . . < dn < 1. To meet the specifications of the
mask means to make sure that Pr{∆ ≤ di} ≤ pi ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where ∆ is the equivocation of
a secret message, defined as the ratio between the conditional entropy of the secret message, given
the eavesdropper’s received sequence, and the unconditioned entropy of the secret message.
We see this as the most practical approach to secrecy in slow-fading channels so far. However,
our secrecy mask approach raises some more questions, which remain open at this time. One of
them is what are the actual implications of non-perfect secrecy on the intelligibility of the secret
message.
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6.6 Non-Perfect Secrecy
In the early ’90s, [50] notes for the first time that Wyner’s notion of secrecy [12] may not be
the strongest. Indeed, as [50] points out, Wyner’s secrecy definition reduces to 1
k
H(Kk|Zn) >
H(K) − ², for an arbitrarily small ², as n, k → ∞, where k is the length of the secret message
Kk, and n is the length of the eavesdropper’s received codeword Zn. Here, the secret message is a
sequence of i.i.d. symbols, each distributed according to the random variable K. The argument in
[50] states that as n, k →∞, the amount of information about the secret message that leaks to the
eavesdropper may be significant – note that H(Kk) − H(Kk|Zn) < k². Therefore, they propose
the notion of “strong secrecy”, defined as H(Kk|Zn) > H(Kk)− ² as n, k →∞.
Our questions about the argument in [50] are what does significant leakage mean in the first
place and how can the eavesdropper use this information. These two questions also hold for the
previously discussed slow-fading channel scenario.
We believe that non-perfect secrecy, for example an equivocation ∆ = H(K
k|Zn)
H(Kk)
= 0.9, may
lead to the eavesdropper’s ability to generate a list of messages (perhaps smaller than the whole
codebook that the legitimate parties use), with different (a posteriori) probabilities of having been
transmitted. This would be related to the problem of list decoding in [49].
Even if the eavesdropper could perfectly decode part of the secret message, this information
might not be enough to understand the meaning of the overall secret message. For example, if
the secure transmission of a page of text through multiple channel codewords is desired, and if a
simple interleaving procedure is performed before channel encoding, compromising the secrecy of
the message over only one codeword may reveal several letters randomly spread on the page. But
this would by no means render the content of the page intelligible to the eavesdropper.
We believe that some light needs to be shed on the link between the imperfect secrecy and the
eavesdropper’s intelligibility of the message, and this subject is on our immediate research agenda.
In this short section we talked about the meaning and the intelligibility of the message. We believe
that in order to explore these notions, we first need to link our information theoretical problem to
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a different area, which is strongly connected to the field of communications as part of electrical
engineering: human communication, or semantics.
6.7 On Semantics and Its Implications in Communications
Engineering
By definition, “semantics” is the study of the meaning or relationship of meanings of a sign or
set of signs. Since the objective of communications – as part of electrical engineering – is to
facilitate the transmission of meaningful messages at long distance, the composition and structure
of those messages can be used to develop a better understanding of the concepts we use regularly
in engineering.
This fact has been understood from the first mathematical formulation of the theory behind
source and channel coding. Source coding itself is concerned with reducing the redundancy in a
message, such that the size of that message is minimized for efficient storage or transmission over
a channel [48]. The extent to which the size of a message can be reduced by source coding, such
that it can be reproduced from its encoded version, up to some distortion constraint, is studied by
the rate distortion theory [48].
However, the rate distortion theory, and the measures of distortion used therein for a particu-
lar type of message, are primarily concerned with the quality of the reproduction. At the other
end, when looking at source coding from the security point of view, we are more interested in the
converse problem: what is the minimum distortion necessary to render the reproduction unintelli-
gible. We believe that the concept of “unintelligibility” is vital to leading the field of information-
theoretic secrecy towards practical implementation. Until this concept is defined, the only notion
of secrecy that makes sense is that of “perfect strong secrecy” [49].
This is the motivation behind our goal to extend the applicability of physical-layer secrecy by
launching our own cross-disciplinary research, and incorporating concepts from semantics and
hermeneutics (the study of interpretation theory) into the already-existing engineering framework.
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